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Restructuring: Complaint Writer Found to be Extortionist

18010361 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Apr 88 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Lt Col N. Belan, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondent: "Behind the Shield of Complaints"]

[Text] How could I anticipate the kind of man that Apanasenko is! Taisiya Maksimovna smiles wryly. In her voice is neither pain, nor indignation, and what was there for her to be indignant about? In large measure she herself was at fault. But, she could not conceal her surprise, her bitter surprise.

"But Aleksey Ivanovich asserts that your words are slander, and that you have no proof," I tell her.

"Isn't he ashamed?" Said the woman with astonishment. "And the letters he wrote me? In them is the proof. When I went to Stavropol I submitted them to the military prosecutor's office, and now they are in the school. However, for some reason Aleksey Ivanovich got away with everything."

If she only knew what a long echo her visit has.

I became acquainted last year with Retired Lt Col A. Apanasenko, about whom Taisiya Maksimovna (she requested that her last name not be used) spoke. It was when I was collecting material for a feature story on Col B. Averin (recently promoted to major general aviation), chief of the Stavropol Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots and Navigators imeni Mar Avn V. A. Sudets, who was a delegate to the 27th CPSU Congress.

Apanasenko himself requested the meeting in order to tell me something important. He arrived, dignified, with a proud bearing and head of gray hair. He got to his main point immediately: how bad Averin was, and how difficult it was for him, Apanasenko, to expose the chief of the school.

I had heard much about Averin. People spoke of him as an honorable, honest man, and an excellent pilot and pedagogue. "He is an innovator, and a devotee of restructuring," stated his superiors and subordinates.

Apanasenko, senior laboratory assistant in one of the school faculties, had a different opinion. He showered the central and local organs with letters, stating that Averin misused his official position, squandered state funds, and that his reputation was falling daily. Repeatedly people came to look in to this complaints.

"The first deputy commander-in-chief gave an explanation to Aleksey Ivanovich, and the commander-in-chief of Troops of Air Defense met with him," recently stated

Maj Gen Avn V. Yelchanikov, deputy chief of PVO [Air Defense] aviation for political affairs. "And we told Apanasenko many times that his accusations of Averin were unfounded."

However, this was clear from the results of checks back during our first meeting with Apanasenko. And I told him this.

"You do not want to understand me," he became offended and left.

And new complaints came, from the man who "like none of the other veterans of the war and labor working with us tries selflessly everyday to do good for the school that has become his home." This is how Apanasenko describes himself. Well, everyone is entitled to have his own opinion of himself. Only don't sin against the truth. And Aleksey Ivanovich is sometimes at variance with it.

"I traversed the path from an ordinary pilot to commander of a guards heavy bomber regiment," he says.

However, this is, I am sorry to say, not entirely so. His last duty position was as deputy regiment commander for flight training.

"War injuries trouble me relentlessly," exclaims Apanasenko pathetically.

But here is a note from his personnel record: "Has no wounds or concussions."

He was certified as a war participant based on the fact that the first VDV [Airborne] training glider regiment, in which he served on active military duty from 1942 through 1943, entered the active army.

"I always try to do good for people, and be honest," Apanasenko invariably emphasizes.

Probably he forgot about his adventures, when before working at the school he was a house manager. Let us refer to the materials of his first personnel record. "Apanasenko seduced my wife," we read the statement of Vitaliy Sergeyevich Z. "He entered into a love affair with her, taking advantage of his official position and her dependence on him." "Apanasenko conducts himself dishonestly, and was crude, arrogant and even resorted to intimidation at the primary party organization buro and meeting," it was stated at a session of the Stavropol CPSU Raykom Buro.

For his immoral conduct Apanasenko was given a strict reprimand with annotation in his record card.

"To overlook the most flagrant violations and malicious shortcomings is not in my nature," believes Apanasenko.

And for what was he expelled from the party a year after he received the strict reprimand? Here is the protocol of the CPSU raykom buro session: "On the abuses of his official position, theft of state funds and violation of financial and staff discipline by former health manager Apanasenko, A. I.

Essence of the matter: Apanasenko listed non-existent people on the work roles, which enabled him to violate financial discipline and misappropriate state funds. Thus, by incomplete data, in violation of the statute on holding more than one office, 4,511 rubles were expended. Six thousand thirty one rubles were paid out to individual official workers by putting members of their families and other non-existent persons in duty positions.

Some individuals handed over the unlawfully obtained money personally to Apanasenko. Senior yardkeeper A. Shtayn alone, as she stated, handed over 1,700 rubles to him."

The pilfering house manager, as the reader already understands, was asked to leave. He found himself a position at the school. I will not say whether his then supervisors knew why Apanasenko was expelled from the party, but I know one thing. Soon Aleksey Ivanovich gained a reputation as a man who is doing much to beautify the territory of the school. He planted flowers and looked after the trees. He was in the public eye, and received more and more praise. He was asked to speak in the student auditorium, where he shared his front line reminiscences, and spoke about duty, honor and high morality.

There was a crash of thunder in October 1985. When Taisiya Maksimovna, the mother of a student expelled for lack of discipline, arrived at the school. Her story was a revelation to the new VUZ command.

They became acquainted in 1981, next to the school, where Taisiya Maksimovna was waiting for her son, a first year student. Taisiya Maksimovna told Apanasenko that she was a woman alone, who recently went on pension, and was living in Leningrad, and that Andrey was her only son. Apanasenko promised to look after him. The woman did not know how to thank him.

Soon he himself prompted her how to do this. His letters were filled with requests to buy him something and send him something else. As payment for this, he would watch after Andrey.

Of course, Taisiya Maksimovna herself does not look very attractive in this whole story. What was she thinking about, sending one "present" after another to Stavropol? How to make things better for her son? But, as a result of this "mentorship" did not Aleksey Ivanovich ruin the lad? Such lessons in dissembling he received from Apanasenko, who spoke in the school about high morals, and at the same time extracted presents from his mother.

Various products, three knitted suits...

"Why you have so many suits?" I asked Apanasenko.

"For participants in the Great Patriotic War, my acquaintances," was the answer.

"Aleksey Ivanovich," I asked him again, "and the 500 rubles that you requested of Taisiya Maksimovna?"

"I requested it, but you see I did not receive it..."

Let us not delve into the details of this story. I believe that the appropriate officials will investigate it and give an assessment. And the collective, no doubt, will not remain on the side. Aleksey Ivanovich, I hope, will not object to glasnost, all the more so in that Apanasenko fights for it so, picturing his past and present solely in heroic tones.

"To dishonest people, for slackers, rascals and time-servers, trying to create the appearance of wellbeing and imitate restructuring in every way, I am a disagreeable man," he states, listing himself as a champion of restructuring.

And what happened in the school, did they really not try to take steps, having listened to Taisiya Maksimovna? The fact is that an attempt was made. But Apanasenko immediately wrote a complaint about the chief of the school. He stated "I am struggling against shortcomings, and for this Averin wants to take vengeance against me. In short, I am a guard, good people save me from reprisals for my criticism." This worked momentarily. And already people came to look into Averin, asking, What are you up to, comrade school chief?

I am convinced that back then, two years ago, everything could have been sorted out. However, the fact that Apanasenko appealed to very high levels, from where his letters with resolutions were sent to be checked out, no doubt magically had an effect on the inspectors. And the comrades to whom it was given at first shied away. Until the Troops of Air Defense leadership finally saw that Averin was guilty of nothing.

The feature story on the school chief, and his innovativeness in his work, published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, caused Apanasenko acute dissatisfaction. Complaints were made against the author of these lines, about his inobjectivity. But, after all, Aleksey Ivanovich for some reason forgot about this fact. Knowing in advance about the appearance of the article, he wrote a letter to the editors. In order to check out my position, I had to visit the school again, go to a meeting of the party and trade union aktiv of the training department, and consult with people. I asked whether perhaps I was wrong about something in giving a favorable assessment of communist Averin, and not supporting Apanasenko's position. Only after this did the article appear. Apanasenko did not wish to take part in this open conversation.

I have already written several times about the dozens of commissions that were appointed to look into these very same complaints. There is no question that attention must be paid to each letter. But if the complaints are not borne out, why the endless chain of inquiries? Is it not time to question the responsibility, both of such complainants, and of those inspectors in the footsteps of whom come new commissions?

After all, it is no secret that some people, cloaking themselves with words about social justice, the struggle against shortcomings and for restructuring, pursue their own personal interests, and narrow, selfish goals. Of course, this cannot always be caught from letters, but it can be investigated on the ground.

Here we have Apanasenko. Why did he suddenly begin to make accusations against Averin, who at that time had just been named chief of the school? Everything started with the visit by Taisiya Maksimovna. Then rightfully the question was posed about whether Apanasenko had a place in the school. And also the trade union organization, in summing up the results of the year, decided not to confer upon Aleksey Ivanovich the title shock worker of communist labor, and this poured fat on the fire. Apanasenko was accustomed to being in favor.

"Aleksey Ivanovich," I asked him, "you call yourself an honest and just man. But why did you commit acts that, for example, caused you to be expelled from the party?"

"I was not expelled from the party, I turned over my party card myself, protesting against red-tapists, self-seekers, rascals and toadies," he answered, posturing. "Remember the years of stagnation, and how people then acted toward words of truth and glasnost, especially toward criticism."

So that is it. It turns out that Apanasenko was an honorable and pure man, who suffered for the right cause.

I have already heard the opinion many times: Is it not right to remember the people who turned out to be "inconvenient" and "unsuitable" during the years of stagnation? It is not right to justify them morally, after all someone was demoted, removed, or given a party punishment... But, as we say, on the sly former embezzlers of state property, bribe-takers and people with blots on their honor and conscience also raised their heads here. And they say that they are the innocent "victims" of stagnation.

These people have a keen sense of the situation, and try to use it to their benefit. Here we have Apanasenko, saying he is not guilty, but himself turned in his party card as, you see, a form of protest. But, did he value this card, and his membership in the party? That is the question.

Each of us has his chance in restructuring. No one absents himself from today's doings and concerns. And it is not necessary to reproach the past, if a man truly, and with all his heart, has accepted restructuring and decided to live in the new way. But direct and honest discussion is necessary with those who do not work, and bind us with fetters of demagoguery.

I speak with Andrey. Having finished his service, he returned to Leningrad, got married, and enrolled in the institute. But his dream about the sky, which he has had since his childhood, has become even sharper.

"I will appeal to Boris Arsenyevich Averin, and tell him that I cannot live without the army," says Andrey. "He is a remarkable man and must understand me. You see, I dream for my school everyday."

He tries not to remember Apanasenko.

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Moldavian CC: Reintegrating Veterans of Afghanistan

18010412 Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 14 May 88 p 1

[Unsigned Article: "On the Article, 'Only Pity is Not Necessary!' Published in the Newspaper MOLODEZH MOLDAVII"]

[Text] Having examined this article, published on 9 May of this year, the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee Buro noted that it raised important problems of the patriotic and international indoctrination of the republic population, improving the work of various services and organizations with soldiers who have completed their international duty in Afghanistan, more fully satisfying their wants and needs, and rendering daily attention and assistance to their families.

In the republic there has taken shape a system of work of party, trade union, komsomol and other special organizations, soviets of people's deputies, and economic organs who attract soldier-internationalists into indoctrination of young people, and active labor and social activity. An important role in raising the social prestige and authority of former soldier-internationalists is played by their participation in the work of social organizations. Today 22 such individuals are working in the elective leading party organs, 119 in trade union organs, and 419 in komsomol organs; 106 former soldiers have been elected deputies of soviets. At the initiative of the komsomol, work is being carried out to enter the names of soldiers that have been killed in labor collectives and student detachments, and to confer their names to schools, streets, and pioneer teams and detachments.

Definite attention is being paid to military personnel who have been declared invalids in the established procedure, as a result of wounds, shell-shock or illnesses received in the period of their service in Afghanistan. They are being issued appropriate certificates, travel passes and leaflets about benefits that are granted. They are free from payment of income tax on their wages. The families of deceased military personnel everywhere are being paid the one time allowances provided for by law; pensions for loss of the bread winner are being granted at the established times; and the questions of improving the housing conditions of soldier-internationalists and the families of those killed are being solved.

At the same time, some local party, soviet and economic organs, and trade union and komsomol organizations, are displaying indifference and bureaucratism, in solving the questions of material support and medical service for soldiers who have fulfilled their international duty. The Komratskiy, Glodyanskiy, Strashenskiy, Faleshtskiy, and a number of other party raykoms have taken a formalistic attitude toward fulfilling the instructions of the Central Committee Secretariat, Communist Party of Moldavia, concerning work with comrades who have fulfilled their international duty on the territory of the Republic of Afghanistan, and they have not taken exhaustive measures to improve it fundamentally. Here there is no precise coordination of the activity of primary party, trade union, komsomol and other social organizations, soviets of people's deputies, city and rayon military commissariats, and labor collectives to set up effective international and military-patriotic indoctrination of the population.

The question of improving the housing conditions of soldier-internationalists in the cities of Kishinev, Beltsy, Tiraspol, and Bendery, and in Dondyushanskiy, Rybnitskiy, and other rayons is being solved impermissibly slowly. More than 800 people have waited unjustifiably long on the lines for improvement of housing conditions in the republic. In a number of rayons this category of individuals is not being provided construction materials, and is encountering difficulties in obtaining free loans for individual construction. In Ungenskiy and Leovski rayons there are difficulties with enrolling the children of soldier-internationalists in children's preschool institutions. Not everywhere are exhaustive measures being taken to set up in jobs effectively soldiers discharged into the reserves. Necessary medical attention is not being given to everyone who requires it.

The Central Committee Buro acknowledged the typicality and supported the statement of the problems contained in the article, "Only Pity is Not Needed!" published in MOLODEZH MOLDAVII.

The approved resolution emphasizes that it is the paramount duty of party committees, party organizations, and soviet, trade-union and komsomol organs to become manifestations of maximum concern about the people who experienced the most grave trials in Afghanistan,

about raising the authority and social prestige of the soldier-internationalists, and about advancing the most deserving of them to work in trade unions, komsomol organs, and other social organizations. It is necessary to pay particular attention to providing them work, and to creating working and living conditions that take into account the condition of their health, and to assist them in preparing for study at higher educational institutions, improving their housing conditions, and strengthening their health and medical treatment. It is necessary to give a principled party assessment to instances of heartless attitude toward the requests and appeals of soldier-internationalists, and to their needs.

The fate of each man who has honorably fulfilled his duty, displayed high patriotism and internationalism, and fealty to his military and civic duty must be kept in mind. First of all this must be done with respect to the families and relatives of those killed, invalids, and the wounded.

Comrade M. S. Platon, deputy chairman, Council of Ministers, Moldavian SSR; Comrade B. M. Stratulat, chief of the department of science and educational institutions, Central Committee, Communist Party of Moldavia; Comrade L. A. Bolgarin, chief of the department of administrative organs, Central Committee, Communist Party of Moldavia; Comrade I. I. Buzhenitsa, first secretary, Central Committee, Moldavian Komsomol; Comrade A. S. Kishlar, republic minister of social security; and Comrade V. I. Nazarov, republic military commissar, have been charged to investigate the living, working and everyday conditions of the soldier-internationalists, and to take effective measures to provide them and the families of those killed with the established benefits fully and in a timely manner.

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Lt Gen Beldzhanov Reflects on Bilingualism, Language Training, Defense

18010441d Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 20, 21 May 88 p 3

[Article by Lt Gen I. Beldzhanov, deputy troop commander of the Belorussian Military District: "National Pride and the Russian Language"]

[20 May 88 p 3]

[Text] The foundations for resolving the national question were laid by the Great October Socialist Revolution, which destroyed once and for all national oppression and national inequality on the entire territory of the Land of the Soviets. The indissoluble friendship of the peoples of our multinational state and mutual respect for national culture and national dignity have triumphed.

I think, however, that our undisputed achievements cannot and should not create the impression of a lack of problems in the continuing and rapidly developing

national processes. They are in dialectical development, and in the development of the basic directions of national policy for the future in the union republics, autonomous republics and oblasts, I feel it is very important that there not be, either voluntarily or involuntarily, artificially created obstacles to the successful resolution of everything connected with this policy and these questions. After all, we are creating and reinforcing a qualitatively new social, economic, political, ideological, psychological and cultural unity of citizens in the first socialist state in the world.

I would like to give my opinions on this issue today. I was brought to this by my military profession and the problems that I have encountered over a span of many years.

It is well known that the Soviet armed forces are most international in national composition. Service in the ranks is a constitutional obligation for all male citizens of the USSR. At the same time, all commands, manuals, orders, directives, instructions and other documents, army newspapers and journals (although one can subscribe to periodicals in the national languages) published in the armed forces system are in Russian. And a lack of knowledge or a poor mastery of Russian understandably makes very difficult the successful training of specialists in their military fields and complicates the completion of the soldier's service. Both the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers are concerned about this, and they oblige us to improve the selection of the youths of the indigenous nationalities of the union and autonomous republics, oblasts and okrugs to the military training establishments. At the same time, young people come into the armed forces with a poor mastery of Russian, including from the republics of Central Asia and Turkmenia. I see in this the answer to the question of why there are no Turkmeni astronauts or party or state figures on an all-union or world level. There are no diplomats or military leaders. Whose fault is that?

First and foremost, our own—party, state and public figures, the creative intelligentsia. We have long had a very delicate attitude toward these issues, thinking of national interests and linking them insufficiently with international questions. The development of national-Russian and Russian-national bilingualism is an indispensable component of the national policies of the CPSU and the Soviet state, the essence of which is improving national relations on the basis of Leninist principles of a further flourishing of nations and nationalities and their steady convergence. We turn to the new edition of the CPSU program adopted by the 27th CPSU Congress. It says: "The free development and equal utilization of native languages by all citizens of the USSR will be ensured in the future as well. At the same time, the mastery of Russian along with the language of one's own nationality, freely accepted by Soviet people as a means of intercourse among nations, expands access to the achievements of science, technology and domestic and world culture."

The role of bilingualism in the life of Soviet society is increasing steadily. Proceeding from this vital fact, the party and the government have adopted decrees aimed at further improving the study and instruction of Russian and national languages at the union-republic level. This thought was specifically emphasized in the decisions of the February (1988) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee: "National and Russian bilingualism must be actively developed, the study of the national languages of the USSR must be radically improved along with the Russian language—voluntarily accepted by the Soviet people as a means of intercourse among peoples—and the practice of the joint teaching of Russian and native languages in the schools must be expanded. There must be incentives for the study of the indigenous national language by the youth of different nationalities."

There is also the noteworthy decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers that was adopted in 1983 entitled "Additional Steps to Study Russian in General Educational Schools and Other Educational Institutions in the Union Republics." Had this decree been universally fulfilled, as they say, on all counts, then every youth called up into the ranks of the army and navy would possess fluent conversational and reading skills in Russian. Matters are in fact far from that, to our great regret.

I think I would also be correct in saying that to be concerned only with improving the solution to the issue of bilingualism for the purpose of raising the level of specialists' training for the national economy and the army and navy and to raise the quality of the youth in the armed forces is to take a narrow departmental position. The question is much broader than that. Without a language for intercourse among nations, we cannot proceed along the path of a further flourishing of nations and nationalities in our multinational country or reinforce socio-economic ties.

I am in favor of the further development of national languages. At the same time, a mastery of namely the Russian language (along with the language of one's nationality) expands access to the achievements of science and technology and domestic and world culture. The deep interest of every Soviet nation and nationality is in natural international development, mutual enrichment and a reinforcement of the fraternal friendship of all peoples. A mastery of Russian in no way diminishes us and offends us, but on the contrary elevates us and immeasurably enriches all nations and nationalities and their spiritual life.

We are Soviet. Whether from the city, village, mountain aul or Central Asian kishlak, we should be able to make ourselves freely understood when meeting each other. For this it is essential that a knowledge of the Russian language as the language of intercourse among nations be **compulsory** for all citizens of the USSR.

Who among educated people can complain that the knowledge of a second or several other languages has hindered him in life or pushed national culture and national art back toward their origins? But the artificial protection of one's own language and culture from the influence of other national cultures is characteristic of a certain portion of our creative intelligentsia. Those who are acquainted with the dialectical development of human society should understand that this is impossible.

Also impermissible here is any artificial shove, the same as the restraint of mature objective trends of development. I therefore am against artificial obstacles that place a drag on the natural process of bilingualism. But the problem forces us to seek more efficient ways of solving this question.

It is no secret to anyone that about half of the population in the republics of Central Asia, the Transcaucasus, the Baltic regions and in Moldavia lives in a rural locale and that only a few of them speak Russian. But then the youth go to study in Moscow or the cities of other republics. Can these people fully realize their civil rights? I think not. The lack of knowledge of Russian impedes them.

And here is what it says in Article 36 of the USSR Constitution: "Any direct or indirect limitations of rights or the establishment of direct or indirect advantages for citizens according to racial or national traits whatsoever, as well as the propagation of racist or national exclusiveness, hostility or neglect are punishable by law."

The rights defined by the USSR Constitution are the conquest of our society. But an ignorance of Russian leads in one way or another to the direct or indirect impossibility of making full use of one's constitutional rights.

I, for example, can be a rank-and-file worker or the leader of a collective—large or small—in any corner of my great Motherland: it depends on my professional training. Because I am fluent in the language of international intercourse.

Language is a tool for development. The interests of the USSR demand that the representatives of every nation of our country have the full right to enjoy the knowledge of that language in which an education is obtained. Speaking at meetings, for example, or appealing to state or public institutions. I am not in favor of Russification. But I can cite thousands of examples where an ignorance of Russian has made it impossible to achieve goals set in life. I will cite just one.

Shokhrat Berdyev, a cadet at the Baku Higher Military Combined-Arms Command School imeni AzSSR Supreme Soviet, enrolled at the school after completing the Ashkhabad Specialized Secondary School. Soon

afterward, however, he was dismissed for a poor knowledge of Russian. Today he is serving as a private, as he informed me in his letter. The fact that he speaks Russian poorly is our common guilt, and misfortune occurred to him—his dream did not come true.

I think that no representative of national minorities that does not have a mastery of Russian can be assigned or elected to a management organ or be a leader of a collective in Belorussia, the Ukraine or in Russia, and I also feel that a person cannot be assigned to a leadership role who does not speak the language of the indigenous nationality. But this logic is often violated. True, courses of study in the local languages are being opened in the union republics, and a program called Bilingualism is being discussed in Turkmenia, while courses have been opened for the study of the Turkmeni language at the Znaniye Society. In Estonia, there exists experience in the study of the local language in a short time period that merits attention (monthly accelerated courses). Courses of intensive study in the local language in the republics are not such a difficult matter for the Russian-speaking population. We are solving larger problems than that. But I feel that it is too little for Russian-speaking managers in the union republics to know the local language. They must know the mores, traditions and history of the people.

[21 May 88 p 3]

In order to expand democracy, which recognizes the equal right of every citizen to participation in the management of the public affairs of the country, a single language is essential. Without it we will be unable to ensure full-blooded socialist democracy and socialist self-management by the people.

When part of our population speaks a language understandable to many, and another part is understood only in certain regions, a diminishment of the rights of all citizens to participation in the management of public affairs involuntarily results. As the experience of history testifies, the eternal and unspoken testament of rulers striving to raise themselves above those they ruled and consolidate their ruling positions consisted of limiting the opportunities of the popular masses to raise their general educational and cultural level, i.e. keep those ruled in ignorance of statewide public affairs.

If a people knows the language of international intercourse, it acquires the opportunity of expanding its information on all questions in the public and social life of our multinational country and the world. It is well known that the absence of a unifying language in a state that is compulsory for all confirms the political inequality among those who know it and those who know only their own national language. Without a unifying language we can only speak of genuine popular rule and self-rule of the masses, it cannot be implemented in practice.

In a speech at the February (1988) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, M.S. Gorbachev justly noted that "a unique feature of our culture is its multi-nationality. We often speak of it, but it seems that we have not yet learned to value it fully. The peoples of the USSR are joined by a commonality of historical fate. It is the foundation of our fraternity and kinship which has passed through most difficult trials. The source of our strength is the free development of national cultures, enriched by the spiritual experience of the fraternal peoples and all of humanity."

"True internationalism and true friendship of peoples are possible only with profound respect for the dignity, honor, culture, language and history of every people in the broad contacts among them. We should facilitate in every way possible an expansion of the contacts among national cultures and their mutual enrichment, ascent and flourishing." And this cannot be achieved in a historically short time period without a linguistic means of communication among nationalities. M.S. Gorbachev further states that "Soviet patriotism is our greatest value. Any manifestations of nationalism and chauvinism are incompatible with it. Nationalism in any form is blind. Efforts at self-isolation lead only to a spiritual dead-end. A knowledge and understanding of the scope of greatness and the human specifics of socialist revolution, complete truth and the heroics of the party's and people's struggle for socialism and the defense of the socialist Fatherland nourish the root system of Soviet patriotism. **And here we are approaching a very important question—the unification of the national pride and national merit of every people through the revolution and Soviet power with the internationalism of socialist society.**" Soviet patriotism—the expression of socialist internationalism—requires an international language.

In pointing out the inadmissibility of playing around with issues of culture and ideology, M.S. Gorbachev notes that it is in the spiritual sphere, and perhaps, namely there, that we should act guided by our Marxist-Leninist principles. Principles we should not forgo under any pretext. According to Lenin, the most correct policy is the principled one.

The principled policy on this issue should be a policy of unifying the peoples of the Soviet Union and eroding "fences" between peoples. A unifying language for all will help in that. It is the most effective tool for improving relations among nationalities.

A unified common language along with local national ones will make it possible to increase the quantity and improve the quality of the training of national personnel, by their mores and morals raised above national limitations and in their competence able to work fruitfully in central and international organs and protect the interests of the whole Soviet people and the interests of socialism. We all should understand that the development of

national cultures and all spheres of public life should transpire on the basis of the perception of more improved and progressive forms that exist among the peoples of the world.

And how do matters stand with the teaching of the Russian language, taking Turkmenia as an example?

The program of Russian language for grades 5-11 of general educational schools with instruction in Turkmeni explains that "the Russian language is a most important means of contact among the peoples of the Soviet Union. The fluent mastery of Russian should be the norm for youth finishing secondary teaching institutions." And further: "The basic educational goal of teaching the Russian language in Turkmeni schools is to teach the students to converse fluently in Russian and to read popular-science and socio-political literature in Russian.

"The educational goal of the 'Russian Language' curriculum is the formation among the students, by means of the Russian language, **a dialectical-materialistic world view, a feeling of Soviet patriotism, socialist internationalism, the friendship of peoples and communist morals.**"

Explained very well, isn't it?

In schools where the teaching language is Turkmeni, the Russian language as a separate academic subject is studied from the first grade. But the number of program hours is invariably reduced. Whereas 238 hours are devoted to it in the 5th grade, it is 102 in the 7th and 70 hours in the 8th-11th.

Here is the number of words assimilated in the classes: in the 5th, 650 and in the 8th-11th, 350.

Even a superficial analysis of the program shows that it is practically impossible to achieve the aforementioned goals and tasks with such study. In my opinion, if we brought the quantity of words from 350 to 650 to the extent that class hours increase from 70 in the 5th grade to 238 in the 11th, rather than the reverse, this could somehow be agreed to. Otherwise it obtains that at the beginning we study the language intensively, but by the end we bring to naught the knowledge obtained.

How can the dissemination of the Russian language be accelerated in all of our republics, oblasts and okrugs? This must be done, in my opinion, in several parallel directions.

The subjects in natural and hard sciences taught in Russian must be expanded beginning with the initial classes of the national schools, and secondary education (9th-10th grades), secondary specialized education, SPTUs [agricultural professional and technical institutes] and technical institutes should be completed in Russian.

Will our national pride be diminished by this? I am sure that it will not. I personally completed 7 grades in Turkmen schools. All other teaching institutions—the railroad institute in Kizyl-Arvat, the industrial technical institute and military academy in Tashkent, two military academies in Moscow—the latter, by the way, finished with honors—were in Russian. I did not forget my own language, my own national culture, I know and read the best traditions, and this is reflected in my moral outlook and my attitude toward my surroundings and my job. A good knowledge of Russian and the indigenous language of where I have served have helped rather than hindered me to fulfill my duties more completely and realize my civil rights.

The mutual exchange of students at SPTUs, special secondary schools and the students of higher educational institutions along with attendees of the higher party schools and improvement courses must be increased considerably. The teaching at all these special teaching institutions should be in Russian. A significant place should be allotted, aside from professional training, to cultivating civic responsibility and the formation of a spirit of communist morality. At the same time, the language, history, culture and local economy must be studied to a sufficient degree.

After the completion of these educational institutions, representatives of the peoples of Central Asia, the Transcaucasus etc. should work in the same republic in which they studied and return voluntarily after three years.

Students from among the Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, peoples of the Baltic etc. that are studying in educational institutions of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus of regional significance (the Higher Party School in Tashkent, for example) can be brought together in groups to work in a specific republic, kray or okrug. They should receive, along with professional training, training for work on studying the language, history, culture and economics of the republic, oblast or okrug where they will be working.

The representatives of the peoples of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus who have been trained in the educational institutions of Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, the Baltic and Moldavia and have worked there no less than three years are probably learning much that is progressive that is typical for these regions, which will make it possible to accelerate the socio-economic development of the southern republics. Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Lithuanians, Estonians, Latvians and others that have completed educational institutions in the southern republics will also find out what they have learned. After all, we should, can and are obliged to learn from each other.

The daily television and radio lessons in the republics of Central Asia, the Transcaucasus, the Baltic and Moldavia are also of great help in studying the Russian language.

Tourist routes to various regions of the country and the world must be expanded, and more all-union youth rallies should be held. It is essential to create privileged material conditions for instructors in the schools of Central Asia and Transcaucasus from among the specialists of Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, the Baltic republics and Moldavia, i.e. give them wage supplements depending on the distance of the jobs from administrative, cultural and economic centers. They should enjoy priority rights in acquiring housing, foodstuffs etc.

Preparatory 10-month courses for deeper study of the Russian language and special terminology should be organized as a temporary measure (until the universal mastery of Russian) for youth that have completed national schools and passed the entrance exams for higher educational institutions or higher military academies. These courses should be opened at the base institutes and military academies and graduates should be distributed evenly among all institutes and military academies in the country.

The Soviet people—which took shape historically as a result of the Great October Revolution and a 70-year struggle for the affirmation of a new social order—is a territorial, economic, ideological, psychological in many parameters and cultural commonality of people. And in order for that commonality to be solid, indivisible and universal, a single, nationwide, state language is needed that represents the Soviet people both in every corner of our Motherland and beyond its borders.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a socialist nationwide state reflecting the will and interests of the workers, peasants and intelligentsia and the laborers of all nations and nationalities (USSR Constitution). The mastery of the Russian language should thus be a national pride and merit for us all, and an ignorance of it and failure to master it a national disgrace.

This task will not be completed in one or two years, but it must be completed, because it is a necessity.

12821

Advantages in Drafting Students

18010417c Moscow KRISNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Jun 88 Second Edition p 1

[Article by Gorkiy Agricultural Institute CPSU History Department senior instructor A. Marenko under the rubric "Toward the 19th All-Union Party Conference. We Discuss the Theses of the CPSU Central Committee": "Facts, Not Emotions"]

[Text] "...a topical discussion of the qualitative parameters of personnel is hardly possible with the exclusion from the ranks of the army and navy of the most educated part of the youth—the students in higher education."

The Theses of the CPSU Central Committee for the 19th All-Union Party Conference devote considerable attention to the comprehensive development and maximum utilization of the intellectual and spiritual potential of the people and improvements in the educational system at various levels and stages. These problems have been widely illuminated in the press for three years now. I would like to touch once again on a question that elicited heated discussion not so long ago—whether or not to draft students into the armed forces. Some parties to the debate have asserted that the tearing of students away from their studies is all but a brake to scientific and technical progress. People who are far from the life of higher educational institutions can easily accept these assertions as truth and axiom. Graduates of the schools, dreaming of studying at the universities, the students in the first years and their parents take to them in concert. A fixed opinion has taken shape in many of them that an interruption in study in connection with the service is inconceivable.

But here is what is surprising: I have been unable to encounter any convincing reasoning on this topic either in any feature where this opinion is taken up in one manner or another or in any discussion except for theoretical reflection.

Sociological research done at our institute, however, is completely convincing of the opposite. I will cite some data.

Today some 60 percent of the students at the institute have completed service in the army or navy. Some 130 of them, having held positions of commanders of some detachment, deputy platoon commanders or sergeant-majors of companies and batteries, have acquired quite solid skills in educational work with people. It should be emphasized: such practices are not offered by any higher-educational curriculum. Moreover, it is no secret to anyone that it is namely an inability to work with people that is the stumbling block for very many young specialists in practical activity.

An absolute majority of soldiers in the reserves have raised their level of civic maturity, have hardened their convictions and taken a more active position in life. Some 57 of them returned to the institute as communists. Some 96 percent of those polled answered that military service inculcated them with such a quality as intolerance of duplicity and deceit, 90 percent—subservience and 70 percent—drunkenness. Many came to regard their student obligations in a different light, and 97.6 percent declared that it was namely during their period of service that they had become convinced of the correctness of their choice of future field, and 72 percent continued their study process without complications after the interruption, 85 percent were actively included into the social life of their departments and 86 percent eliminated absences from class.

As for the results of study, as the winter examination period showed, the average grade for the reserve soldiers was higher than the overall average grade, and the success rate of 40 percent of them was higher than before the service.

Other exceedingly curious figures were obtained that affirmed that the interconnection of the service and studies is not on the plane that some had presented it earlier at all. In the name of establishing the truth, I suggest, it would not hurt to do sociological research at other higher educational institutions as well. I do not think that the results will differ too much from ours. In any case, they will provide food for thought and for a better-adjusted orientation of the pedagogical process. The same that has been given to the pedagogical collective and the party and Komsomol organizations of our institute.

The Theses emphasize that the effectiveness of our defense organization should be ensured as of today primarily through qualitative parameters in regard to both equipment and personnel. I think that a topic: discussion of the qualitative parameters of personnel is hardly possible with the exclusion from the ranks of the army and navy of the most educated part of the youth—the students in higher education.

12821

Alternative Service Proposed for Those Not Drafted

1801041 *b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Jun 88 Second Edition p 1

[Article by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Lt Col V. Lyashenko under the rubric "Toward the 19th All-Union Party Conference: We Discuss the Theses of the CPSU Central Committee". "The Parameters of Quality"]

[Text] "...the orientation toward qualitative parameters signifies a decisive shift in the training of command personnel and all combat and political training in the direction of intensification and a material improvement in political-education work."

In familiarizing oneself with the Theses of the CPSU Central Committee, every communist devotes especial attention—and I think it is natural—toward those of their provisions that are synonymous with his professional occupation. For me, a serviceman, it was the ninth section of the Theses that evoked this interest, describing, in particular, the problem of the organization of Soviet defense.

I wholeheartedly support and consider fundamentally important the conclusion of our party that we not dismiss the militarist threat lurking in the nature of imperialism. This conclusion demonstrates the unfoundedness and harm of the pacifist euphoria that is making

itself felt of late on the pages of some press organs. And even the fact, noted in the Theses, that "the direct threat of war with the participation of the major powers has diminished" does not reduce the responsibility of army and navy communists and all military personnel to ensure the country's security, maintain combat readiness at an adequate level and raise the quality of combat and political training.

Of fundamental significance, in my opinion, is the provision of the Theses on the fact that the effectiveness of Soviet defense organization "as of today should be ensured primarily by qualitative parameters both in relation to equipment and to personnel." As it concerns personnel, the orientation toward qualitative parameters signifies a decisive shift in the training of command personnel and all combat and political training in the direction of intensification and a material improvement in political-education work.

The problem of the quality of the draft contingent seems to me to be closely linked with this. For it is clear that the qualitative features of army and navy personnel depend quite strongly on the "source material" that enters the ranks of our armed forces. A simplistic approach to defense organization has led to the fact that not only do physically and morally poorly prepared youth now frequently come into the ranks of the armed forces, but now even some that have convictions. And commanders and political workers must be engaged not so much in education as in the re-education of the soldiers, the defenders of the country.

What should have been done, in my opinion, so as to ensure a rise in the qualitative features of the personnel and, this means, the more successful resolution of the tasks they face under contemporary conditions? One such measure could be the establishment of social justice in relation to those who go into military service and those who are not called up for this or that reason. I know that in Poland, for example, they are now discussing a draft resolution in accordance with which young people that do not enter military service for one reason or another will be called up for the fulfillment of other duties not connected with the army sphere, but for a term twice as long as the army, by virtue of the fulfillment of lighter duties.

The term of service itself for sergeants and rank-and-file soldiers, it seems to me, could be made variable depending on the difficulty and danger of the tasks fulfilled, the degree of mastery of military skills and industry and discipline in the fulfillment of military duty. The term of service could be reduced, say, for those who have mastered their specialty at the 1st-class level or for those fulfilling combat missions in peacetime (minesweeping, etc.).

12821

Non-Party Captain Denied Command

18010417a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Jun 88 Second Edition p 1

[Letter to the Editor by Capt N. Drobotun of the PVO:
"Not a Grudge"]

[Text] "A climate cannot be created in which career considerations would push people into joining the party"

To the Editor: At the end of last year, my candidacy for the post of company commander was advanced, but in January I received the reply that my documents had been returned and I had not been approved for the position, since I am not a party member. I have been acting company commander for nine months, and no one is troubled that I am not in the party. Something doesn't add up here.

I cannot understand why some comrades would want to use party membership as a barrier or ticket to the future. If you have a party card, it means, all roads are opened to you, while if you don't, then don't even dream. And what of the decree of the January (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee? Is it no longer in effect already?

The issue is not my own personal grudges. A climate cannot be created in which career considerations would push people into joining the party. We should probably think about how this problem could be posed more clearly at the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

I was 28 years old the other day. I have passed Komso-mol age. But I cannot yet make application to the party. What will come to pass for the company will come to pass.

12821

Journalists' Union Donation for Afghan Veterans Rehabilitation

18010441c Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Jun 88 Second Edition p 3

[Appeal signed by V. Afanasyev, A. Aksenov, I. Zubkov, I. Lantev, S. Losev, M. Nenashev, V. Falin, A. Laurinch-yukas, I. Panov, G. Seleznev, M. Leshchinskiy and G. Musayelyan: "A Debt of Conscience"]

[Text] The Board of the USSR Union of Journalists supported the Dolg project of the newspaper KOMSO-MOLSKAYA PRAVDA and decided to make a journalistic contribution to the construction of a Rehabilitation Center for Internationalist Soldiers wounded in Afghanistan, transferring 100,000 rubles to Account 700344 of the Sverdlovsk Division of Zhilsotsbank [Housing and Social Bank] of the city of Moscow, as well as to create a public correspondence station for the construction of the center.

Soviet journalists are honorably carrying out their official and patriotic duty along with the internationalist soldiers on the dangerous roads of Afghanistan, displaying courage and valor. The heroic deeds of journalists Aleksandr Sekretarev and Sergey Sevruk were highly regarded with state awards.

The moral obligation of the mass media is to depict vividly the soldierly heroism of the internationalist soldiers and to display constant concern for those who have returned from Afghanistan and are in need of support and treatment of combat wounds.

We appeal to all journalists and editorial colleagues to monitor the rendering of aid in the localities to those who have returned home and make a personal material contribution to the construction of the rehabilitation center for wounded soldiers.

12821

GlavPU's Agitprop Deputy Chief on Conference Theses

18010441a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Jun 88 Second Edition pp 1-2

[Interview by Maj I. Sas with GlavPU [Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy] Deputy Chief Maj Gen V. Khrobostov under the rubric "We Debate the Theses of the CPSU Central Committee": "Mastering the Ideas of Restructuring"]

[Text] *"The party defines the ideological essence of the processes of restructuring that are transpiring," states the February (1988) Plenum of the Central Committee in the CPSU Central Committee Theses for the 19th All-Union Party Conference, "as a revolution of consciousness and ideological renewal." Will traditional forms of ideological work succeed today for these processes? How will the fulfillment of the CPSU Central Committee decree "Restructuring the System of Political and Economic Training of the Workers" proceed in particular on the mass level of the political training of the army and navy—the system of political classes for soldiers, NCOs, sailors and warrant officers? Our correspondent discusses this with the chief of the department of propaganda and agitation and deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, Maj Gen V. Khrobostov.*

Correspondent: Comrade Major-General, the country is debating the Theses of the CPSU Central Committee. Striving to gain a deeper interpretation of this document, people are naturally comparing what we are striving toward with what we have. We will therefore start the conversation, if you do not object, with a letter. Here is what was written to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA by I. Demin from Moscow: "In one of the central newspapers, some serviceman E. Gimadeyev declared the following: 'I feel it is my duty to report on the pitiful situation of political

studies in units of the Soviet Army. The holding of the planned classes in political training are at such a low level that there can be no discussion at all of education.'

"I do not know," Demin continues, "who this serviceman is and who authorized him to make such a declaration in the name of the whole Soviet Army. But it is terribly offensive for me, a former political worker who devoted almost forty years to army service, to hear such a thing. It is, after all, a lie."

Two diametrically opposed opinions...

[V. Khrobostov] ...And neither one can be taken as the truth. Not to offend the authors of the letters, but both of them run to extremes, and any extreme always leads a person away from objectivity.

Let's discuss this soberly. Recall the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The military man has been tested for strength there for many years. Daily. Hourly. Without any niceties. Thousands of servicemen have passed this test with honor, displaying examples of courage and ideological conviction. Take the test of Chernobyl. The extreme situation showed our soldier for what he is—morally ready to carry out his duty to the end. This readiness, figuratively speaking, did not fall from the sky, it is the result of education. Including in the army environment. Including by means of political studies. And to put it all exclusively in a dark light is to blacken everything good we have accumulated. And on the other hand, this does not mean that we have no problems. They are especially being illuminated today.

[Correspondent] It makes sense to single out the basics.

[V.Kh.] We must first and foremost decisively renew the content of political studies. The shame here is that the remnants of a conservative and bureaucratic consciousness have proved to be very tenacious—as was stated directly in the Theses of the CPSU Central Committee. Many in the new day and the new climate are dragging along old dogmatic conceptions of socialism. People want to elucidate better the sense of the changes that have begun in society and determine their position in them more precisely. And in political classes we nevertheless encounter a tedious treatment of mothballed truths. The doors must be thrown wide open to the fresh ideas of restructuring, and its military, political, historical, social, moral and other aspects must be placed at its foundation.

[Correspondent] Some readers write that it should begin with the programs and curricula that are developed and approved by the Main Political Directorate. And they have many critical observations on that account.

[V.Kh.] We have also received many letters as well. I can report that new thematic teaching materials for the political studies of servicemen have recently been approved. We took into account the criticism, suggestions and advice of our readers in them.

[Correspondent] How do they differ from the former ones?

[V.Kh.] Greater attention is devoted to problems of military, legal and moral education. Restructuring has stirred up unprecedented interest in our history, and therefore the circle of historical topics has been widened. The biography of V.I. Lenin will be studied in the political-classes system—this desire comes from the very heart of the mass of servicemen. In revising the topics, we strove to move away from non-problematical and dry academics and to merge theory and practice. Life itself has demanded the strengthening of some areas. Focus has been placed, for example, on problems of educating soldiers in the spirit of the friendship of the peoples of the USSR, soldiers' comradeship and regulation order and discipline. The differentiation of subject matter by branch of service has been expanded.

Political organizers have also been granted the right to experiment in the organization and techniques of political classes and the introduction of changes in certain topics with a regard for local specifics. As you well understand yourself, however, it would be self-deceiving to hope that changing the program is enough, and that all questions will be removed. Life must be breathed into it, it must be filled with modern substance, by the leader of the group of political classes. He is the key figure therein.

[Correspondent] It would probably be interesting for the readers to know who has been entrusted with such an important part of the political education of the soldiers. Here is an "average statistical" portrait of a non-staff propagandist of the training motorcycle rifle regiment of the Kiev Military District. He is a junior officer about 25 years old. He has higher education and about three years of experience in propaganda work. Nine out of ten are communists. The command staff predominates, and political workers comprise one fifth. How well does this "portrait" conform on an army- and navy-wide scale?

[V.Kh.] There are deviations for some branches of the armed forces, but they are small ones. Two decades ago you could only dream of such a make-up for the propagandists in the regiment or on the ship.

[Correspondent] A paradoxical situation is taking shape: on the one hand, the quality level of the propagandists is increasing continuously, while on the other, the number of letters to the editors saying that other classes have left a bitter taste of wasted time in the mouths of the attendees is increasing.

[V.Kh.] There are many reasons. Take this one. There has been a splash in public awareness that I would call a splash of thirst for the truth. There is a re-evaluation of many views and concepts underway. A multitude of most difficult questions are demanding answers. And far from all of the propagandist aktiv has proven ready for this—theoretically, morally or psychologically. Some are confused. The old theoretical base cannot serve as grounds for effective ideological work, while the new one is still poorly developed and assimilated by propagandists. I think that these problems will be raised at the party conference, and ways of solving them will be projected. In short, a turn to the new is difficult.

[Correspondent] Serviceman A. Lyashkov of the DVO [Far East Military District] has his own view of these difficulties. "We of course understand," he writes, "that the commanders are not specialists in the realm of ideology, and they do not have enough purely methodological skills. All right, they are not docents or candidates of sciences and have not completed teaching institutes." And the author later asks: what is the way out?

[V.Kh.] We cannot accept the condescension behind that letter. An officer is of course not obligated to be a candidate of sciences or complete a teaching institute. But he is not an officer if he has no basic training in the social disciplines and no higher pedagogical culture. It is impossible to be a "pure specialist" in our army. This principle should be imparted to the consciousness of youth at the threshold of the military-teaching institution, and where possible even sooner.

We connect great hopes with the restructuring of military schooling. It should remove many of problems behind such letters.

[Correspondent] A year ago KRASNAYA ZVEZDA related the story of Gds Capt I. Panarin, who was actively incorporating into the practice of political classes the techniques of the famous pedagogue V. Shatalov. There were many replies. Others are running across sad tales. Almost all cadet letters, for example, are reduced to one request: explain the essence of that technique, as they don't tell us a thing about it in the course of military pedagogy.

[V.Kh.] This year the Main Political Directorate studied the work of higher educational institutions in the Urals Military District. There are changes for the better in that regard. The experience of innovative teachers is also being used. But something else is also obvious. The teaching process has not yet everywhere been re-oriented toward the human factor as the main one at the foundation of the future activity of the graduate. There are practically no problems today in the sphere of combat readiness which do not touch on the person. This should determine the priorities in the formation of the personality of the future officer. And it must be stated directly

that the social-sciences departments of many academies are still not laboratories of progressive experience or methodological centers of political work.

[Correspondent] And what are the reasons?

[V.Kh.] The main one is the distortions that have been permitted in the selection and placement of instructor personnel. Chance people have sometimes been assigned there. It has even happened that they mess up the work in the ranks and they are told to go and teach at the academy. A consolidation process has now begun among current specialists and people who know how to think and create in non-standard fashion.

Today let's take apart and re-assemble the nuts and bolts of the system that is called upon to supplement and improve the ideological, theoretical and methodological baggage of the non-staff propagandist right in the unit or on the ship. We will begin with those four hours that should be given to the leader of a group every week for class training. "Tell me, where is this requirement being rigorously observed?" was asked of me by the political workers of the units of a certain formation. The comrades did not have the nerve to state firmly: here. Do you understand what is behind this? It must be honestly acknowledged that some requirements are taken as paper idols—everyone can see them, but no one takes them into account. There is a definite position of commanders and political organizers and organizations behind this. In order to change it at the root, we must construct an attitude toward political studies as a particularly party matter at all levels and along all lines.

[Correspondent] Doesn't assiduity suffice for restructuring?

[V.Kh.] A caveat is needed here. Bureaucratism and formalism are also sometimes not lacking in assiduity. Assiduity of a different sort is needed for restructuring—thoughtful, based on creative approaches, and not genuflecting before outmoded paragraphs. I refer to the impressions of a recent trip to the Transcaucasus Military District. The instruction and methodological seminars with non-staff propagandists were conducted thoroughly in the regiment (in the sense of observing the time periods). Two or three classes a month—what possibilities there. But the group leaders attend the seminars unwillingly. Because every time they hear the doleful retelling of the substance of the next topic. If you think about it, the very essence and the very purpose of the functions are distorted—the seminar itself is instructional and methodological. It is namely there that progressive pedagogical thought and fresh ideas should pulsate, there that the experience of the best methodologists should be concentrated.

What we must learn is the ability to make sensible use of everything that is valuable at our disposal. After all, there exists interesting experience on the incorporation

of progressive techniques in the Turkmenistan and Transcarpathian military districts. The efforts of the Transbaykal people, where they are trying to introduce a competitive system in the development of political classes, are interesting, and the innovations that are being consolidated in the military-construction units are deserving of attention.

[Correspondent] If I understand you correctly, restructuring this work means relying heavily on technique.

[V.Kh.] We must adhere to a firm policy of the democratization of political studies. The decisions of the 27th Party Congress and the Theses of the CPSU Central Committee point toward that approach. What does this mean for us in practice? More reliance on active forms of conducting classes. Dialogue, the collective debate of the issue, disputes, discussion instead of monologue.

[Correspondent] We have somehow skirted such an important factor of political education as the richness (or, on the contrary, the limited nature) of the spiritual world of the propagandist.

[V.Kh.] The formation, if it can be expressed thus, of a favorable "nourishing environment" around the propaganda aktiv that would facilitate to the maximum the development of the Marxist-Leninist world view of the individual, his spiritual growth and ideological, political and moral tempering, is becoming the task of tasks of the officer corps with the current service commitments. We must think over a great deal. How to make it so that every officer has access to periodical literature with the sharpest and most sensational features, so that he can judge them for himself instead of by hearsay. How to orient him in an enormous sea of information, how to acquaint him with the world of art and culture. A simple question: does the regimental propagandist concern himself with seeing that television programs such as the meetings with famous pedagogues in Ostankino do not escape the attention of officers? And if you think about it, that is the agenda for the sessions of the party committee and the party bureau. We must create a system that would stimulate self-education. And, of course, be especially concerned with the unity of word and deed. I know, for example, instances when an officer who has just received a reprimand for a personal lack of discipline has spoken in political classes on the need for firm military discipline. This is a vulgarization of what is sacred, a discrediting of the very idea of political classes.

[Correspondent] We return to the letters once again. "The majority of my students," writes political worker Lt A. Aynutdinov from a military-construction company, "have been drafted from regions of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, and many have a poor knowledge of Russian. And the general educational level of some is such that it is shameful. But there are also those that grasp the material quickly. Whom should I be oriented toward? If to the former, then the latter are

bored, if to the latter, then the former do not understand. It is very difficult to structure the class. Can't groups be formed with a regard for this factor?"

[V.Kh.] This idea has its minuses as well. First of all, collective ties are violated (the platoon itself comprises the group for political classes). Second, the mutual intercourse of those who know Russian well and those who do not, those who are strong in political training and those who are less so, has a great many benefits. Third, some opportunities will be let slip to make the multinational nature of the collective more cohesive and to form an international awareness among the students (and this task is especially emphasized in the Theses of the CPSU Central Committee). We must therefore carefully weigh the pros and cons and take specific local features and conditions into account.

We know of the objective difficulties that the officer corps of the military-construction units run up against. And last year we introduced the new post of staff propagandist. This is, of course, a serious shoring up. But there also exist instances when officers on the spot are used not according to their specialties, but "the most senior ones are sent." We have no right to such extravagance.

We must speak in particular of the staff propagandist of the unit or the ship—after all, an awful lot depends on him in the whole arrangement of ideological work. He should be the best trained on a theoretical plane, the most erudite, irreproachable in a moral regard, a most subtle psychologist. We should approach the selection of personnel for these posts today only with such criteria, otherwise our attempts to raise the intellectual level of political studies and their effectiveness will go no further than good intentions. Enormous responsibility is placed on the political organizers and party organizations therein for pursuing namely such a personnel policy.

[Correspondent] Many of our readers are asking questions concerning the material support for political classes...

[V.Kh.] Work on renewing textbooks and methodological materials is reaching its concluding stages. We are also making use of new approaches here. Whereas before we simply sought out an author and gave him an order, we are converting to a competitive system today. The scholars of military academies, staff members of the Institute of Military History and journalists have taken part in the development of new textbooks. Quality has won out as a result.

[Correspondent] Good reviews are coming in for the first three issues of the teaching-methodology text that was prepared by the Institute of Military History.

[V.Kh.] That is nice to hear. I think that many units already have the fourth. Kits of visual aids are being developed and put out by Voenizdat Publishing House.

There will be more technical means of propaganda under centralized procedure. The number of garrison TV centers is growing. But I would like to say something here: no technical means can supplant live human exchange.

[Correspondent] I cannot skip one more letter. Its author, N. Paravyan from Leningrad, writes without a shadow of a doubt that the last 15-20 years an order has existed in the army according to which it is forbidden to have the journals YUNOST and NOVYY MIR in unit libraries. And he asks if access to the journals ZNAMYA, DRUZHBA NARODOV and NOVYY MIR will now still be closed off to the soldiers—after all, they have "Heart of a Dog," "Children of the Arbat" and "Trench" there.

[V.Kh.] You really cannot find the cited journals in many libraries today: they are in the hands of readers. That is first. Second, there has never been a ban on the journals mentioned. They are furthermore included in the lists of periodicals that are recommended for subscription by unit and ship libraries.

In short, the soldiers of the armed forces are living the same political life as the whole Soviet people. And, of course, the same expectations for the 19th All-Union Party Conference, which will give us new points of reference on the path of restructuring.

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Coordinating Committee on POWs Meets in Moscow

18010417d Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 Jun 88 First Edition p 4

[Unattributed article: "They Should Return to the Motherland"]

[Text] The fate of Soviet servicemen that are missing in action or have been captured in Afghanistan troubles not just their relatives and friends and those that fought alongside them. The trade unions, Komsomol, women's councils, councils for the defense of peace, war veterans, labor and other public organizations are trying to do everything possible to find them and help them return to the Motherland.

At the initiative of these organizations and internationalist soldiers, a constituent assembly of the Coordinating Committee of Soviet Society for the Liberation of Soviet Servicemen in Captivity in Afghanistan was held in Moscow on June 29 in the Palace of Unions. The committee is headed by the deputy chairman of the VTsSPS [All-Union Council of Trade Unions]. V.G. Lomonosov. He granted an interview to a correspondent of TASS.

[Question] Vladimir Grigoryevich, the humanitarian and patriotic nature of the initiative to create this committee is obvious. What are its possibilities?

[Answer] Representatives of Soviet society have visited the embassy of Pakistan in Moscow and entrusted them with a message for President Zia ul-Haq requesting that he render assistance in searching out those Soviet servicemen that are in captivity on Pakistani territory.

It is essential to discover the fate of each fallen Soviet soldier. We will continue in this important matter with an appeal to the International Red Cross and various organs of the UN. At the same time, we will enter into contact with representatives of the societies of a number of foreign countries, including Pakistan, Iran and the United States.

Our main purpose is to coordinate the actions of all Soviet social organizations for the fastest possible return to the Motherland of Soviet servicemen in captivity. We are counting on the support of broad international opinion in our work.

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**A. Arbatov on 'Disarmament and Security'
Yearbook**

18120096a Moscow *NEW TIMES* in English
No 26, Jun 88 pp 10-11

[Interview with Alexei Arbatov, D.Sc. (Hist.), by I. Konstantinov: "Stability Was at Its Peak in the Early 1970's"; date and place not given]

[Text] *NEW TIMES*: I have before me the yearbook "Disarmament and Security, 1987," compiled by a panel of authors you headed. The book has attracted attention by virtue of its unconventional judgements, appraisals and prognostications relating to Soviet foreign policy.

Alexei Arbatov: True enough, the conclusions drawn by the researchers of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences' Institute of World Economics and International Relations set forth in the yearbook do not always coincide with the official viewpoint. But, of course, we do not claim to have said "the last word" on the subject or to have advanced the only correct solution. The yearbook offers food for thought, for further discussion by political scientists.

NEW TIMES: Foreign policy has doubtless always stood in need of an intellectual groundwork. However, your department which deals with problems of disarmament was founded only two years ago. Prior to that, neither the Institute of World Economics and International Relations nor the other institutes under the Academy of Sciences had any major independent section concretely and consistently devoted to the study of such questions.

Arbatov: You are right. Formerly few scientists studied the problem of disarmament. A vast quantity of factual data was either lost or fragmented in isolated files. I would attribute this partly to the fact that the Academy of Sciences did not adapt quickly enough to the changed

political realities. There were also objective reasons. In the 1970s and early 1980s the study of international disarmament policy was regarded as a means of propaganda substantiation of our foreign policy. It was only when the concept of new political thinking began to be realized, when fundamentally new approaches to security issues appeared and when past mistakes were properly weighed, that it became clear that what was needed was truly scientific treatment of disarmament problems and not a doctrine serving propaganda purposes. Above all, what was needed was a basis for working out a purposeful and thoroughly considered policy.

I shall take the liberty of reproaching you journalists on that score. The standard of our journalistic treatment of world affairs does not measure up to the requirements of our foreign policy. This judgement is based on a number of TV interviews in which our journalists did not acquit themselves with distinction, as well as on the many superficial, one-sided and noncritical articles that have been published on the subject. It is for this reason that this area of our journalism is not taken seriously in the West, nor to some extent in the Soviet Union either.

It would be a good thing if our people working in the mass media had the possibility and the desire to make a systematic study of researches on these issues. The fact is, however, that scientists have far from always provided them with the kind of analyses and data that could enable them to become knowledgeable and well-informed analysts and commentators of the disarmament process.

NEW TIMES: Let us turn to the yearbook. It is a huge, 800-page compilation. Which of its sections do you think might be of the most interest to readers?

Arbatov: I would divide the readers to whom the yearbook is addressed into two categories: the general public interested in matters relating to disarmament, and the experts. For the former, I believe, the most interesting are the chapters and sections analyzing the current process of disarmament and the struggle for security. For instance, the reader will doubtless be surprised by the changes that have taken place in the positions of the sides in the course of working out a compromise solution in the matter of reducing the number of medium- and shorter-range missiles, and will find a clear, illustrated, intelligible explanation of the relevant treaty in its entirety.

We also examine diverse variants of strategic, technical and political problems arising at the negotiations on strategic and space armaments, on nuclear tests and the prohibition of chemical weapons, and explain the complexity of these problems and the mechanism of their interconnection.

The experts, I trust, will be interested in the section "Problems of Military Stabilities" in which the military doctrines of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. and of the Warsaw

Treaty Organization and NATO are examined. Discussed also are the criteria by which the proportions of strategic offensive weaponry are determined. The chapter "Strategic Equilibrium and Stability" is, to my mind, actually in a sense revolutionary. And not only because it touches upon problems which are at present in the focus of attention at the talks on reducing strategic offensive armaments. We have included in this chapter data obtained in experiments in computer modelling.

The model and the programme were worked out in accordance with the present nuclear balance between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. When this model was applied to an analysis of the past and the future, with the necessary adjustments, it produced extremely interesting results which demonstrate many aspects of the evolution of the strategic balance intuitively felt by politicians and scientists.

Stability was at its peak in the early 1970s. The calculations show that a first strike at the strategic forces of the adversary far from substantially diminishing the possibility of a retaliatory strike, would have given its initiator no advantage whatsoever.

In the course of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, with the deployment and modernization of guidance systems, with the preservation and even heightening of the mutual assured destruction potential of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S., the chances of gaining relative advantages by a counterstrike increased. This gave added incentive to have recourse to a preemptive attack in a conflict situation, which meant that the likelihood of nuclear war was increased and stability undermined.

Part of the scheme drawn up on the basis of computer modelling, beginning with the second half of the 1980s, resembles a rooster's tail. It is based on long-term modelling, depending moreover on whether the unlimited arms race is to continue or whether there will be 50-per cent reduction. And if there will be a reduction, on what conditions—closer to the position of the U.S.S.R. or to that of the U.S.?

Analysis of the conception of a protracted global conventional war and the operational concepts of the two sides brings us to the conclusion that war between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries is impossible or at any rate unlikely. From this it follows that many conventional armament programmes can only be a reflection of certain departmental interests, but from the standpoint of the political realities they are totally unjustified.

NEW TIMES: The yearbook contains no new facts and figures relating to Soviet defensive strategy. How did you contrive to pierce the veil of secrecy?

Arbatov: We do not disclose any secrets. We use official Soviet information wherever possible. Where it is not available, and this you will agree remains a serious problem, we give our own analysis, based on the wealth

of data available everywhere. After all, neither the London International Institute for Strategic Studies nor the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, for instance, has direct access to satellite or radar information. They painstakingly collect information from hundreds or thousands of sources available to the public all over the world and skilfully analyze it.

As scientists, we too cannot sit back with folded arms and wait for official information. Let me cite a very simple example. How many nuclear warheads does the Soviet Union possess? We do not know the exact figure. But there exist approximate data on the total number of warheads in the possession of all the nuclear powers—more than 50,000. By subtracting from this figure the nuclear potential of the U.S., Britain, France and China (which can also be roughly computed) we get the approximate number of Soviet warheads. We may go still farther in our calculations. Knowing how many warheads there are on strategic carriers (the figures were cited in an article by Soviet Defence Minister Yazov published in PRAVDA) and on medium- and shorter-range missiles, we arrive at a figure which more or less accurately reflects the nuclear potential of both battlefield and tactical weapons in the land forces, the air force and the navy.

If official Soviet data differing from ours are made public, we shall correct our own data accordingly.

We have already begun work on the next yearbook, for 1988.

/6091

Problems of Switching Military Production to Civilian Purposes

18120096b Moscow NEW TIMES in English
No 27, Jul 88 p 17-18

[Articles by Malcolm Chalmers of the University of Bradford, Britain: "The Burden of Economic Decline" and Pyotr Litavrin, a Soviet expert: "Examine the Issue in Its Entirety" under the headline: "Conversion. Is It Possible?"]

[Text] NEW TIMES continues its discussion on the problems of switching military production to civilian purposes (for previous contributions on the subject see No. 39 for 1987 and No. 1 for this year).

The Burden of Economic Decline

After the second world war, successive British governments maintained defence spending at a level disproportionate to the country's economic strength. At the same time, none of the defeated countries—Germany, Japan or Italy—went nuclear, and their conventional armed forces were limited to their needs for defence. Therefore, even in the past few years they have spent much less on defence than the main victors in the war: the two

superpowers and Great Britain. Today in Japan and West Germany 2 and 9 per cent respectively of public spending goes on military research, as against 55 per cent in Britain and over 60 per cent in the United States.

Though Britain is by no means the richest nation in Western Europe at present, it is still along with the Federal Republic of Germany and France, one of the "big three" in military terms. At the same time, the military budget of Italy, the fourth West European power, which has surpassed Britain in the volume of its gross domestic product, comes to only 40 per cent of Britain's military spending. Such is the ratio of priorities between the economic development and military commitments of the two countries.

There is considerable evidence that Britain's high level of military spending has been a major factor in the country's rapid relative economic decline since the 1950s. If the British government is seriously committed to tackling the country's economic decline, it cannot afford to ignore the high proportion of industrial and scientific resources used for military purposes. Achieving international competitiveness in the civilian sectors likely to grow fastest in the near future—notably in the sphere of information technology—will be considerably more difficult if there is not a large reduction in the military's demands on resources.

To carry out the conversion of a large part of the arms industry to civil production, the government will have to overcome strong resistance, not only from the military, but also from the companies and workers involved. An important role in this process could be played by alternative production plans drawn up by workers at arms factories. A series of such plans have already shown the potential for using existing skills to make a range of socially useful products in areas as diverse as public transport and marine technology. Government financing of such projects, even if providing only a fraction of the amount currently spent on military research and development, could act as a catalyst in turning these ideas into productive new technologies.

A policy of steadily reducing arms spending, and diverting resources into high technology civilian industry, could have substantial benefits for Britain's economy. The government should grasp the opportunity to pursue such a policy afforded by the current relaxation in East-West tension. Both the major opposition parties in Britain appear to accept the need to reduce dependence on nuclear weapons. The Labour Party wants Britain to adopt an entirely non-nuclear defence policy. The conclusion of the INF treaty has brought the idea of a nuclear-free Europe to the forefront of public discussion.

Non-nuclear defence does not seek simply to replace nuclear weapons with conventional weapons of equal destructive power. Rather the aim of non-nuclear defence proposals is to give NATO the ability to defend itself against conventional attack without resorting to the

use of nuclear weapons. Whether such a policy requires higher defence spending by Britain, or by other NATO members, depends both on one's view of the current balance of conventional forces in Europe, and on how that balance is thought likely to change in the near future.

The economic pressures leading Britain to reduce its high level of defence spending are also being felt by both the United States and the Soviet Union. If this is translated into real cuts in the military budgets of the two superpowers, the reductions in Britain's own defence burden could be even greater. Non-nuclear defence and conversion could complement each other, both contributing to the process of reducing tension that is so necessary if Europe is to live in peace.

Examine the Issue in Its Entirety

Discussions on the problem of conversion often reflect the polarization of those who take part in them. The advocates of a continuing arms race are trying to prove that conversion will entail grave economic and social consequences, unemployment, and a slowing down of scientific and technological progress. This argument is not sufficiently well founded. The numerous studies carried out both East and West, as well as U.N.-sponsored research show that, despite the difficulties, the conversion of the munitions industry to civilian production is entirely feasible and can in effect be started today. The postwar experience of the Soviet Union, the United States and other countries also proves that conversion is possible.

Others assert that conversion will not meet with great difficulties, especially in the socialist countries, and if obstacles arise, they will most likely be connected with the demilitarization of the economy. In his contribution to the discussion published in issue No. 39/87, Nikolai Karpukhin argues that conversion is rather a political and organizational problem which can to all intents and purposes be solved in the same way as the problem of switching over to a new mass-scale technology. I think this a very simplistic approach to the matter.

As distinct from the early postwar years, the munitions industry has today achieved a high degree of specialization. This is particularly true of the aerospace and radio electronic industries and the manufacture of a number of technologies and types of electronic computer and armoured equipment. It is difficult to regear these highly militarized industries to the production of socially useful goods. Considerable time and effort will therefore be needed to convert them to civil purposes.

The consumption of raw materials per unit of output is bigger in civilian production than in the munitions industry. However, the munitions industry requires highly specialized types of raw material; for instance, such rare and expensive metals and components as titanium, niobium, carbon, boron and fiber glass are

used in the manufacture of B-1B and Stealth bombers. The specific character of military technologies using special raw materials and semi-finished items also complicates the transfer of plants to production for civilian needs.

It should be noted at the same time that a high proportion of the scientific achievements applied in the munitions industry can be used as dual-purpose technology. This is, for instance, the aim of the West European programme Eureka, which envisages the use of research findings both for military and civilian purposes. American experts have estimated that if all the funds spent on scientific, research and development work in the military field over the period 1962-82 were used for research in the U.S. civilian industries, these would then attain a technical level expected to have been achieved only by the year 2000. The conversion of scientific, research and development work to civilian needs would reduce its secrecy, make scientific achievements more accessible, and lead to a broader international exchange of licences and know-how.

In some branches of military production conversion can be effected without great difficulty. It is known that Boeing manufactured planes of the 707 model both for civilian and military purposes (the KC-135 refueller). In the late 1970s the Boeing plant assembling combat helicopters was converted to the production of streetcars and subway trains. Calculations by Labour Party experts in Britain show that civilian planes and turbines could be manufactured instead of multi-purpose Tornado aircraft, and merchant ships and equipment for oil-fields instead of anti-submarine cruisers. Many plants in the Soviet defence industry have acquired experience in manufacturing civilian products.

Also worthy of note is the difference between conversion in the East and the West. The socialist countries have a real economic interest in genuine disarmament and the conversion of their defence industries. They have no social strata or professional groups that profit from the arms race. Military production in the Soviet Union can be switched to civilian production in a planned way both on a wide scale and in individual plants and industries. This will naturally involve complex problems such as whether this or that plant is fit for the manufacture of civilian goods, and the employment of servicemen, engineers and technicians in the defence industry.

Constantly stressing that in a planned economy conversion will not create problems is wishful thinking. Moreover, this statement could play into the hands of those Western politicians who oppose conversion by saying that it is only advantageous to socialist countries. The point is that even the dismantling and scrapping of military equipment will immediately entail considerable expenditure.

In the final analysis, conversion depends on the solution of disarmament and security problems, on radical measures that would question the expediency of preserving the munitions industry from the political, defence and economic points of view. This is often used in the West as a pretext for saying that the time has not yet come for serious talk of conversion. The leaders of major capitalist countries, especially the United States, Britain, France and West Germany, make conversion dependent on global security and the settlement of regional conflicts and crises, that is, on eliminating the causes of the arms race.

Of course, a healthier international climate would make conversion a practicable scheme. It would be unwise, however, to give up the consideration of this problem only because it cannot be solved immediately. For success in tackling the conversion problem and the effectiveness of the struggle against the arms race largely depend on the ability of experts to prove convincingly that arms buildup will entail disastrous consequences and that conversion will have a beneficial effect on the economy, the social sphere and international relations. But to achieve this the conversion problem should be examined in its entirety today.

/6091

Instructions for Study of 19th Party Conference
18010441b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Jul 88 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed article: "A Course of Revolutionary Transformations—How to Conduct Classes to Study the Materials of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference"]

[Text] A study of the materials of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference is beginning in the system of political studies for servicemen in the army and navy. Convened by decision of the CPSU Central Committee, it was held at a crucial stage in restructuring and gave answers to questions of vital significance to the party and the people: the first results of restructuring, steps to eliminate the obstacles standing in its path and how to make the process of revolutionary renewal irreversible.

The Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy recommends the following for the purpose of a profound study of the materials of the All-Union Party Conference and the mobilization of soldiers to fulfill the tasks facing the armed forces:

Two discussions to be held in groups for Marxist-Leninist training of officers and the political studies of warrant officers in July and August on the topics:

1. The development and expansion of the ideas of restructuring in the materials of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference.

2. Problems in the further democratization of party and public life.

Allot 8 hours of class time for this purpose in universities of Marxism-Leninism in the new school year; hold 3-4 class sessions with workers and employees along with family members of the servicemen. Allot 8 hours (4 lecture and 4 seminar) of class time allotted for the study of social sciences from the reserve of the chief of the institution to study the conference materials in military-training institutions.

Twelve hours of classroom time are to be allotted (4 hours each on each section of the report and the resolutions that correspond to them) to the study of the report of CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev "The Course of Realization of the Decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the Tasks of Deepening Restructuring," resolutions that were adopted and other materials of the 19th All-Union Party Conference in the system of political classes for soldiers, sailors and non-commissioned officers. An elaboration of the content of the report's sections must be done in close connection with the content of the resolutions adopted at the conference and the speeches of delegates published in the press and the tasks facing the unit, ship or subunit in light of the requirements of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference.

It should be noted in a brief introductory word that the conference was preceded by a fruitful and candid discussion of the Theses of the CPSU Central Committee. During the course of it, communists and non-party members expressed many constructive suggestions and critical observations aimed at further deepening restructuring and the development of democracy. The conference has confirmed once again that the party has at its disposal a well-defined action program determined by the 27th CPSU Congress and improved by the accumulated experience of restructuring.

The resolutions adopted by the conference have enormous historical significance for the fate of the country and are an indispensable constituent element of restructuring and its mighty accelerator at the same time, revealing possibilities for society to progress confidently along the path of revolutionary renewal and reinforce the role of the party as the political vanguard. The main result of the conference consists of the fact that a programmatic political position was devised for all of the basic issues that were the topic of party-wide and nationwide discussion based on the Theses of the CPSU Central Committee.

In elaborating on the first section of M.S. Gorbachev's report, "Develop and Deepen Restructuring," it is important to emphasize that the basic question that was resolved at the conference essentially consisted of a search for and substantiation of ways of deepening and ensuring the irreversibility of the revolutionary restructuring that is unfurling in our country. The policy of

restructuring, as embodied in concrete socio-economic programs, is becoming a practical matter for millions. Today people have completely felt their own responsibility for the future of the country and the fate of restructuring. A great deal has been done over the years since April of 1985. And most importantly, the country has ceased sliding down into crisis in the economic, social and spiritual spheres.

The entire increase in national income in 1987 was obtained for the first time through raising labor productivity alone. Real income per capita over two years of the five-year plan increased by 4.6 percent. The annual start-up of housing was 15 million square meters more than in the last five-year plan. The production of consumer goods is growing at a rapid rate. The volume of domestic services to the population has increased by 13.5 percent. The party nonetheless feels that the state of affairs is changing for the better too slowly in the economy.

It would be expedient for the group leader to reveal the ways of satisfying the vital needs of the people for foodstuffs, housing and consumer goods that are projected by the party and cite the principal directions for the implementation of radical economic reforms and the activation of the intellectual and spiritual potential of our society.

The students' attention should be directed in particular toward the party's conclusion that sources of aggression and warfare have not yet disappeared, and the threat to peace on the part of imperialism remains a real one. Guided by the conference resolution "The Course of Realization of the Decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the Tasks of Deepening Restructuring," Soviet soldiers are being called upon to concentrate their efforts on the consistent incarnation of conference directives on the priority of qualitative parameters in defense construction and providing guarantees of reliable security for the Soviet state and its allies. This requirement signifies an unwavering rise in vigilance, the combat readiness of subunits, units and ships and the direction of one's efforts toward the high-quality assimilation of modern arms and equipment and a rise in organization and regulation order for all of the armed protectors of the Motherland.

In expounding on the substance of the second section of M.S. Gorbachev's report, "Reforming the Political System—A Most Important Guarantee of the Irreversibility of Restructuring," the students should be reminded that a program of radical democratization of public political life and the reform of the political system of our state was devised at the party conference. Group leaders must dwell in detail on the elaboration of the basic provisions of the resolution "The Democratization of Soviet Society and Reform of the Political System," and emphasize that its realization will ensure the high social activeness of Soviet people, the effectiveness of our political institutions and the affirmation of the socialist sovereignty of

the people. Soviet soldiers are fully enfranchised citizens of the USSR, and the reform of the political system creates conditions for the development of their creative initiative, a rise in the role of representatives of the army and navy in the Soviets of People's Deputies and the activation of party organization and soldiers' and workers' collectives.

In light of the requirements of the conference resolution, a reconsideration of existing provisions and instructions regulating the activity of public institutions is planned in the USSR Ministry of Defense this year, having in mind their democratization, an expansion of initiative and a strengthening of the influence of soldiers' collectives on various spheres of public political life. All types of artificial obstacles to the receipt of progressive people with initiative into the party will be eliminated in regulating party replenishment. The chief criteria for evaluating the qualities of those entering the party should be their political position, real participation in restructuring, attitude toward official duties and moral temperament.

The group leader should pass along to students the basic provisions of the resolutions "The Fight Against Bureaucratism," "Relations Among Nations," "Glasnost" and "Legal Reform," tying them in closely with the life and practical tasks of restructuring under army conditions.

Elaborating in particular on the provisions of the resolution "Relations Among Nations," it is important to stress that service in the ranks of the armed forces of the USSR should be a genuine school of internationalism. It should be shown using convincing examples from the life of the unit and its branch of service that friendship of soldiers of different nationalities serves as a sure means of raising the level of combat readiness, achieving successes in combat and political training and reinforcing military discipline.

Shifting to setting forth the content of the third section of M.S. Gorbachev's report, "Democratization of the Leadership Activity and Internal Life of the CPSU," the soldiers' attention must be directed first and foremost toward the fact that the resurrection of intraparty democracy is the rehabilitation of the Leninist comprehension of the principle of democratic centralism, it is a rise in the role of party meetings and the responsibility of communist leaders for the fulfillment of decisions being made, it is the creation within the party of an atmosphere of principle, efficiency, openness, conscious discipline and party comradeship. Relating the delimitations of the functions of party and state organs, the propagandist should again address the resolution "The Democratization of Soviet Society and Reform of the Political System."

A paramount place is earmarked for ideological work in resolving the task of shifting to a new look for socialism. After long years of stagnation, the party has succeeded in awakening public opinion. And a question has arisen in connection with this: where will this awakened consciousness go, in what direction will public opinion develop? The

party will make use of all opportunities to form public awareness on a foundation of developing democracy and glasnost and is aimed toward creative work.

Restructuring has brought glasnost to the leading edge of life, and it is being realized in the most varied of forms—in the work of state and public organizations, at conferences, meetings, citizens' assemblies and the like. The mass media are a mighty rostrum of public opinion today. They have done a great deal to rehabilitate historical truth and justice, the criticism of shortcomings and omissions and the dissemination of the experience of restructuring.

An expanded concept of socialism as a structure with genuine, real humanity in which the person is in fact the "measure of all things" has been devised at the conference. M.S. Gorbachev's report and the speeches of the delegates were permeated with social optimism and faith in the creative might of restructuring.

In conclusion, it is essential to emphasize that the forum of Soviet communists has great significance not only for our party and Soviet society, but also for all of progressive humanity. The peoples of the world are attentively following our restructuring and see its influence on the easing of international tensions and the elimination of the threat of nuclear war.

The conference provided a mighty ideological charge for the more active execution of restructuring in the army and navy. Soviet soldiers greeted the results of the party conference with satisfaction. Much work lies ahead to realize its decisions. Army and navy communists, Komsomol members and all soldiers of the armed forces should become fighters in deed and not just in word for restructuring, the renewal of our society and a rise in the economic and defensive might of the Motherland.

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12821

Review: 'Evolution of Military Art'

18010445 Moscow: KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Jun 88 Second Edition p 2

[Book Review of Col Gen F.F.Gayvoronskiy, ed., "Evolution of Military Art: Its Stages, Trends and Principles" by Candidate of Military Sciences, Maj Gen A.Antonov: "A New Work on the Military Art", under the "Book-shelf" rubric]

[Text] In-depth study of the history of military arts means above all acquiring an understanding of the trends and laws of their development. The key to understanding them is correct assessment of forces that govern social phenomena and of the development and change of social and economic structures, as well as the marxist-leninist doctrine of war and the armed forces. These fundamental theses of marxism-leninism form the basis of a study undertaken by a group of military scientists from the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Academy in their work "Evolution of Military Art: Its Stages, Trends and Principles" ¹.

Studying the stages of development of military arts from the period of slavery to modern times, the authors stress that specific methods of warfare or military actions depend on the available weapons and technology and on the state of that specially organized mass of people, the army. This interconnection and interdependence gives rise to objective laws which govern the process whereby new methods and forms of warfare actions replace old ones.

At the same time, the reader's attention is drawn on the fact that under modern conditions, changes in the means and methods of warfare have become cardinal. The cause of this is in radical social change occurring in the world and the use by the military of the most advanced achievements of the scientific and technical revolution. The radical change in the material base of warfare may engender doubt that objective laws of development of military arts exist or are relevant to today's conditions. The work convincingly proves that such views are false and underscores the special importance of in-depth knowledge of the history of military arts to our military

personnel. Without it, it would be impossible to understand and assess the main trends in the development of military arts, to apply all the advanced ideas developed in this area to military training and to use the accumulated knowledge in one's work and the Armed Forces' task of defending the socialist fatherland. The fact that these problems are at the center of the study sets it apart from many previous ones, also devoted to the study of the history of military arts.

The authors have analyzed the changing views on the place and role of force in international relations, looked at new approaches to the concept of universal security and studied the need to have an in-depth understanding of the questions of war, peace and the army taking into consideration decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress, as well as demands of the military doctrine of Warsaw Pact nations and its defensive orientation.

At the same time the book has, in my opinion, a number of shortcomings. More attention should have been paid forecasting possible changes in the development of trends in military arts. In addition to the authors' opinions, it would have been desirable to see alternative ones, and main conclusions should have been formulated based on a thorough analysis and comparison of those opinions. It would have been also useful to provide a list of recommended bibliography to help readers study the subject further. Finally, many ideas developed in the book would have been much more convincing had they been illustrated with comparative tables, charts, etc.

The book is written in an accessible language and distinguished by the logical presentation of the material; since it contain much new information for the military personnel, it will be a significant aid in their military and ideological training.

Footnotes

1. "Evolution of Military Art: Its Stages, Trends and Principles", Moscow, Voenizdat, 1987; Maj Gen V.V.Larionov et al; Col Gen F.F.Gayvoronskiy, Editor.

12892

One-Year Training Program for Drafted NCO's Proposed

18010418a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 May 88 Second Edition p 1

[Article by Maj A. Biryukov: "A New Approach is Needed"]

[Text] The proposal of Maj V. Nizov to make changes in the USSR Law on Universal Military Obligation on the time periods for the completion of military service was considered at a general meeting of the officers of our anti-aircraft artillery training regiment. His letter, published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in April of this year, discussed the discharge of servicemen in the course of the third year of service with positive certification and the recommendation of the unit commission. We propose another change: develop a one-year training program for junior commanders. This is explained not only by the complexity of combat equipment and weaponry, but also the persistent necessity of imparting to them skills in working with people.

12821

Response to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's April Reader Survey

18010418b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Jun 88 Second Edition pp 1-2

[Questionnaire and article by the Letters and Mass Work Department of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA under the rubric "The Readers on KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: Replies, Opinions, Advice" with the questionnaire "Express-Analysis": "This Topic Troubles the Heart..."]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in May: Your Opinion?

Dear Comrades! Some 462 people answered the April questionnaire. The express-analysis received 2,340 replies in all.

As usual, a survey of the replies is published on page 2, but we have decided not to do the questionnaire itself in the usual manner this time. We would like to offer the readers a chance to act... in the role of a member of the newspaper's editorial staff. Not everyone knows—it is, so to speak, the newspaper's home cooking—that the editors, at their daily meetings, discuss previous issues and note the best features along with the usual questions. This is done in order to devise creative reference points. But how much do these internal editorial evaluations correspond to the readers?

1. Here is a list of 10 May features from among those that the editorial staff noted as the best. We ask that you also evaluate each on a five-point scale. If a newspaper feature does not stick in your mind, cross it off the list:

—"Following the Traditions of Bolshevism" (May 4, Lt Col V. Kosarev)

—"Who is Against Games Outside" (May 8, Maj N. Burbyga)

—"Without Fly or Elephant" (May 5, V. Pustov)

—"None for the Glory of the Dead" (May 9, A. Khorev)

—"Time to Go on the Attack" (May 11, Capt 3rd Rank A. Orlov)

—"A Million in the Ravine" (May 11, Col V. Gusarev, Col A. Andryushkov)

—"Reject a 'Second Face'" (May 14, Capt 1st Rank V. Adazhiy)

—"People's Commissar Kuznetsov" (May 21, Capt 3rd Rank O. Odnokolenko)

—"Heroes and Heroic Deeds" (May 21, Maj Gen A. Zakharov)

—"Sons, not Stepsons" (May 28, Lt Col N. Belan)

2. It is possible that some material you would like to note in a positive or, on the contrary, in a negative sense was not on the list. We ask that you indicate this and briefly substantiate your evaluation.

3. How satisfactory to you was the level of the May features of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA overall? Underline one of the following:

a) completely satisfactory; b) largely satisfactory; c) largely unsatisfactory; d) completely unsatisfactory.

4. Give data about yourself, in addition to name, age, place of work or service and military rank. We also request that you indicate how long you have been reading our newspaper, if you are a subscriber—since what year—or if you prefer to buy it at a kiosk.

After completing the questionnaire, please cut it out and send it to the address: 123826, GSP, Moscow D-317, Khoroshevoye Shosse, 38.

"This Topic Troubles the Heart..."

The Readers on KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: Replies, Opinions, Advice

First, how the readers evaluated the April issues of the newspaper overall. Some 12 percent of the participants in the poll expressed complete satisfaction, 49 percent were largely satisfied, 36 percent were the opposite, largely unsatisfied, and 3 percent were completely unsatisfied. Interest in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA was at roughly the same level compared with March. Some 84 features were cited as being among those the readers liked most, while the greatest number of votes was garnered by the features "You Are Alien Here..." (author—Maj N.

Burbyga, published on April 26). "Overcoming" (Lt Col V. Kaushanskiy, April 23), "Behind the Back of Another" (Col (Ret) A. Khorev, April 9), "...Because I Am on the Earth" (Lt Col P. Tkachenko, April 24) and "We Swore an Oath on Elba..." (Col R. Zvyagelskiy, April 30).

As we see, 3 of the 5 leading April features were on a topic directly connected with our soldiers' fulfillment of their internationalist duty on Afghan soil. It seems that it was not the merit of the materials themselves alone that had an effect on the evaluation in this instance. The Geneva agreements on a settlement in Afghanistan and the start of the withdrawal of our troops are events of enormous significance which, of course, cannot leave people indifferent. And our express-analysis quite distinctly shows the splash of reader interest in the topic of Afghan events and the topic of the heroic deeds of the Soviet internationalist soldiers. A majority of the forms, almost two thirds of them, touched on this in one manner or another. That is why we felt it was justified to single out in particular namely this portion of the express-analysis mail and devote today's survey entirely to it.

It is enough to take several forms at random to see that everything connected with the situation in Afghanistan and with the fulfillment of our internationalist duty on Afghan soil concerns people of various professions, nationalities and ages... Here are the letters of Lt Col A. Rudometov, Sgt S. Vinlyarskiy, nurse Ye. Orlov from Novoshakhtinsk, worker Z. Sultanov from Baku, N. Klimenchuk from Novosibirsk, I. Novoselskiy from Simferopol, N. Rashidov from Tashkent... Different people write, but they have the same request: "Tell us more about Afghanistan, about the internationalist soldiers!"

"Afghanistan... This is a topic that troubles my heart," writes N. Fedoseyev from Penza, a participant in the Great Patriotic War. "These fellows you tell us about on the pages of the newspaper—R. Aushev, N. Lukashov, Yu. Islamov, S. Kharchenko and others—are true heroes."

It is perhaps especially noteworthy that the number of replies from 13-, 14- and 15-year-old young men and women has increased among those answering our questionnaire. And judging by the replies, it is namely the topic of Afghanistan that has attracted their attention to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

"I began to read your newspaper last year," writes, by way of example, a fourteen-year-old schoolgirl from Tomilino in Moscow Oblast, O. Maksimova, "and at first I did not like it at all. But now lately you have begun to relate properly about Afghanistan. Today I read the paper from front to back." "Thanks to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA for the fact that it told about such a man as Viktor Tarasov and published his verses," writes ninth-grader N. Sidorenko from Leningrad. "We have different types of people in my class. There are those who care

about nothing, but it even reached them when I brought that feature to school..." History teacher V. Remchukov of Yagodnoye in Magadan Oblast reports that he uses the sketches on the internationalist soldiers that have won the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for their heroic deeds to conduct discussion and class hours, and this helps him in the military and patriotic education of the pupils. "Some of my kids," he writes, "have now started subscribing to your newspaper. So don't let up on this."

There are, of course, opinions of a different sort in the replies as well. Not many, but there are. One of the participants in the express-analysis, who put down an unintelligible signature, true, wrote the following: "How much can there be of these bullets, those explosions and those dushman... There are ultimately other no less interesting topics." N. Kuznetsov of Moscow is somewhat in solidarity with this opinion: "There is no need to puff up the theme of Afghanistan so. Our boys are leaving there and thank God. We must forget all of this, and the sooner the better."

Letters of this type, of course, should be commented on. But we will leave that to our readers. "The events in Afghanistan," writes eighteen-year-old worker D. Sukhov from Kirsha in Leningrad Oblast, "are an indelible page in our history. And whether we want to or not, they cannot be erased from popular memory. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has made more active the showing of examples of courage and heroism by the internationalist soldiers. But so much of this remains to be told. No one should be omitted, not one hero should be forgotten." "We are saying much today about the 'blank spots' in history," writes Col (Ret) P. Pustovoy of Reutovo in Moscow Oblast as if continuing this thought, "but what a shame it will be if we ourselves today leave our descendants some new 'blank spots' connected with Afghanistan!" This was expressed even more sharply and emotionally by S. Nikolayenko from Krivoy Rog: "One of the bitterest and most terrible realities of the period of stagnation," he writes, "was the silencing of the truth on what was happening in Afghanistan. Battles took place, people perished, while the press, including KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, put on the guise that none of it was happening. Now it is as if we are paying back a debt. And it is a very large debt. And justice demands that apart from relating what is happening today in Afghanistan, we must without fail return to what happened there at the beginning of the 1980s."

This same theme—the theme of remembering, of our debt to the internationalist heroes, to those who gave their lives on Afghan soil or were wounded or crippled, is also raised in the letters of Maj A. Poteshkin, cadet A. Shishkov, M. Kuznetsova from Klyuchevskiy in Chita Oblast, Ye. Byukova from Volodarskoye in Kokchetav Oblast and many others. A number of readers write with alarm and concern in this connection of the insultingly indifferent attitude toward the former internationalist soldiers and the families of those who were lost. They reacted with genuine

indignation and pain to the articles "You Are Alien Here..." and "Overcoming," in which examples of that sort are cited.

"I was reading the feature 'You Are Alien Here...,'" writes the wife of officer N. Makarevich from Novocherkassk, "and it was simply terrible. My own husband is in Afghanistan, and I am thus especially close to the tragedy of the Kozin family. How can this happen in our society? Why do these functionaries get away with everything?" Today we can report to the readers that the fate of the lost officer's family has, at the behest of the USSR Minister of Defense, been taken up by the representative of the Main Personnel Administration in the area. The widow I.I. Kozin has been granted a separate two-room apartment in the city of Znamenok. Her children have been registered with her. As for measures in relation to those who permitted red tape and indifference toward the family of the lost officer, we will report on that in an upcoming issue. "The attitude toward the internationalist soldiers," feels N. Bakayev from Ufa, "is one of the touchstones on which the true face of any Soviet and party leader is displayed today: do they really care about people or so they just chatter about them?" "Reveal by name those who display indifference toward the soldiers returning from Afghanistan," demands Lt Col (Res) N. Volochay.

Readers are making very definite demands on that plane of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. Col A. Shchukin writes "I wrote N. Burbyga's feature 'You Are Alien Here...' into two categories of the form at once—into the best and the worst material. Good, in that it is written so passionately and with such agitation. Bad, in that matters are still, judging from everything, 'hanging in the air.' You should not only assert that things have gone poorly with this or that officer's or soldier's widow or with a wounded soldier, you should literally battle the bureaucrats who are carrying out the measures."

There are also letters among the mail that touch on a somewhat different facet of the problem: is it only certain specific officials who are guilty of an indifferent attitude toward the internationalist soldiers and their families? Are we, the rest, sufficiently lavish with our warmth and sympathy toward those who in the current, nominal peacetime, have had to endure the genuine evil of war? Alas, it must be acknowledged that many in the lethargy of the stagnant years lost the sharpness of their perceptions of another's misfortune, another's grief. Indifference and apathy have deeply infected many, and it is not so easy to treat these ailments. It is disgraceful when a person who has honorably fulfilled his soldier's duty and has the right to privileges has to undergo procrastinations and humiliations to get those privileges, but something else is even more disgraceful—when, say, another wounded soldier has no one call on him in the hospital for months, when an invalid who has returned from Afghanistan is living in some city and his compatriots—Komsomol members—don't even know it...

The return of our boys from Afghanistan," writes a student from Moscow, N. Bakhorev, "should force all of us

to get ourselves together and truly recall what the concepts of kindness, compassion and conscience finally mean!" He poses another problem as well: "Even if a person returns from Afghanistan alive and well, one cannot forget that he could still have no small problems of his own connected with social and psychological adaptation..."

Yes, returning—it is not just the road home and festive meetings. And those readers who ask that we relate more on how the fate of the officers and soldiers takes shape after Afghanistan, on those internationalist soldiers who have achieved no small success on native soil—both in the service and in civilian life—are, in our opinion, quite right. The truth also cannot be concealed of those instances where some of them cannot find peace and crack up, as they say—it happens, albeit not frequently. N. Gerasimov from Tula, student O. Vikhrev from Moscow and others propose that we should inveigh more actively for the inclusion of reserve soldiers who have been through Afghanistan in the military and patriotic education of the pre-draft youth.

Many of the questionnaires also express the request to relate in more detail the situation in Afghanistan itself. "This country has become especially close to us today," writes Sr Lt S. Petrov, "and we, the Soviet people, are of course not at all indifferent as to how events turn out there. Please inform the readers about all that is connected with the fulfillment of the Geneva agreements, how the United States, Pakistan and Iran respond to our goodwill gestures..." N. Prokofyeva from Alma-Ata requests more information on the economic and humanitarian aid that our country is rendering to the Afghan people. "According to your other features," she reproaches the newspaper, "the impression could take shape that it is only our people who have gained there. But after all, that is not so: so many roads, bridges, schools and hospitals have been rehabilitated and built there, so much vitally important cargo has been shipped in, so many Afghan lives have been saved by Soviet medical personnel! We must speak of this at the top of our voices."

Frankly speaking, reasonable criticism. We will try to take it into account in our work. As well as the suggestions of N. Gorbenko of Kiev, who asks that we tell more about the activity of the UN observers in Afghanistan, and war veteran N. Kiselev from Odessa, who wants a series of reports on the Afghan Army, among others.

12821

Maj Gen Bay on Benefits for Returning Afghan Veterans

18010430b Moscow CHELOVEK I ZAKON in Russian
No 5, May 88 (signed to press 23 Mar 88) pp 77-80

[Interview of Maj Gen N. Bay, deputy chief, Central Finance Directorate, USSR Ministry of Defense: "Benefits to Soldier-Internationalists"]

[Text] Many letters that the editors receive contain questions about military personnel who are fulfilling their international duty. Readers are interested in what benefits

and advantages are provided by existing legislation for soldiers who are serving in special, frequently extreme conditions. After all, their service is associated not only with serious deprivations, but also with increased danger to their lives.

Our correspondent, M. Karyshev, asked Maj Gen N. Bay, deputy chief, Central Finance Directorate, USSR Ministry of Defense, to answer the questions of the readers of the journal CHELOVEK I ZAKON.

[Correspondent] Nikolay Maksimovich, the questions that brought me today to the USSR Ministry of Defense are the result of careful analysis of the mail from our readers. The authors of many letters, as well as citizens who come to our public reception room, are interested in the housing benefits provided for soldier-internationalists.

[N. Bay] Military personnel who have fulfilled their international duty, both those who are continuing to serve in military districts and groups of forces, and those who have been discharged from active military service into the reserves or have retired, who require better housing conditions, are granted the right to priority housing. Those who have been granted Group 1 invalid status have been given the right to be provided housing out of turn.

After their discharge from active military service, they also have the right to obtain no-interest loans for individual housing construction in the established amount, to be repaid in the period determined by law.

Unfortunately, this legal requirement about providing housing is not always and not everywhere being fulfilled in a timely manner. We receive numerous complaints about the formalistic and bureaucratic approach taken by a number of local soviets of peoples' deputies toward assigning housing to former soldier-internationalists and their families who require better housing conditions. Many such examples could be cited. It is the duty of the military commissariat offices to render them all manner of assistance in this.

[Correspondent] Tell us, please, about the benefits that are granted to soldier-internationalists in the area of education.

[N. Bay] Military personnel who distinguished themselves in combat operations have the right, after returning to the territory of their country, to be enrolled on a non-competitive basis for study in military educational institutions. For military personnel who have fulfilled their international duty, after they are discharged from active military service the law gives them the right to enter higher and secondary specialized educational institutions on a non-competitive basis. Needless to say, favorable grades must be obtained in order to exert this right.

[Correspondent] There are military personnel who received wounds, shell shock or mutilations. What additional benefits and advantages are provided for them?

[N. Bay] Military personnel who in fulfillment of their international duty received wounds, shell shock, or mutilations associated with fulfilling their official duties are paid one time allowances in established amounts. They are also granted a 50 percent reduction in the cost of travel (round trip) by rail transport once per year, and by water, air or intercity automobile transport in areas lacking rail transport. This benefit is retained by the military personnel while they are in the reserves and following retirement.

Military personnel who have invalid status that occurred as a result of wounds, shell shock, mutilations or illness received during the fulfillment of their international duty, are granted benefits established by law for invalids of the Great Patriotic War, including the right to receive medicines prescribed by a doctor; the right to free travel by city passenger transport (excluding taxis) and common use automobile transport (excluding taxis) in rural areas within the administrative area of their place of residence, by local rail and water transport, and on local bus routes; the right to a 50 percent reduction in the cost of residential housing (within the limits of established norms) occupied by these invalids and their family members living with them; as well as other benefits.

Increased pensions are provided for military personnel who have invalid status associated with fulfillment of their international duty. Invalid pensions are allotted to them in the amounts provided by law for invalids of the Great Patriotic War.

[Correspondent] An important benefit in the area of pensions for soldier-internationalists is, in particular, recording their service in years served for pension purposes on a beneficial basis. Tell us about this in more detail, please.

[N. Bay] Time of service associated with fulfillment of international duty and participation in combat operations is recorded in years served for pension purposes under beneficial conditions—based on a calculation of 3 months for 1 month served. This procedure for counting years served for pension purposes should not be confused with the procedure established by law for counting the amount of time worked, which authorizes a pension for age, that is designated by the social security organs. Active military service, including that associated with fulfillment of international duty, is counted in the overall years worked on a one for one calendar basis.

[Correspondent] What benefits are established for the families of military personnel who have been killed?

[N. Bay] The parents, wives and minor children of military personnel who were killed or died as a result of a wound, shell shock, mutilation or illness obtained in

combat operations or while carrying out other duties of military service in the period of fulfilling their international duty are paid one time allowances in the established amounts.

In addition, beneficial conditions are provided for the families of these military personnel for designation and payment of pensions provided for loss of the breadwinner. The wives and incapacitated relatives of these military personnel are granted pensions regardless of whether they are dependents of the serviceman. The pension is granted to the wife when she reaches 50 years of age, and school children of the serviceman are paid a pension until they have completed a secondary or higher educational institution (but not after they have reached 23 years of age).

The families of servicemen who have been killed that require improved housing conditions are provided housing on a priority basis. Housing occupied by families receiving pensions as a result of loss of the breadwinner are paid in the amount of 50 percent of the apartment payment, and they receive a single amount for extra living space (up to 15 cubic meters). They are also granted a 50 percent reduction in payment of utilities. These benefits in payment for housing and utilities are granted to pensioners (wives and relatives) of deceased military personnel, regardless of the type of pension they receive.

I should also discuss the benefits for workers and employees fulfilling their international duties. A payment of one time allowances is provided for them in case they are wounded, shell shocked, or mutilated while fulfilling their international duty, and in case of their death a one time payment is paid to their families.

[Correspondent] Our readers also ask questions about the benefits and advantages for soldier-internationalists who require medical health resort treatment. What are these benefits?

[N. Bay] When military personnel receive serious wounds, shell shock or mutilations associated with fulfillment of their international duty, after hospital treatment they are sent to sanatoria or rest houses for a period of 1 month, without collecting travel costs from them. All military personnel who have fulfilled their international duty and been discharged from active military service have a priority right to being provided at their place of work trip tickets to sanatoria, preventive clinics and rest homes. Military personnel who have received invalid status associated with fulfillment of their international duty, with appropriate medical statements, enjoy the right to free prosthetic appliances on a priority basis, and to obtaining an automobile with hand controls.

[Correspondent] Our mail indicates that not all military personnel who are fulfilling their international duty understand to whom and when the 45 day leave is granted. Can you not clarify this?

[N. Bay] An annual regular leave of 45 days, not counting travel time to and from, is granted to officers, warrant officers, and extended service personnel, only for the period in which they are fulfilling their international duty. Subsequently, while they are serving in a military district or group of forces, the duration of regular leave is determined in the usual way.

[Correspondent] What if a serviceman, having fulfilled his international duty, is discharged into the reserves or retires?

[N. Bay] In this case another benefit is provided. The military personnel can use the annual leave at a time convenient to them, and, moreover, can receive an additional unpaid leave of up to 2 weeks per year.

[Correspondent] At the beginning of our discussion you stated that in local areas the documents by which benefits for soldier-internationalists are provided are not always executed in a timely manner. Our mail also confirms this. However, I must note that the difficulties that military personnel who have fulfilled their international duty have also arise in many cases as a result of the fact that they are ill informed about legal matters. The benefits and advantages are set down in the law, but in order to enjoy them it is necessary for all documents to be filled out accurately and conscientiously. Let us be frank, these requirements are not always observed. Tell us, Nikolay Maksimovich, what documents are required to receive benefits?

[N. Bay] Military personnel who have completed their international duty are issued certificates about their rights to benefits of the established type, and those who received wounds, shell shock or mutilations in the fulfillment of their international duty, additionally, are given coupons to receive a 50 percent reduction in payment for travel by rail or other types of transport. These certificates and coupons are issued by military units, military commissariats and other authorized organs.

The benefits provided for by law to war invalids are granted to military personnel who became invalids as a result of fulfillment of their international duty, on the basis of the certification of the invalid about his rights to benefits, and coupons to obtain travel ticket under beneficial conditions are issued to them by the pension designating organs. In connection with this, the above mentioned certificates are not issued to them.

Benefits provided for by law are granted to the families of military personnel and other persons killed in fulfillment of their international duty, on the basis of certificates of the established types issued by pension designating organs.

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9069

Doctors, Nurses Who Served in Afghanistan Not Receiving Benefits

18010430a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
8 Jun 88 Second Edition p 2

[Article by G. Akhmedova, T. Sleptsova, M. Alimov, K. Zufarov, and T. Loginov: "Our Sisters"]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA is correct that a systematic struggle is going on to grant benefits to soldier-internationalists and their families. But, there are people among those who have returned from Afghanistan who are out of the field of vision of the newspaper, because benefits are not authorized to them. And they, in fulfilling their international duty, drank not only the soldier's cabbage soup, but their misfortunes as well.

Two of the people who signed this letter were awarded orders of the Red Star in Afghanistan, and we can bear witness that our women, doctors and nurses, especially those who were part of agitation detachments and travelled all over the roads and to the villages, many hundreds of kilometers, risked their lives at times no less than did the military personnel. Bullets and mines, you see, do not know where a man is, and where a woman is, who is authorized benefits, and who is not.

And, if a functionary has the heart to tell the widow of an internationalist, who, by the way, is authorized benefits: "You don't belong here!" is he, as it seems, completely authorized to show the door to a "benefitless" nurse, who lost her health in Afghanistan?

9069

Proposal To Change Annual Training Cycle

18010434b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 June 88 Second Edition p 1

[Article by Colonel V. Yevstigneyev, senior officer at the Transbaykal Military District Directorate of Military Training: "We Are Discussing the CPSU Central Committee Thesis to Meet the 19th All-Union Party Conference—Quality Reserves". First paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Perestroyka must apply to all spheres of our army life and especially to the most important area—combat readiness.

Those sentences in the CPSU Central Committee Thesis for the 19th All-Union Party Conference that discuss the problems of guaranteeing the country's defensive capabilities prompted me to do some serious thinking. It has long been time to make the qualitative aspect of our business paramount, for life itself demand that this be done. Take the program of combat readiness for example. It has become noticeably more complicated in recent years, has become saturated and dynamic and has forced military training organizers to mount all conceivable reserves to intensify the training process. However it is

practically impossible to cram the program into the confines of the six-month training problem that we have universally adopted. There is therefore a contradiction between the former forms and the present requirements in maintaining combat readiness.

The logic of those advocates of the six-month cycle is simple. Conscription into the Armed Forces takes place twice a year and this means that the military training program must be totally "cycled" twice each year. There is no doubt that this opinion was warranted at one time. Young replacements arrived at military units and the majority of them had no serious military training. To maintain combat readiness these young people had to be taught in a very short time, before the next call-up, take their place in ranks and get the subunit prepared.

But the picture has radically changed now. The overwhelming majority of our young people pass through training subunits before going to their units. They are given their military specialty in the training subunit and become a part of military work. Regardless of what we may think of training subunits, we must recognize that when their graduates arrive at military units, they are not novices. But why then must they be "cycled" through the six-month cycle of training from "a" to "z"?

Some comrades from the directorate, some officers from major units and I recently discussed the idea of changing the training process to an annual cycle. The majority approved this move and our arguments were as follows. Planning is simpler and of better quality. Unit commanders get time to fully and completely work out the subjects that they are planning. Now, because of the time shortage, they are practically forced to hold the education of their subordinates to the basics.

A shift to the annual cycle would allow us to conduct the final inspection only one time per year. And socialist commitments would then more logically be adopted not for every holiday, but for the entire year. In addition, all of this would reduce superfluous paper activities in directorates and free up staff officers for specific work in units and subunits. In general there would be more of an opportunity to maneuver men and equipment.

Perestroyka must apply to all aspects of our army life and especially to its most important aspect—combat readiness. And it is critical that we employ all qualitative reserves in this area.

12511

Proposal: Minimum Training Level Prior To Separation

18010434c Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Jun 88 Second Edition p 2

[Article by Senior Lieutenant S. Matveychuk, Air Defense Forces: "If We Experiment"]

[Text] I was very interested in reading Major V. Nizov's letter ("I Want to Recommend...") that was published in

the newspaper on 8 April 1988. I myself intended to make a similar recommendation, but at the last moment I doubted whether it would be published.

However the newspaper has a discussion on an urgent subject, a discussion that will hopefully end with a changed sequence for the passage of service for conscripts, for life itself demands this. One would think that every commissioned and warrant officer has enough examples to show it.

Private G. Magomedsharipov arrived at our location eighteen months ago. One would think that we could teach him a lot in that time, but the soldier has not mastered a single one of the specialty that there are in a radio support battalion. And yet Lieutenant Colonel V. Yanchenko and other officers conscientiously worked with him a lot. But as the saying goes, little good came of it. Moreover Private Magomedsharipov succeeded in picking up penalties for violating military discipline.

And there is another soldier who is, figuratively speaking, following in his footsteps. He has a careless attitude toward his service and is not trying to master a specialty, although his commanders and fellow servicemen have made several attempts to help him. But as the saying goes, things are still right where they started.

What is surprising is that when the time came for people to be discharged into the reserves, these soldiers were discharged at the same time as specialists 1st class and those who had been leaders in competition. Is it fair to have a "second-class" soldier and a soldier who is outstanding in military and political training serve for the same amount of time?

One would think that it is time to stop having the length of service until discharge into the reserves remain the same. Then we would see people take an interest in qualitatively mastering their specialty, totally learning subjects and strengthening military discipline. And this in turn would be reflected in combat readiness. I feel that Major Nizov is correct in his recommendation and I would change only one thing. The passing grade for dismissal into the reserves should be the assignment of a class qualification to the soldier or its confirmation. Soldiers must be evaluated on all other training subjects just like a VUZ [institution of higher education] student is evaluated during graduation examinations. If a soldier has not been granted a specialty, he can then be so kind as to eliminate the gap in his knowledge and continue to serve.

There are interesting experiments taking place in many spheres of the national economy. Why not try this experiment at the unit or major unit level?

Educational Benefits for Servicemen Following Separation

18010434a Moscow *EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA*
in Russian No 25, Jun 88 p 17

[Article by USSR Ministry of Defense lawyer V. Vandysh: "The Reference Desk: Getting an Education After Army Service". First paragraph is *EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA* introduction]

[Text] After active military service a lot of young people enroll in schools or continue their education where they were studying prior to being called up. What educational advantages have been established for soldiers and sergeants who have been discharged into the reserves? USSR Ministry of Defense military lawyer V. Vandysh tells us about them.

Soldiers, sailors, sergeants and starshina [sergeants major] who have been discharged into the reserves retain the right to continue their education in the academic institution and course of instruction where they were prior to being called up. They are authorized a stipend from the day they are re-enrolled in the academic institution until the results of their final examination session and out-of-towners are also provided dormitory space. They are excused from agricultural work for the first academic year after returning from military service and as a rule are not enrolled in student detachments. If necessary, they can be provided with financial support during this period and the time period for paying off their academic indebtedness is established on an individual basis. Personnel who have been discharged into the reserves at the end of the year are allowed to re-enter VUZ's [institutions of higher education] during the entire first semester without any additional testing.

Servicemen who have been discharged into the reserves and who have a "Certificate of Authorization for Privileges" are accepted into higher and secondary special academic institutions on a non-competitive basis if they receive good marks on their entrance examinations. Soldiers, sailors, sergeants and starshina who have been discharged into the reserves at the completion of their enlistment and have been directed to get an education at the recommendation of military unit commanders are also to be enrolled in secondary special academic institutions on a non-competitive basis.

Servicemen who have been discharged into the reserves within the past three years and who want to get an education while still working are enrolled into VUZ's on an priority basis on par with people who have been working at least a year in their chosen specialty and into secondary special academic institutions on a non-competitive basis. Such servicemen have priority for admission to VUZ's when competitive marks on admissions exams are equal.

Servicemen who have been discharged into the reserves at the end of their enlistments are accepted into VUZ preparatory departments at the direction and recommendation of military unit commands if they have completed their full term of active military service or have completed at least one year and have been discharged into the reserve before their full term because of illness or their family situation. In these cases those who are sent for education or who have recommendations are not required to present their service references to the VUZ.

Those people with a "Certificate of Authorization for Privileges" and also those with a disability certificate with authorization for Patriotic War privileges are accepted into preparatory departments on the basis of a copy of these documents regardless of their length of service and time they were discharged into the reserves.

Graduates of secondary and professional-technical special academic institutions who have been discharged into the reserves after serving in the USSR Armed Forces for at least two years are enrolled into preparatory departments regardless of how long they have worked after completing the indicated academic institution.

As a rule, servicemen who have been discharged into the reserves in the spring-summer of the calendar year are accepted into preparatory departments for abbreviated academic terms.

A preparatory department assignment issued by a military unit command is in effect for one year after discharge into the reserves. Educational slots for those discharged into the reserves are usually reserved at preparatory departments until January-February.

At their request, former servicemen who have successfully passed entrance examinations but who have not undergone competition for full-time admission to a VUZ are enrolled into VUZ preparatory departments on a priority basis without discussion for three years after being discharged into the reserves.

Rectors of higher academic institutions and directors of secondary academic institutions must efficiently resolve all problems associated with educating servicemen who have been discharged into the reserves and with establishing appropriate housing and living conditions for them.

12511

Problems in Selection, Training of NCOs
*18010258 Moscow AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA in
Russian No 11, Jun 88 p 12*

[Article by Major I. V. Gayday: "Who Should Be an NCO?"]

[Text] The sergeant had not even served a full month after graduating from the training subunit when the question arose of removing him from his position. Why does this often happen? This urgent problem, which needs to be solved, is discussed by Major I. V. Gayday, bearer of the order of the Red Star. In the past he was chief of staff of a training battalion, served in Afghanistan and at present is a student at the M. V. Frunze Military Academy.

ITEM 1: SELECTION. How is it carried out? The persons working in the military commissariat must approach the selection of conscripts for the training subunits in a responsible manner. In this regard there are documents laying out the appropriate requirements. Let us look at things the way they are, however. Anyone who has gone to bring in new recruits even once knows perfectly well that these requirements are observed only formally: "Did you finish high school? Good. How did you study? All right. Can you do three pullups? You will do fine!" A formal approach like this is very prevalent.

How can one select high quality candidates for the training subunits? How is this to be done?

A solution is suggested by practical, concrete experience. During each training period two or three persons from the cargo conveying company were sent to us after serving a month and a half. During this time the commanding officers studied these candidates thoroughly. Of course mistakes are possible even in this approach, but they are less than a tenth as frequent. At least I do not recall a single case in which we received any complaints about the low level of training of the NCOs. Therefore I think that it should be a rule that at first all conscripts be sent to the troops and then after a certain period of service the most deserving be sent to the training subunits. After the training period has been completed the graduate specialists should be sent to the subunits from which they came.

ITEM 2: TRAINING. There are many deficiencies in it. What is a commanding officer of a training platoon striving for? To have fifty percent of his platoon score excellent in the final exams. In this case the platoon will be considered excellent, and the commanding officer will receive honor and respect. In other words the main concern of the commander of a training platoon is quantity! Where there is emphasis on quantitative success measures there is no quality. This is an axiom. This is how sad excuses for outstanding students and noncommissioned officers are churned out by hook or by crook.

The main thing is that because of these shortcomings and mistakes in the final analysis people suffer.

I can recall many examples where a lad who was basically a decent sort had to be removed from his position within a month after graduating from the training subunit. He was not lazy or a violator of military discipline; he was industrious and honest but he could not become an NCO! A mistake was made in assessing his talent. And this was not his fault but it was a misfortune. And then it began: one could not put him on a detail as an orderly since he is an NCO; there is no reason to reduce him in rank. And the boy languishes, sensing his own inferiority. And the commanding officer does not know what to do with him. Where is the way out?

It is necessary to make a fundamental change in the approach to the graduation of trainees in the training subunit. **The evaluation of the work of the commanding officer of the training subunit should be handed over to the commanding officer of the troop subunit to which the graduates are sent. He is really the one who should be given the right of final decision about the level of readiness of the NCO or specialist.** Then the need for squeezing out scores by all possible means will fall away of its own accord; then the main thing will be the quality of training. And this is just what is needed.

Naturally the solutions proposed are not ideal. It is possible (and quite likely) that there are other variants. One thing is beyond doubt: it is necessary to resolve the problem of quality training of NCOs and to do so quickly.

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12893

Quality of Junior Aviation Officers Questioned
18010409 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 May 88 p 1

[Article by Lt Col V. Yarko, air regiment commander, military pilot first class: "And We Have to Pay for the Defects"]

[Text] Today much is being said about the personal responsibility of Communists for the success of the work. Of course, the heights of professional skill are not achieved without assistance from senior comrades, and experienced commanders and supervisors. But, when one familiarizes himself with some of the young officers coming into the regiment and studies their documents, frankly speaking he begins to doubt whether they can be made into true military pilots or navigators. I will cite a specific example.

"During the period of his training in the school he showed himself to be an inadequately disciplined and industrious student. He knows the general military regulations, but does not always fulfill their requirements. By nature he is hot tempered. In his interaction with senior comrades he is tactless and crude. For his personal lack of discipline and discrediting the rank of sergeant he was removed from the position of squad commander..."

These lines were taken from the recommendation of Igor Bergrin, a student at the Voroshilovgrad Higher Military Aviation School for Navigators imeni Proletariat Donbass, when he was presented to be awarded the military rank of lieutenant. It was signed by Maj Grinko, student company commander, Col Ponomarev, student battalion commander, and Col M. Rybakin, chief of the school (other initials on the document were lacking). These people no doubt hold party cards.

Lt Bergrin had only satisfactory marks in the main academic disciplines. This means, according to aviation wisdom that has repeatedly been tested in practice, he will not be able to use this knowledge in the air. It is too weak. Of course, experienced instructors will do everything possible to train the lieutenant as a transport helicopter navigator. But, considerable time, effort and resources will be required for this. One cannot help but ask: Is there any value in graduating from the school a notoriously weak specialist? I am able to make this conclusion due to the fact that this is the second time we have retrained Lt Bergrin after completion of a school. Earlier he already attempted to master a modern bomber.

And now our retraining of Bergrin on a transport helicopter is not going as smoothly and well as would be desired. It has become clear that the lieutenant has only an elementary impression about navigation, and about the methods of carrying out orientation, etc. In short, we have to pay for the defects in the work of the school instructors and commanders.

Unfortunately, the case of Lt Bergrin is not isolated. Practically every year, among the graduates of flying and navigation schools, as well as aviation-technical schools, poorly trained officers are still encountered, who have, moreover, poor moral qualities. The commanders of other subunits confirm this. Who needs such formalism in this work?

9069

Abilities of Higher Rated Pilots Said to Be Overrated

18010435a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Jun 88 Second Edition p 2

[Article by Col T. Sheshenya, USSR Honored Military Pilot: "The Combat Nucleus of a Regiment"]

[Text] When a group of pilots was heading to the missile-carrying aircraft, one of them joked:

"Some old fellows' are going into combat!"

Seemingly, the situation was in no way reminiscent of what we remembered from the well-known film, but the phrase, repeated subsequently about the heroes of a favorite film, with amazing accuracy got across the main thing which brought such far apart episodes close together. Both in the film as well as in reality when air combat assumed a particularly intense nature and the more experienced pilots took off. And now, the seats in the winged machines were being occupied by the best fliers in the regiment, Lt Cols V. Yefremov, Ye. Kaburov and A. Pelevin. This meant that the situation in the tactical flight exercise had become abruptly more complex and for this reason the unit commander had taken a decision to have the most experienced air fighters over the range.

The first-class aviators with honor justified the confidence of fellow servicemen. In an intense air combat they were able to achieve an important and persuasive victory.

From my many years of flying experience I know that such a phenomenon, when success in carrying out the set mission is achieved precisely by the best trained air fighters, has a very widespread nature. And this is no surprise. Who but the high-class pilots who possess the best combat skills can take on the most responsible burden?

I do not want to be understood as though I were endeavoring to dispute the contribution of other, less experienced aviators. The carrying out of many tasks also falls to them and these play a crucial role in a combat situation. But still I am not afraid of repeating that the appearance of a regiment is determined precisely by those aviators who possess the highest level of combat skill.

At the same time, one often hears from aviation commanders that the struggle to increase the number of highly trained pilots is not always looked on in the same manner. Here there are references to the fact that the drive for the number of produced masters of air combat inevitably gives rise to formalism, padding and eyewash.

There may well be grounds for such judgments. I will not conceal that certain commanders do not refrain from the temptation to report more loudly so that the state of affairs with the training of high-class aviators is shown in a better light. Hence, the reduced exactingness upon the candidates for a higher degree of their professional skill and a desire to establish for them, as they say, the best of all possible situations.

Precisely this happened at one time in the unit which was then commanded by Lt Col V. Smirnov. Here a majority of the aviators had the title of military pilots first class. Externally the picture appeared perfectly fine. But everything turned out differently in the tactical flight exercise when the subordinates of Lt Col V. Smirnov had to operate in a situation as close as possible to the requirements of real combat. The aviators ranked as first class did not pass the difficult exam.

And then it was learned that certain aviators among the first-class air fighters had suffered a come-down, as they say, without particular difficulty. For the sake of increasing the figures, a stupid operation was carried out in the regiment. The pilots who were to increase their classification had the weather conditions "touched up" in the flight documents, the carrying out of the tasks was made easier and they were forgiven shortcomings in piloting techniques. As a result the cause suffered. Lt Col V. Smirnov was transferred to another position but the fruits of his activities were present in the regiment for a long time to come.

I feel that there is no particular need to prove that such an approach has nothing in common with true concern for the development of a real air fighter who is up to the most complicated and responsible assignments. At present, in a majority of the air units, a decisive struggle is being waged against "percentomania." Now no one pressures the commander that he have continuously growing indicators. The aviators themselves determine their capabilities in training first-class air fighters and they show more independence, initiative and creativity than hitherto.

But what concerns me is that in some places they have completely wound down the work of increasing the ranks of military pilots first class. Here they have endeavored to restrict them to the essential minimum in the sole aim of avoiding criticism of "percentomania." One can only be amazed how at times the appeals to keep step serve as a justification for idleness and passivity.

The experience of the best units and subunits convincingly shows that their success is based primarily upon attention to the training of first-class air fighters. Here we would again like to refer to the experience of the regiment where Lt Cols V. Yefremov, Ye. Kaburov and A. Pelevin serve and which I mentioned above. In the unit the development of first-class fliers is the number-one concern for all aviators without exception. This work begins even when the young pilots are taking their first steps towards the heights of flying skill. For each of them a specific program is outlined for improving combat skills. This gives detailed consideration to the particular features of the beginning aviators including their abilities and capabilities.

It is these last features that I would particularly like to point out. And here is why. It must be recognized that not every aviator is capable of achieving the highest expertise. There are many reasons for this but the main one, in my view, is that not all the aviators possess such givens which make it possible to become a true master of air combat. I feel that there is nothing prejudicial or insulting in the recognition of this fact. Daily life indicates that a flier who plans to become a model of flying skill, in addition to the desire, must also have the corresponding basis, that is, irreproachable responses, the ability to master oneself in any situation and the capacity almost instantaneously to carry out a multiplicity of the most diverse tasks.

Seemingly, everyone understands this perfectly. But, in fact, one frequently encounters instances when an aviator who does not fully possess such givens is rushed in every possible way and pushed to achieve something that is clearly beyond him. And hence it turns out subsequently that what in principle is a good desire ends up with bitter results. In order to avoid this, it is essential as soon as possible to ascertain the real capabilities of a pilot and determine the prospects for his growth with the maximum possible accuracy.

Unfortunately, as yet the commanders do not possess the technical means which would make it possible to provide an objective evaluation of the pilot's performance with the greatest reliability. In this context, in my opinion, it is not always justified to criticize the first-class air pilots who make mistakes in their actions. Some leaders immediately level the accusation:

"And even a first-class pilot!"

Yes, it is always shameful to see when an experienced pilot makes a mistake. But it must be remembered that he, as a rule, has been assigned the most complicated mission, when the aviator undergoes a maximum harsh test. And can it be assumed that all the blame for what happened rests exclusively on him. I do not mean instances of outright personal inefficiency. Rather it is a question of those situations where the development of events in air combat outstrips the capabilities of a pilot who does not have the required response speed and the

ability to keep the situation under control under conditions of a critical time shortage. This is why it is important to have a sensitive, respectful attitude to an officer who by his flight talent and labor has achieved the heights of combat skill. This not only helps to affirm his personal authority in the eyes of fellow servicemen but also contributes markedly to the greater prestige of the high-class air fighter.

And he, as life shows, is still not everywhere at the center of attention of the commanders, the political workers, the party and Komsomol activists. Some of them feel that the material remuneration by which the conscientious military service of a high-class military pilot is recognized should be sufficient. But with good reason it is said that man does not live by bread alone. Much more important for human dignity is social recognition and an awareness that the effort and zeal will be remunerated by respect from those around. If the achieving of the goal of military pilot first class is viewed as a commonplace event, then one can be certain that with such an attitude you will not produce feelings of pride in the aviators for high professional skill.

Certainly the true heights of military skill are achieved by difficult, tenacious labor, by enormous effort and total self-dedication. For myself I know how much effort has to be spent in order to acquire a readiness to carry out any given mission.

Hence, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the military pilots first class are the combat nucleus of the regiment which also is the primary determinant of its capacity to successfully carry out any mission.

10272

Col Gen Borsuk Responds to Letter on Quality of Flight Training

18010435b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Jul 88 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Col Gen Avn A. Borsuk by *Krasnaya Zvezda* Correspondent Col V. Seledkin: "To Assume Responsibility More Boldly"; place and time of interview not given]

[Text] [Introduction] "At times the impression is created that certain superiors delight in using their right to cancel flights on the slightest pretext." This conclusion was drawn by the Military Pilot First Class Col A. Shtepa in his article "Risk Factors" published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 20 February. In it the author analyzes the reasons for various instances of violating flight safety. The article evoked a broad response among the military aviators. Many of them pointed out, like Col A. Shtepa that the main impediment on the path to further improving the combat skill of the aviators has become the numerous prohibitions which fetter the independence of the commanders and prevent them from fully utilizing

the rich arsenal of methods and procedures for improving the flight training of the aviators. To comment on these judgments, the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Col V. Seledkin has interviewed the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces for Combat Training, Col Gen Avn A. Borsuk.

[Question] Comrade Colonel General! Certain readers of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA have voiced the opinion that many prohibitions derive from the workers of the central apparatus of the Air Forces. What can be said on this question?

[Answer] I agree fully with those comrades who emphasize that the abundance of all sorts of prohibitions has a pernicious influence on the steady pace of flying and sharply reduces the quality of pilot training. I myself am a pilot and I know what a depressing effect the artificially created obstacles have on the aviators. I will not enumerate the consequences of such practices. They have been set out in sufficient detail in the articles "The Risk Factor" of Col A. Shtepa, "Hobbled Initiative" by Lt Col V. Korotovskiy and Capt S. Frolov as well as other materials on this question.

But I would like to say the following. Certain comrades seriously assume that all the restrictions are merely the fruit of the activities of the central apparatus of the Air Forces exclusively. In their opinion precisely here lie the sources of the overensurance, the bans on initiative and the desire to curtail as much as possible the independence of the commanders on the questions of organizing the combat training of the aviators.

This is a profound error. In actuality, some time ago such prohibitions did exist, however, at present, when under the conditions of restructuring the center for resolving many of the most important problems of combat training has been shifted directly into the regiment and subunit, the practice of the unjustified imposing of prohibitions has outlived itself. At present, all the guiding documents are aimed at granting the commanders maximum independence, providing them with initiative and encouraging activity aimed at achieving high end results.

The Air Forces Command is in no way interested in training the aviators following oversimplified methods, so to speak, standing over them during the flights, for in modern combat victory is won only by the air fighter who is accustomed to act boldly, decisively and with initiative.

[Question] But, as the newspaper articles and the responses from the readers to them show, the bans still occur....

[Answer] Yes, and there is nothing contradictory here to what I said. There are many examples when the organization and execution of the flights in the regiments are

carried out with violations of the established rules. In this instance it is the direct official duty of a commander who observes such errors to impose a ban on the flights. This was the case, for example, in the regiment commanded by Lt Col V. Fedorenko who has now been relieved of his position. In the course of a planned inspection conducted by officers from the Air Forces High Staff, it became clear that the unit flagrantly violated the procedure for flight planning as the young pilots were to carry out missions for which they were not fully prepared. Naturally, in the aim of preventing serious consequences the decision was taken to stop the flights.

I would like to add to this that the bans can concern not only a regiment as a whole but also squadrons, flights and individual pilots. Here the main thing is the necessity of providing flight safety and excluding any unjustified complications. But in such instances it is not a question of across-the-board restrictions. There is the opinion that information about flight accidents can give rise to a wave of cancelings. This is an erroneous viewpoint. The task is something else, namely a desire to focus the attention of the aviators on the reasons which led to one or another violation and to draw correct conclusions for oneself and consider them in further work. Without this the individual instances can become a system and lead to severe consequences not only at one airfield but also at a number of other places where an analogous situation has arisen. I could mention more than one example when the discovery and analysis of the reasons for a specific air accident prevented the appearance of them in other places.

[Question] In this instance, what prevents the commander of an air regiment from fully showing his independence if no one intends to place restrictions on his path?

[Answer] I would put it this way: his inability to utilize in a sufficiently reasonable and sound manner the independence granted him. Do you know that sometimes I get the impression that the aviators who say a great deal about the infringement of their initiative are nearly concealing by such arguments their inability to act intelligently, decisively and creatively. For example, in the regiment where one of the squadrons is under the command of Lt Col Z. Sakanyan, the aviators were preparing for a tactical flight exercise in the course of which the air fighters were to carry out difficult tasks. In a discussion of these tasks certain aviators stated that the plans were rigidly governed by "instructions from above" and no room remained for any independent decisions. Then the regiment's commander was asked to set out his ideas on the over-all concept of the exercise. Here it was agreed that any initiative which benefited things would be realized. But what happened? The commander was unable to define in a clear and intelligent manner his own request for improving the quality of aviator flight training.

This fact contains what in my view is a very noteworthy circumstance. At present, when the barriers on the path to the independent activities of the commanders are being lifted more and more decisively, it suddenly turns out that some of them are merely unprepared for such a free search for the necessary decisions. Certainly here the practice of previous years is still felt, when initiative could run only from the top down but it is high time to cease referring to just the errors of the past. From complaints we must move on to action. And primarily to acquiring true independence.

But what happens at times? Under the guiding documents the commanders of the air regiments have been granted every opportunity to determine the organization of the combat training for the unit's aviators independently and proceeding from the specific conditions and tasks. But as they say, just dare try! And so some of them beseech the superior levels with requests to give them a detailed program of actions for all instances of life.

This is what the habit of "assistance" means where each step of the commander was scheduled out by the corresponding instructions and orders! However, life, as was emphasized at the 19th All-Union Party Conference, with every passing day more and more urgently demands that all levels of leaders should more boldly assume responsibility for the most effective carrying out of the posed tasks and show a creative and independent approach.

There are such commanders. Among such thinking and enterprising aviators I would put, for example, Col V. Basov. I have known this officer for over a year and in him there is always a desire to seek out new, more effective ways for improving the combat skill of the pilots. During the current training year, the subordinates of Col V. Basov have mastered the tactical procedures which make it possible to more successfully conduct air combat. It is worth pointing out that the aviators work out their own innovation and introduce it not under some instructions "from above" but by their own initiative. Here not everything went smoothly. Some of the aviators showed caution for the new procedure wondering why they should take the risk. There are already well mastered methods, fully enough of them. It took all the experience and authority of Col V. Basov to firmly introduce the innovation into the combat arsenal of the regiment's pilots.

[Question] Hence, it turns out that the officer takes a risk. But what would happen if it was less than a total success?

[Answer] Obviously, everything depends upon what is invested in the concept of risk. Certain aviators understand this as some precipitous passion where it is a question of all or nothing. As a rule, here the outcome is usually lamentable.

But it is another thing when the drive to a new level of combat skill is carefully thought out, completely examined and dependably prepared. This is precisely what happened in the case of Col V. Basov. High professional training, non-routine thinking and the ability to look to tomorrow made it possible for him to assume responsibility for successfully carrying out this task.

[Question] The question comes up: What was he risking then if all the chances had been minimized?

[Answer] As they say, the unknown always entails a certain level of risk. In a new undertaking you cannot provide for everything. But if, in setting out you see only problems ahead, then ultimately this is what you will get. At the same time, certain commanders do not seek independence merely because this is a bother and is unsafe. And so it happens that a regimental commander merely thinks about one thing: how he can survive for a year or two without accidents. And at the end there is the question of promotion. If you take on too much, you can all of a sudden trip up.

The situation is far from blameless. Such a position could be directly called antirestructuring. Certainly a regimental commander who is safely "sitting it out" for

a higher position in the new place as well will endeavor to do everything to protect himself against possible accidents. Here you will not find either creativity or independence. Here the main task is to securely shield oneself behind instructions, orders and numerous restrictions. And it is precisely in such a situation that all sorts of prohibitions are born.

I feel that such a practice can be eradicated only by one method and that is assessing the activities of a commander by the final result. He certainly has everything to achieve the set goal including the collective, equipment, knowledge, skills and ability. So let him use these fully for better and more effective results.

In such a situation it is immediately clear who can do what. As yet, unfortunately, in many instances preference is given to those commanders who endeavor, as they say, not to excel. In other words, they work in the old way and under any pretexts avoid the search for new forms to train the aviators. We must fight uncompromisingly against this.

10272

Port Call: Yegorov in Algeria

18010410b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 May 88 p 5

[Article: "Visit of Soviet Ships"]

[Text] In accordance with an agreement, a detachment of Soviet warships made up of the large antisubmarine ship "Komsomolets Ykrainy" and the patrol ship "Pytlivyy" under the command of Vice Adm V.G. Yegorov will pay an official friendly visit to the port of Algiers from 30 May through 3 June.

9746

Officer Struggles with Protectionism in Navy

18010420 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Jun 88 Second Edition p 1

[Article by Capt Third Rank S. Bryndin: "Truth Has No Variants"]

[Text] "We shall oppose bureaucratic interests and self-protective psychology with high party-mindedness, truth and purity."

Having taken over management of the unit rear services and checked the state of affairs before the planned inspection, I established that the previous chief, F. Iovel, an officer and communist I emphasize, did the unit, and respectively also the state, great material harm, in the amount of approximately 16,000 rubles. It was based on machinations with automotive gasoline. The materials of the administrative investigation conducted on my report comprised 200 pages. Everything was confirmed and proven by a subsequent inspection and by witness testimonies of officers, warrant officers and employees. Seemingly there were no further problems. But it only seemed so. Many officials jumped in to protect Iovel, who had compromised the high title of communist (behind him, you see, stood those who had stolen this gasoline). The mechanism was simple. Officers V. Gerasimov, V. Simanov, N. Markin, and others began to "persuade" personally each individual who confirmed the thefts. It is simply amazing how people changed after such persuasion.

Now I must discuss the main thing that caused me to write to the editors. After signing the report on the results of the inspection, eight penalties were inflicted upon me. I was told directly by Communist V. Gerasimov that if I did not give up my intentions to seek justice I would regret it bitterly. However, I do not intend to yield, despite the fact that a personal case was fabricated against me. I was punished with a strict reprimand with annotation in my CPSU party card stating: "For omissions in service and attempt to discredit the command." They were no longer investigating the question of the thefts of communist Iovel and the involvement of others in this. The problem of a moral climate in the collective was no longer being discussed.

And here is the result. I was dragged through a court of honor of senior officers. And I was censured, although later once again this fact of unprecedented pressure and persecution for criticism was also protected by the prosecutor. I was expelled from the party. Happily, I was justified by the party commission at the VMF [Navy] political directorate, and my actions and position were supported. I was restored to the ranks of the party. But this is only in Moscow.

Locally everything remained as before. First, I was transferred without my concurrence to a new place of service, thereby creating insurmountable difficulties with everyday living conditions (by hook or by crook, as the saying goes), and was not allowed to continue my studies in the academy where I was studying, on the basis that, they said, a "paper" had come from the unit... Second, some of the funds to make up for the losses are now being recovered from me (?) by order of the commander, although the garrison prosecutor also protested this decision. Third, I have remained branded in the collective. Even now rumors and hearsay continue to the effect that I am a malicious slanderer.

Reading carefully today the CPSU Central Committee thesis to the All-Union Party Conference, I find an answer to my main question there where it discusses overcoming the difficulties in the struggle of the new against the old. Truly, restructuring is going on in a contradictory way, and until party organizations stand up to protect the honor and worth of ordinary communists, we will not achieve success. We must oppose bureaucratic interests and protective psychology with high party-mindedness, truth and purity.

9069

Quality of Watch Officers Criticized

18010410a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Jun 88 First Edition p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank A. Shevchenko, senior naval officer for combat training, under "Perestroika: the Ship Link" rubric: "For the Watch Officer"]

[Text] It all happened literally in a few seconds. The lead ship plunged into a heavy wave and unexpectedly began to "slip" downward. We almost converged. But the watch officer of our ship, Lt S. Vinogradov, did not undertake any actions. Having gone up on the bridge by chance, I quickly evaluated the extremely dangerous situation and gave commands to the helm and telegraph office. We were able to avoid a collision....

This episode happened long ago, when I was assistant to the commander of a small antisubmarine boat. But it seems to me that the event is quite typical for our time as well. I will explain why. We were returning to the base after many days in stormy seas. The crew was tired and the young seaman were literally falling over from the exhausting buffeting. The commander, Capt 3rd Rank L.

Baranov, who had not left the navigating bridge, got the worst of it. But the storm subsided somewhat and the commander fell asleep in his chair. The steering of the ship was completely up to the lieutenant....

The importance of the role of the watch officer is also shown by the following characteristic example from the Persian Gulf. Last year, Iraqi fighters erroneously fired upon the American frigate "Stark." As a result of a missile hit, 37 members of the crew were killed and several people were injured.

What happened? At that moment, as the newspapers reported, the commander was not on the bridge and the watch officer, despite having been warned of the appearance of aircraft, did not carry out the necessary maneuver. All he had to do was turn the ship. In the position in which the anti-aircraft system was located, it was impossible to register the approaching missiles.

In our own situation, Lieutenant Vinogradov was not prepared for decisive action when the flagship suddenly lost speed.

Who is the watch officer today? He is the who must be responsible for a great deal on a ship at sea. Theoretically he is the watch commander of the ship. And in practice? One colleague of mine, a submarine commander in the past, called the watch officer an "appendage of the intercom system." Alas, there is a bit of truth in this assertion. Taking reports from the combat posts, he merely duplicates them for the commander. He himself rarely makes decisions.

There is much evidence for this. In the episode mentioned above, I remember the justification of Vinogradov himself: "What did you expect if we were required merely to record the situation." This psychology showed up immediately under extreme conditions. Later on, I had to analyze similar premises to navigation occurrences and the reasons were the same. So what we face is not a chance event but a serious problem.

I happened to hear how this problem began to arise more than 30 years ago. Prior to 1949, the higher naval command schools trained precisely watch officers (this was written on their diplomas). The lieutenants assigned to ships successfully performed the watch on cruise and were prepared for it practically and morally.

Gradually, when in connection with the scientific-technical revolution more in-depth engineering training of the ship's crew of officers became necessary, the course of navigation in the school curricula was greatly squeezed by other disciplines. It would be reasonable to compensate for the training omissions on the ship (which, by the way, is being done but not always productively and persistently). But no good system came about.

Thus, the mistrust of commanders toward watch officers has increased every year. It is now already the norm that the ship's commander hardly leaves the bridge during the voyage.

In paying primary attention to navigation, the commander ignores other questions, especially in tactics. This has even become natural during peacetime. For mistakes in the guidance of the ship can produce a natural real danger to the ship. And here the commander is examined by life itself continuously, severely and impartially. But his combat skills, which are everywhere sacrificed to navigation, are examined very rarely and very conditionally. And, if the ship suddenly finds itself in a real combat situation, the commander will not be able to cope with the guidance of the ship if he cannot completely rely on his helpers: the senior assistant, watch officer, watch navigator, the watch officer of the combat information post and the entire crew of the main command station. But will the commander be able to make such a "qualitative leap" if he rather frequently performs the duties of the watch officer and the senior officer on board those of the commander. Here life presents rich material for thought. In any case, however, one thing is clear: such a situation cannot satisfy the fleet.

In my view, it is essential above all to give back to the watch officer his original role. The entire system of officer training is still far from always being specific. These shortcomings are already visible in the basis of instruction—it has been made too theoretical. But the watch officer is above all a practical worker and not a student in a class of instruction.

When I had to put together the crew of a modern ship, I ran right into this problem, in a manner of speaking. All of the officers were young. One of the most "experienced" of them was the navigator, Sr Lt A. Vlasov, whose short service was in repair work. At first, I took my head in my hands: How can we go to sea? But this feeling gradually subsided and I began to deal specifically with each one. I recalled, for example, the demands that my first flagship navigator of the formation imposed in examinations on knowledge of the navigation theater. He sat us lieutenants down and gave each of us a sheet of paper. He then said, a certain bay for you and a certain strait for you.... That meant that it was necessary to draw a map of the places that he named. One mistake and the examination is not accepted. The same thing in the other 18 positions. On the other hand, there were, as a rule, no navigation errors after a successful examination. And this was just a small part of his system of instruction.

My navigator was also "put through" such a system. The results were apparent. After 2 years, Vlasov became one of the formation's best specialists and a master of military science. I sailed with him, as I did with other young officers, with complete confidence. In this way, I ensured myself a large reserve of time for the resolution of tactical questions and the combat training of the crew.

By the way, after the departure of the flagship navigator, the level of the training of the formation's watch officers declined substantially. And the commanders themselves had to compensate in this matter. Understandably, the main method was instruction directly on the navigating bridge through the imparting of personal experience. But the system for training watch officers must not depend so much on the personal qualities of flagship specialists and it is not their enthusiasm that must be the driving force but an optimum program.

But, as it is said, demand gives rise to supply. At some stage, the navy "ceased to need" strong watch officers. (Of course, no commander will turn down such a person but now he will not dare use him fully as a watch commander). And for this reason the system for training these officers began to break down.

In some formations, let us say, they renounced special folders where information had been collected on naval theaters and on a specific project for ships. These folders were a good help in the training. They almost do not issue special instructions to watch officers on how to maintain and control the combat readiness of the ship and how to guarantee navigation safety. I encountered them only in the Northern Fleet. Many officers, for example, will perceive knowledge of the instruction on the code of signals as an unusual requirement, for it is addressed to the commander. But this opinion is incorrect. It is above all the watch officer who needs to be guided by the signal code—and without pointers.

Here is the testimony of my former subordinate Capt 3rd Rank Yu. Bondarev, now a staff officer: "A watch officer can work efficiently and rapidly in a complex situation only when his movements have become automatic and his thoughts are capable of foreseeing any quite unexpected development of events. All of this is achieved through training. But the instructional base essentially does not present such possibilities." One can understand him. For years now, the ship's crew has been fighting for the use of complex simulators like those used in aviation for the training of watch officers. And the result? This question has heretofore been studied at different levels. Everyone agrees that the question is raised correctly. Until now there have been few simulators. The "standard" explanation: they are expensive. But are the frequent accidents at the fault of the watch officer any less costly for the navy and state?

They can, of course, build simulators with their own hands. For example, our ship experts produced the simulation device for perfecting the international rules for preventing ship collisions at sea. And in general, much can be produced by their own hands. But by no means everything in our time. And the commander cannot resolve all problems by himself. Even the extremely important and primary problem of his own independence. Have him, let us say, try to entrust the

ship to well-trained watch officers, as the Ship Statute allows. It will not be long before this bold person is restrained. How, they will say, did he dare?

This question is the product of the times of stagnation, which—let us put it this way—did not spare the navy either. The sense of personal safety was foremost for many, including for high-ranking officials.

But the passive line of self-preservation does not produce the qualities of warriors. And the bold commander, decisive in everything and truly independent, gradually began to give way to the comfortable and docile commander. It is enough to see how often our ships go to sea without the senior officer on board to become convinced of this. But the fleet is weak without a strong commander. It is now time to remember and take responsibility for this strength. This is why it is important to give back to the watch officer his rights so as to give back to the commander his place on the bridge.

9746

Posthumous Rehabilitation of Admiral Kuznetsov

Short Biography

18010269 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
28 Jul 88 p 6

[Article by R. Ignatyev under the heading "Names and Events": "It Was Not the Fleet Admiral's Fault"]

[Text] Yesterday, IZVESTIYA published a report from the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the rehabilitation of Vice Adm N.G. Kuznetsov in his previous military rank of fleet admiral of the Soviet Union. These shoulder-boards were returned to Nikolay Gerasimovich 32 (!) years later. Unfortunately, he will never know about this; he passed away on 6 December 1974.

So, just what happened? Of what was the former people's commissar guilty?

Until recently, the name of this prominent military leader has sort of remained in the background. No, it had not been prohibited by anyone, but it was customary not to mention it. Even N.G. Kuznetsov's true date of birth was established only recently. In any event, the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, which I contacted yesterday by telephone, gave me an inaccurate date—11 July 1902. Actually, Nikolay Gerasimovich was born 2 years later. The "mistake" happened in 1919, when Kuznetsov went to join the seamen of the Severodvinsk Flotilla. He added 2 years to his age so they would take him into the service (he was 15 years old at the time)...

Before he reached age 35, this son of a peasant from the small village of Medvedka in Arkhangelsk Oblast became people's commissar of the USSR Navy. On the eve of Nazi Germany's attack on the Soviet Union,

Nikolay Gerasimovich, without any special orders from above, brought all the country's fleets to combat readiness. Therefore, the first enemy surprise attacks did not catch the seamen unawares. Combat ships and naval aviation were preserved. The people's commissar of the Navy was a member of Headquarters, Supreme High Command.

"For exemplary fulfillment of missions of the Supreme High Command in supervising combat operations of the fleets, including the Pacific Ocean Fleet, and for the successes achieved as a result of these operations, Flt Adm Nikolay Gerasimovich Kuznetsov is awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union and presented the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal." These are lines from the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet promulgated on 14 September 1945.

Kuznetsov was later relieved of his duties and demoted to the rank of rear admiral...

The fact is that the Main Naval Staff was being inspected in late 1946. As Retired Admiral Yu. Panteleyev recalls, this commission was interested basically in the activities of N.G. Kuznetsov. The result of this inspection was an act approved by Mar L.A. Govorov. In Panteleyev's opinion, the document contained many unjust and untrue charges against Nikolay Gerasimovich and other admirals. Later, a case was cooked up against them. The grounds for this was a letter to Stalin in which one of the officer-inventors reported that supposedly the People's Commissariat of the Navy had transferred to the Allied Powers designs of a secret Soviet torpedo weapon and secret maps of approaches to our ports.

Then Yu. Panteleyev was instructed to carry out an examination. The investigations did not confirm N.G. Kuznetsov's guilt. The group of experts at that time also included Adm N. Sergeyev.

"I carefully studied the map of the Sea of Japan which was submitted to me for examination," Nikolay Dmitriyevich [Sergeyev] says. "It was not a secret map. In general, all of this was concocted. Someone was bothered by N.G. Kuznetsov's accomplishments."

"Stalin did not believe the results of the commission of experts, which consisted of specialists of the Navy," Adm V. Kasatonov says. "He ordered a so-called court of honor to be held and directed that admirals N.G. Kuznetsov, L.M. Galler, V.A. Alafuzov and G.A. Stepanov be brought to account. This court was held in the club of the Main Navy Staff and chaired by MSU L.A. Govorov. I was present in the court at that time. The admirals' guilt was not proven. Kuznetsov remained calm and confident, with a sense of personal dignity."

I asked Vera Nikolayevna Kuznetsova, Nikolay Gerasimovich's wife, to show me the documents stored in the family archives. Among them were many rough drafts by the admiral. Here is what he wrote: "The next phase was

a subpoena for all of us to the military procurator's office and a distinctive interrogation and the suggestion that it is mandatory to sign whatever the investigator wants..."

In the 1950s, N.G. Kuznetsov was rehabilitated in the rank of fleet admiral and appointed USSR naval minister. Later he was appointed deputy USSR minister of defense and commander in chief of the Navy.

In October 1955, a tragedy occurred in Sevastopol; the battleship *Novorossiysk* exploded, and hundreds of people perished. N.G. Kuznetsov was charged with full responsibility. And... "For unsatisfactory leadership of the naval forces he is relieved of his duties and assigned to the Ministry of Defense..." This took place in December 1955. Two months later, N.G. Kuznetsov was again demoted in rank with the following wording: "For major shortcomings in leadership of the fleet and as not conforming in his businesslike qualities..."

He was retired in the rank of vice admiral...

"On 15 February 1956, I was summoned by Minister of Defense G.K. Zhukov," writes N.G. Kuznetsov. Over a period of 5-7 minutes I was informed, in an exceptionally rude manner, of the decision to reduce me in rank and discharge me from the Army without the right to rehabilitation. After this, not only did no one summon me for formal discharge, but some representative of the Personnel Directorate (even without me) came and left for me at my apartment my discharge documents..."

During the brief meeting, the minister of defense charged N.G. Kuznetsov that he allegedly "heaped up" many various rates of pay for extended-service personnel, that discipline in the Navy was extremely low, that the command was dissatisfied with him, and that he enjoyed no prestige. After he had already said "you can go," G.K. Zhukov added that there supposedly were also major shortcomings in shipbuilding.

The former fleet admiral of the Soviet Union was also punished along party lines for everything else. He learned of the penalty only after 12 (!) years...

His innocence was obvious to many, both in the Ministry of Defense and in the fleets. Letters of appeal were received at various levels. Here is what MSU A. Vasilevskiy wrote: "Awareness of the clear injustice committed during the life of Stalin and repeated in 1956 on the initiative of N.S. Khrushchev and G.K. Zhukov with respect to the former fleet admiral of the Soviet Union—today Vice Adm (Ret) N.G. Kuznetsov, forces me to request that the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat instruct that the material on the basis of which this injustice was committed be checked so that it can then be rectified by the appropriate decision..."

Time has assigned everyone to their places. It can be said that justice has triumphed. Another honest name has been rehabilitated.

Fifteen-Year-Old Interview Published

18010269 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in
Russian 29 Jul 88 p 4

[Interview of Flt Adm SU N.G. Kuznetsov by Professor G. Kumanev, doctor of historical sciences and section chief of the Institute of USSR History of the USSR Academy of Sciences, 15 years ago: "Victory Cost Us Very Dearly"]

[Text] This past Tuesday, newspapers printed a report that the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet had rehabilitated Vice Adm Nikolay Gerasimovich Kuznetsov to his former military rank of fleet admiral of the Soviet Union. Many readers of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA who learned of this asked the editorial staff to comment on this act restoring justice with respect to the remarkable Soviet naval leader.

I had the opportunity to know Nikolay Gerasimovich Kuznetsov personally and to meet and talk with him on numerous occasions. Therefore, I gladly fulfill this request. People of the older generation know the name of Adm Kuznetsov well. Beginning his service in the Severodvinsk Flotilla in 1919, he went from sailor to people's commissar and commander in chief of the country's Navy.

N.G. Kuznetsov's talent as a naval leader was demonstrated particularly vividly during the Great Patriotic War. His personal contribution to leadership of fleet combat operations has been noted by conference of the title Hero of the Soviet Union on Nikolay Gerasimovich Kuznetsov.

However, the admiral's future destiny was difficult and truly dramatic. In 1945, when Stalin directed the Baltic Fleet to be divided into two fleets, Nikolay Gerasimovich spoke out decisively and firmly against such a division, which angered the generalissimo. A fake "court of honor" soon followed, and then a meeting of the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court before which four naval leaders appeared immediately: Flt Adm N.G. Kuznetsov, Adm L.M. Galler, Adm V.A. Alafuzov and Vice Adm G.A. Stepanov. The charges brought against them were trumped up; the grounds for this was a letter from one of the officer-inventors who wrote that the people's commissar of the Navy had transferred designs of a secret Soviet torpedo weapon and classified maps of approaches to our ports. Although all of this turned out to be a falsehood, punishment was meted out: Nikolay Gerasimovich was reduced to the rank of rear admiral and later sent to the Far East, and the three other admirals were given various prison terms.

However, this entire story was very absurd and N.G. Kuznetsov's prestige quite high—and even Stalin could not help but deal with this. In 1951, charges against Kuznetsov were dropped, and he was appointed to the post of USSR military naval minister. Beginning in

1953, he was first deputy USSR minister of defense and commander in chief of the Navy. On 3 March 1955 he was promoted to the highest naval rank—fleet admiral of the Soviet Union.

After Stalin's death, considerable efforts were undertaken on N.G. Kuznetsov's initiative to correct the mistakes made in the domestic shipbuilding program during the time he was not in charge. But problems of development of the USSR Navy were being resolved extremely slowly, just as before. N.S. Khrushchev kept putting off the review of the Navy's shipbuilding plans, expressing a negative attitude towards building aircraft carriers. When this happened the next time, as N.G. Kuznetsov told the author of these lines, he harshly announced that the delay was intolerable. Shortly thereafter, Nikolay Gerasimovich was disabled for a long time by a serious illness. Understanding that the state of his health and the situation which had developed would prevent him from performing his duties to the full extent, in the summer of 1955 N.G. Kuznetsov requested that he be released from his position. The request went unanswered.

In October of that same year, the battleship Novorossiysk tragically perished in Sevastopol. N.G. Kuznetsov was held responsible for what happened, although he had not been in charge for almost 6 months due to the infarction he had suffered. He was reduced in rank to vice admiral and retired. Thus, the next injustice with respect to the distinguished military leader was completed. His name was consigned to oblivion. A conspiracy of silence was created around N.G. Kuznetsov: his speeches to broad audiences were not supported, his manuscripts of books and articles were reviewed capriciously, objectionable passages were removed, and his works were not recommended for republication.

It was during those difficult years, 15 years ago, that N.G. Kuznetsov gave me two interviews, which today I would like to offer the readers of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. For reasons stated above, they were not published at that time. Perhaps not all of the admiral's assessments and opinions will appear rightful, but these are the assessments and opinions which Nikolay Gerasimovich Kuznetsov expressed back then. This is his understanding and his opinions about the facts, events and people. In my opinion, it is useful and important to hear them today not only for historians.

[Question] Nikolay Gerasimovich, what days of the beginning of the war are most memorable for you? How did events develop during those first hours of the Nazi attack on our country?

[Answer] First of all, I would like to emphasize that our people have experienced invasions on more than one occasion, and it sometimes happened that the beginning of war took shape unsuccessfully. As you know, the start of the Great Patriotic War was also unsuccessful. But, speaking about the unsuccessful start of war, we also

emphasize that in the final analysis we nevertheless defeated this powerful enemy who attacked us by surprise. This attests to the invincibility of the Soviet people and their armed forces. I will try to dwell on those facts and episodes which may be less known to you, as a historian. Victory cost us very dearly: the world and humanity lost more than 50 million people, more than 20 million of whom were lost by the Soviet Union.

I cannot help but also mention those losses which the country suffered on the eve of the war as a result of the most flagrant violations of socialist law. How many experienced military and naval leaders were among those who perished: Army Commander 2d Rank P.Ye. Dybenko, one of the organizers of the Soviet Navy; Fleet Flagman 1st Rank V.M. Orlov, chief of RKKA Naval Forces; Fleet Flagman 1st Rank M.V. Viktorov, chief of the RKKA Naval Forces Military Council; Flagman 1st Rank G.P. Kireyev, commander of the Pacific Ocean Fleet; and Fleet Flagman 2d Rank I.K. Kozhanov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet. At the same time, many other prominent figures and specialists of the Navy were also subjected to repressions. These and other totally unjustified losses were irreplaceable and weakened our Navy.

Quite a few years have passed since the start of the war with fascist Germany. During that time, naturally, I have had the chance to do a great deal of thinking and write a little. Therefore, somehow the events are separated not by days but by stages.

Recalling the Great Patriotic War, I associate the first stage with the events in Spain. At that time, it seems to me, it was still possible to avoid World War II. Then I remember the Khasan events, when I commanded the Pacific Ocean Fleet in the Far East. Finally (while I was already working in Moscow), I remember the talks with the military missions of England and France which, as you know, ended unsuccessfully, and after them came the treaty with Germany, signed in August 1939. The thought always arises: What would have happened if there were not a treaty and we would have had to enter into war with Germany not in 1941 but in 1939? Of course, at that time we would have been less prepared, for we managed to do very much in 2 years.

But fact remains fact—the treaty was concluded, it left us at peace for another 2 years, and the war did not start until 1941.

I recall the last days and months before the war and go back somewhat—to the Khasan events. As you know, these events were near Vladivostok. On one of those days, the commander of the Air Forces and I went up Tigrovaya Hill, since we expected a possible Japanese aircraft attack on Vladivostok. That is when the thought came to me that we should be so ready that no surprise attack could prove fatal for us.

When I was assigned to work in Moscow after the 18th Party Congress, I remembered these days I had experienced in Vladivostok. And that is when steps were taken throughout the fleets which boiled down to developing, still during peacetime without wasting a single day, a system of fleet operational readiness so that, if necessary, on one prearranged signal—let's say, the word "fire" or "flame"—the fleets could be deployed immediately and be brought to readiness. The first directive was issued to the Navy in November 1939. Intensified training of the fleets took place during all subsequent years—1940 and in early 1941. On 19 June 1941, when it was already clearly stormy at our borders, all the fleets were brought to an increased operational readiness.

June 21 arrived. I summoned our naval attache in Berlin, M.A. Vorontsov, who prior to this had sent me a telegram that the Germans were preparing in the very near future to attack the Soviet Union. Vorontsov arrived literally from the train at about 1800-1900—this was on a Saturday. After a detailed report, he said: "You know, this is war." The statement was quite critical, but there was also very much to support it.

Later in the evening, I was called to the people's defense commissar, Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, who informed me that literally the next night a German attack on the Soviet Union was not ruled out. Former Adm V.A. Alafuzov, acting chief of the Main Naval Staff, was immediately dispatched to headquarters to give the prearranged signal for which we had been preparing over the course of these 2 years. After returning to my office and literally on the move, I ordered a call put through to the commander of the Baltic Fleet, because the Baltic Fleet bordered with Germany and was threatened with the greatest danger.

From Mar Timoshenko's office I called Vice Adm V.F. Tributs, commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. I told him over the phone that I had sent a telegram—"You should have it in 20-25 minutes," but it is necessary immediately to bring the fleet to combat readiness, but not training readiness.

The fleet commander made an entry in his log that he had received the order at 2337 hours, and the fleet began to shift to combat readiness.

By 0200-0300 hours all fleets had gone over to operational readiness condition one.

At about midnight, I was also talking with the Black Sea Fleet, which was given the same order. There are documents which confirm this.

Here is the log entry at Sevastopol: "At 0307 hours, the noise of engines was heard and fascist aircraft appeared." They were met with the fire of our batteries.

And the enemy was unable to carry out his mission—to block the ships in Sevastopol Bay. Under fire from our batteries, the enemy dropped mines on the city and the bay.

At 0315 hours I received a call from Adm F.S. Oktyabryskiy, commander of the Black Sea Fleet. He reported that Sevastopol was bombed at 0307 hours.

Prepared as I was for this, I was still astonished by the entire course of events. I immediately took the telephone receiver and reported to Stalin that the war had begun. Several minutes later I was called by G.M. Malenkov and asked: "Do you understand what you reported to Stalin?"

"Yes, I understand. I reported that the war has begun!"

The naval fleets had to endure a very difficult first period of the war: from the very first hours of the war they defended Libava, Tallinn, the Moonzund Islands. Later came the heroic defense of Khanko in the Baltic and, finally, the 900-day blockade of Leningrad. The absolutely entire Navy was involved in the Great Patriotic War. Up to 500,000 seamen were detached to maintain a single strategy on various land fronts, and they were not only on maritime sectors but also in Moscow and on the Karelian Front. There were well-known events in the south—the defense and abandonment of Odessa, and not under enemy pressure but by order of the Stavka, when a difficult situation developed at Perekop. Then an assault was beaten back three times at Sevastopol, then in the area of Novorossiysk, until the enemy was halted.

Helping the Army fronts, our naval fleets did everything in their power to render assistance on the maritime axes.

[Question] A most difficult situation took shape during those first weeks, particularly on the western and north-western axes. The fate of the Baltic Fleet was even in question, wasn't it?

[Answer] There were very critical and difficult moments. I will tell you about one of them.

In mid-August, when Tallinn was about to be evacuated, I asked to leave the Stavka for Leningrad. Authorization was received, but some events on other axes detained me, and Stalin told me to wait for a while. In late August, I was again summoned to the Stavka, and Stalin asked me: "Are you ready to go to Leningrad?" "Yes, I am." "Get ready and leave for Leningrad tomorrow. We will prepare for you, in addition to your personal fleet affairs, some instructions which you are to relay personally."

I left. Some events in the Stavka made it necessary to dispatch to Leningrad a responsible commission of the State Defense Committee (GKO) and Stavka; it included V.M. Molotov, A.N. Kosygin, G.M. Malenkov, N.N. Voronov and me. I wanted to go there by aircraft. But since a very responsible commission of the GKO and

Stavka had been assembled, we were not authorized to go by aircraft. Orders were to fly to Cherepovets and board a train there to Leningrad. I am telling you this so you will understand how complex and sometimes unclear the situation was. We went by train to Mga Station—this was in the evening and it was drizzling. The train stopped before reaching the station. We could see that the station had been bombed, and tank cars were burning. We were informed that we could not get through to the station; the tracks were destroyed; repair would take much time; and an enemy air attack was expected at dawn. We made our way along the tracks, got on two line inspection cars that happened to be there, and headed towards Leningrad, from where Mar K.Ye. Voroshilov sent his armored train to meet us.

A day later, this Mga Station was occupied by the enemy. We have every reason to believe that there were German sub-machinegunners already next to us when we were making our way through the destroyed areas. That is because it was the Germans' system first to bomb and then capture the terrain with sub-machinegunners.

I flew back from Leningrad on 13 September. Directly from the airfield I was summoned personally to Stalin at the Stavka.

I found an unusual situation. No one else was in the office. The conversation was more polite than usual.

"Did you meet Zhukov?"

"No, Comrade Stalin."

"That means you passed each other on the way. He flew to Leningrad yesterday. Did you know that we have relieved Voroshilov?"

"No, I did not know."

"Yes, we have relieved Voroshilov, and Zhukov has flown there."

But I had a feeling that this was not the main conversation. Then Stalin says:

"You know, it is possible that we may have to abandon Piter (He often called Leningrad Piter)?"

I am relaying this precisely.

"Your mission is to mine the ships, mine them in such a way that, if necessary, not a single ship falls into enemy hands. Prepare the appropriate telegram."

I burst out:

"I cannot prepare such a telegram! I will not sign it."

He was surprised.

"Why is that?"

"This is such a major and serious decision that I cannot do this. Moreover, the Baltic Fleet is not subordinate to me but to the Leningrad District."

He thought for a moment and then said:

"You will go to Mar Shaposhnikov. The two of you will compile the telegram and both sign it."

I went to Boris Mikhaylovich Shaposhnikov, chief of the General Staff, and relayed to him the instructions. He said to me:

"My dear fellow, you are involving me in dirty business! Fleet matters are your business. I have nothing to do with them."

"This is Stalin's order!"

He thought for a bit and then suggested: "Let us write a telegram for three signatures: Stalin, Shaposhnikov and Kuznetsov and go to Stalin."

That is what we did. We went to Stalin. He began to hesitate. Then he took the telegram, put it to the side and said: "Go."

This was a difficult moment.

[Question] Our military history literature does not say much about the actions of military convoys escorting military vessels with deliveries for the USSR. In general, it seems we are not sufficiently informed about the operations of Anglo-American naval forces during this period.

[Answer] Yes, I would like to talk about the operations of our allies' fleets. There are two reasons for this. First, these operations were sufficiently large. Second, and perhaps most important, is that I believe that a future war, if it happens, God forbid, will no longer be a continental war as the Great Patriotic War was. The role of oceans, the role of the seas and, hence, the role of the fleets will be different.

Therefore, in talking about the past war, I try to remember what major operations were under way in the Pacific Ocean, when Japan had destroyed the American Navy at Pearl Harbor, how difficult it was for it to recover from this blow and, finally, how it went over to the offensive and then from atoll to atoll, by so-called "leapfrogging," reached the main islands of Japan. This, of course, was accompanied by major battles, the main one being the Battle of Midway, when the Japanese tried to land and assault force.

The change, like with us, did not come about in one day. This was a rather long and irreversible process. There is an argument among Americans (and not unfounded)

that the Battle of Midway Island in and of itself was not the critical battle. As you know, there are also those in our country who believe, say, that the Battle of Moscow was crucial. In my opinion, the Battle of Moscow created certain prerequisites for the turning-point, nevertheless two battles were crucial—the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk.

[Question] Including the battle for the Dnieper?

[Answer] Yes, of course.

There were many battles in the Pacific Ocean—both large and small—between the American and Japanese navies. I would like to recall one episode: a conversation with American Adm King at the Yalta Conference. Why had they decided to conduct the main offensive against Japan across the full extent of the Pacific Ocean? At that time this was not yet widely known in the press, but he shared the following with me. There were two opinions. One was Gen Marshall's proposal to move along the offshore islands via Taiwan to the southern Japanese islands. The other proposal—particularly supported by MacArthur—was even known as the MacArthur proposal. The second proposal of the commander in chief of the U.S. Navy was to cross the ocean, occupying one group of atolls after another, until they approached the main Japanese Islands. Which, in fact, is what they did.

As we know, the main struggle in the Atlantic was for England's lines of communication, for supplying England. The Germans tried to repeat the struggle of their submarines on the British lines of communication. In history this is now called the Battle for the Atlantic, which by the end of 1943 had begun to tilt in favor of the Allies.

Later, as we know, major operations were the battles for Africa and a number of assault landings on the African coast. Closer to us and directly pertaining to the Great Patriotic War were the convoys. Convoys both in the Atlantic and the Pacific. What was their difference? When the question came up as to how best to supply the Soviet Union with materials under Lend-Lease, three variants were considered: via the Pacific Ocean, via Persia and, finally, the shorter variant—across the Atlantic via Iceland to Murmansk and to Arkhangelsk.

How did these convoys take place? Convoys via the Pacific Ocean, that is, not convoys, but supply was done using our transports under our flag, and the Japanese sunk only individual transports, possibly even by mistake. We transported quite a large amount of cargo to Vladivostok, and then by rail.

But the most intense struggle at sea for convoys, of course, was played out on the route between Iceland and our ports of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. How? British

and U.S. warships were charged with basic security. Our Northern Fleet met these convoys at a meridian stipulated in advance and began assisting the British and American ships.

The years 1941 and 1942 must be considered the intense years on sea lines of communication and in supporting convoys. German efforts had already begun to weaken by the end of 1943, and in 1943 we carried out transportation almost without losses, and especially in 1945, when there were very many supporting forces, but the enemy had few forces with which to attack.

By and large, I believe that the convoys which came from Canada and America via Iceland carried out their mission and delivered a considerable amount of cargo. As you know, American and also British historians write more about this cargo and these Lend-Lease deliveries than they should, that is, they give them a more important role than they actually played during the course of the war. We know that the cargo which we received via Lend-Lease accounted for only 4 percent with respect to that which was produced by our war economy. After the first period of the war we supplied the fronts generally with everything needed in sufficient quantity.

[Question] The opinion exists that assistance from the Allies via Lend-Lease was given to the USSR on a larger scale in 1943, 1944 and 1945, while during the first period of the war it was considerable. But as it appears from data published in the six-volume "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union," Anglo-American assistance via Lend-Lease was most significant and, of course, most useful, during the first period of the war. Is that so?

[Answer] Yes, it is to a certain extent. I do not have figures for Allied deliveries right here which I could cite by years, but I do know that what we received during the first period of the war and also during the first half of 1943 was perhaps not so great, but was extremely necessary for us. Deliveries in 1944 and 1945 were still more considerable and even larger, because we had almost no losses in transports, but their importance for ending the war was not nearly as great as it was at the beginning.

I remember how closely we tracked the movement of the first convoys late in the fall of 1941 and with what intensity and speed we tried to unload them at Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. The Stavka also attached importance to this. When during the most difficult days of October I flew to Kuybyshev for several days to organize a rear services staff there, when partial evacuation of Moscow was taking place, I was urgently summoned to the Stavka by Stalin by telephone. Upon arriving in Moscow, in the situation, I repeat, of the very critical days of 21-22 October 1941, Stalin asked me about the convoys and suggested that I depart immediately for Arkhangelsk to set up everything there and ensure not only the safe movement of the convoys in our waters but also their unloading at our ports. I left for

Arkhangelsk immediately and worked there with the command of the Northern Fleet. The first convoys which arrived in late October and early November were of tremendous importance to us.

We unloaded them, as you know, first at Arkhangelsk; then, when it was difficult getting through to Arkhangelsk, we had to unload them at Murmansk. Later, we modified it—part of the cargo was unloaded at Arkhangelsk and part at Murmansk. That is how I would answer your question about the importance of the convoys during different years.

[Question] In your memoirs, you touch upon the history of dividing the captured fleet. Could you tell me in more detail how this was discussed at the Potsdam Conference?

[Answer] I will tell you briefly about the Potsdam Conference. I would like to emphasize that the Allies kept their "tobacco" separately there.

I was tasked with dividing up the captured German fleet. This question was on the agenda of one of the first plenary sessions. I still remember a harsh dialogue between Stalin and Churchill.

Stalin insisted on dividing the captured fleet into three equal parts. Churchill categorically objected. He turned red and stood up. Stalin remained seated. But the question was not resolved at that session; it was put off, like all the other complex questions which could not be resolved immediately, until the next session.

The conference went on. The day before, I remember, there was a reception in Churchill's private residence. They were there for a very long time, up to 2-3 hours. Truman played the piano; the situation was triumphant. The next morning, Churchill left for the elections in England. No one had any doubts that he would be re-elected, including our delegation. We were astonished the next day at Stalin's meeting with the Polish representatives when we received information from England that the Conservative Party was losing. Atlee arrived already at the Potsdam Conference instead of Churchill.

I reiterate: The conference went on, but the question of dividing the captured fleet was not resolved. Then I turned to Stalin and said that this question had to be resolved somehow, because dragging it out was just what the British needed. Then the following decision was reached between the heads of government: Representatives of the Soviet Union, England and America were to meet that same evening and prepare a decision on dividing the captured fleet into three equal parts.

I remember, late in the evening we, the three leaders of the U.S., British and Soviet navies, met on the third floor of Babelsberg Palace. The Americans were not particularly interested in this matter, but I expected the most stubborn resistance from the British.

The first question that came up: Who was to chair this somber meeting? I remember that the American Adm King said: "I recommend entrusting this to Adm Kuznetsov." He suggested this not out of love for the Soviet Union, but because he did not want to sit through all hours of the night and wanted to finish this as quickly as possible. Someone asked: "Why?" King replied: "In addition to being commander in chief, he also is naval minister." Then I thought, perhaps I can take advantage of this chance, and said: "Thank you for the honor which you intend to give me. But I will accept this mission under one condition?" "Under what condition?" everyone turned to me. "Under the condition that we do not leave this room until we have prepared some kind of a decision." King said, "I readily agree."

And we began to argue. We argued for a very long time. The British procrastinated and said that it was impossible to divide into three equal parts when, say, there was only one battleship and two cruisers.

I had no other way out other than taking some unusual step. I said that, all the same, we would not divide everything three absolutely equal part, but that we should divide it into three approximately equal parts, calling them "A," "B" and "C," and cast lots. I looked at the British Adm Cunningham and said: "I think that you will be lucky and choose the best piece." So it was decided. We identified representatives for the drawing. As far as I remember, it was Adm McCarthy for the British and Adm G.I. Levchenko for us. It took them a very long time to do this. When Levchenko arrived, I asked him: "Well, how are the British?" He replied that McCarthy gladly agreed and when three pieces of paper

were rolled up he put them in his hat so they could be drawn.

In any event, it was decided to divide up this captured fleet by lots.

The Potsdam Conference ended and, after remaining at the Baltic Fleet for a couple of days, I was to depart for Chita, where Mar A.M. Vasilevskiy was located, to help coordinate the actions of our fleets in the upcoming war with Japan.

Several Words in Conclusion. Nikolay Gerasimovich Kuznetsov died in December 1974. He is buried in Novodevichiy Cemetery in Moscow.

He and Vera Nikolayevna had three sons. The eldest, Viktor Nikolayevich, continued his father's profession. He is a captain 1st rank. The middle son, Nikolay Nikolayevich, works at the Institute of Nuclear Physics imeni I.V. Kurchatov. The youngest, Vladimir Nikolayevich, is also in the military. Now a third generation of the Kuznetsov family is growing up—three grandsons and a granddaughter. One of the grandsons bears his grandfather's name.

In the last years of his life, Nikolay Gerasimovich Kuznetsov spent much time on the history of the Great Patriotic War, and above all the Navy. His recollections, those of an honest, courageous and modest man, bring to us the truth about that complex and difficult time, which Flt Adm SU Nikolay Gerasimovich Kuznetsov witnessed and in which he was an active participant.

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Lt Gen Shumilov: Problems of Preparing Military Construction for Economic Reform
18010443 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Jun 88 Second Edition p 2

[Article by the USSR Defense Ministry's first deputy head of construction and billeting Lt Gen L.Shumilov: "Inevitability of Change" under the "Construction Department: How We Approach Reform" heading]

[Text] On January 1, 1989, the military construction department, industrial enterprises, design and research institutes and other entities of the USSR Ministry of Defense's construction department will switch to self-financing. The process of renewal is considerably complicated by the presence of a great number of unprofitable and loss making organizations and enterprises.

How can the situation be improved? There are many resources to draw on: workplace organization and remuneration systems can be changed, nonproductive expenditures and losses eliminated and the collective contract system introduced. In the first quarter, these methods helped increase sums in the accounts of construction organizations 1.7 times compared to the same period of last year and cut accumulated delays to customers 2 times, and that of material suppliers, 2.4 times; above-norm hoarding of materials was reduced 45 percent. Still, economic changes have not been radical enough. Despite the fact that the plan for profits was, upon the whole, fulfilled and profits rose considerably, 40 percent of all entities did not attain their goals, and 29 percent posted losses.

For instance, at the construction department of the Transbaykal military district last year's losses amounted to millions of rubles. There, construction is poorly organized from the engineering point of view and construction machinery and transportation vehicles are not used efficiently.

Similar problems exist practically at every loss making entity. It has become clear that they will not be eliminated as long as their personnel remains economically illiterate. This year, we have initiated economic adult education courses in the construction and billeting system. Managers and specialists from main and central administrative organization attend courses established by the USSR Gosstroy [State Construction Agency] and the military training department of the Moscow Finance Institute. For the engineering and technical staff, office workers, construction workers and military construction workers such courses have also been established, but they are clearly at an rather low level. They have more form than substance.

The introduction of the collective contract system is one of the main components of the transition to self-financing. In compliance with the order of the Minister of Defense, nine construction organizations have been conducting such an experiment since January 1, 1988. In the

first 3 months, the volume of completed construction and assembly work increased 9.2 percent compared to the same period of last year. Productivity rose 13.5 percent, which is three times higher than the overall rate of increase in the USSR Ministry of Defense's construction organizations. Yet, as far as profits are concerned, only one organization, the one headed by Col M.Mikheylov, posted results compatible with complete self-financing.

It should be noted that collective contracts facilitate the shift to new pay rates and managerial salary scales. For instance, at the main military construction administration at a center headed by Col A.Groshev, it was possible to significantly cut managerial personnel, add more than 300 hourly workers to construction teams and shift 80 support workers to main production. These are substantive improvements.

It is also clear that the new financial goals can not be achieved without strengthening construction entities financially. Because they are chronically short of funds, they are constantly in a crisis situation. For instance, in 1987 they paid tens of millions of rubles in fines and reimbursements. Customers are often to blame for this, since they frequently do not pay for the completed work on time. Another reason is hoarding of materials.

To begin with, it is absolutely necessary to continue cutting the number or simultaneously undertaken projects. As to the task of reducing the volume of hoarded materials, it has been decided to do this year's inventory of construction materials, goods and structures not at October 1, as is usual, but at July 1. Surplus items and materials will be sold to military units or civilian economic entities. There is an especially great amount of work to be done in neglected areas: in the construction administrations of the Siberian, Central Asian and Transbaykal military districts, and organizations headed by comrades V.Imnadze, O.Marshalov, G.Merenkov, I.Kosovan, B.Chernyavskiy and A.Bedrin.

New standards of economic management entail considerable changes not only in the substance of economic activity of organizations and their interactions with one another, but in their structure as well. It would be useful to study the experience of the civilian economy in forming industry-based construction groups. In the military, they could include, for instance, construction administrations of military districts, which in turn consist of large construction and assembly sites and UNR [office of the chief of operations].

I think that everyone who works in military construction is concerned how under the conditions of self-financing construction organizations and entities will develop and how social questions will be solved. At present, standard procedures in this area of the military are being coordinated at all levels. There is a provision whereby if an entity's internally generated funds for the development of the industrial base and construction in the social

service sector (the minimum required to fulfill the industrial plan) prove insufficient, some central funds, within the limits of the capital investment budget of the USSR Ministry of Defense, may be allocated to that entity. Moreover, nonprofitable construction entities may be temporarily relieved of paying for their workforce directly.

The task of pursuing new goals that arise from the transition to full self-financing should not overshadow still-unresolved problems. One of the most crucial is to improve the quality of construction and assembly. This is not only an economic problem but a social and political one as well. We have an enormous amount of work to do here, and it should start with military construction engineers, I think. First of all, we need to develop large-scale prefabricated panels, technologically advanced materials and other products which can be manufactured at the factory, as well as advanced methods of construction management.

Considerable mistakes are made when construction industry plants are designed, built, expanded and modernized. Obsolete decisions are often made, which can not ensure required productivity growth, necessary returns on investment or other improvements.

The quality of products manufactured by USSR Ministry of Defense plants has yet not reach desirable levels. For instance, of the plants inspected in 1987, not a single one at the Central Military Construction Administration headed by Maj Gen V. Zakimatoev was producing superior or first quality output.

Experience has shown that the quality of construction projects is mostly determined at the site. Decoration and finishing work is done extremely poorly at many construction sites. Inspections at the Urals and Volga military districts and at the Leningrad Navy base revealed that every other one of the inspected buildings was finished below established technical quality standards. There are many reasons for this. The share of manual labor is at times as high as 80 percent. Modern decorating materials are introduced slowly. Hand power tools are in short supply, and some entities have less than one third of what they need.

One way to improve the quality of construction and construction assembly work, as well as to increase efficiency in the construction industry, is to raise the quality of professional training of military construction personnel. At present, their training standards are extremely low. Yet, the construction administrations of the North Caucasus, Far East, Central Asian, Transbaykal and Turkestan military districts and the Arctic and Pacific fleets have no training detachments.

The implementation of these measures may bring palpable changes at military construction sites as early as in the next six months. Everything will depend on how actively everyone of us joins perestroika.

Complete Retraining of Some DOSAAF Graduates Required

18010407a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 May 88 Second Edition p 1

[Article By Col (Ret) G. Kuznetsov, Zelenograd DOSAAF Driver Training School: "One Hope: To Finish One's Studies in the Ranks"]

[Text] During my service as an officer, I came across instances more than once of young drivers who had completed the DOSAAF [All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy of the USSR] Driver Training School before their conscription had to have much more taught to them. And not only the rules of driving and vehicle maintenance and operation, which is natural, but also elementary knowledge and skills relating to the specific nature of the military driver. Today I myself am an instructor at a DOSAAF driver training school and can judge for myself some of the reasons for such things.

One of these reasons is the incomplete nature of the curriculum. What is, for example, the curriculum for the general military training of cadets? It is nothing other than a roughly two-thirds shortened program of basic military training for the students of general-education schools, SPTUs [agricultural professional and technical institutes] and technical institutes. We thus relegate a single hour to the study of the Kalashnikov assault rifle. Two class hours for developing drill formations and movement without weapons. Try and teach a group of 30-35 people anything over such a time period. Each gets an average of about 3 minutes—that is the whole course of training. And it is that way for almost all sections of the curriculum.

I, like many other instructors, am convinced that general basic training for the cadets of DOSAAF educational institutions in the form it is organized today is simply not needed. After all, the cadets, both in school and in the SPTU, have already assimilated initial military training. The course of general basic training should obviously be aimed not at what has already been completed, but at the formation of a future military specialist.

Take the military driver. He is far more than just a driver. He should know the sequence of operations of personnel around vehicles and in vehicles, signals for guiding vehicle columns and the rules for black-out. He should be able to orient himself to terrain, equip and camouflage a hiding place for the vehicle, decontaminate it, protect it from enemy attack... The list could go on, but one finds nothing of this list in the curriculum.

We had placed great hopes on the new curricula. They arrived recently and brought nothing but disappointment. The general basic training remained practically the same as before.

They have to assimilate the elements of tactical training starting practically from square one once again. There is no tactical training ground either at the school or in the city, essential for the development of a whole series of tactical issues. The same problem faces all of the upper-classmen of all training institutions—there are over twenty of them in our city. Repeated appeals to local party and soviet organs with a proposal to create a unified tactical-training complex for everyone have not led to anything. There reply: "There's nowhere for us to build houses..."

And what of the complex. The driver school has been unable to build a vehicle testing ground for over ten years. The local authorities were even about to take back the land allotted for it. Today the land has been returned to the driver training school, but no one can say when the testing ground construction will begin. These are the conditions under which we must train the future military drivers. Need one be surprised that their training is the cause of much reproach in the ranks?

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Kazakh CC Secretary on Pre-Draft Training, Treatment of Veterans

18010407c Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
31 May 88 Second Edition p 2

[Interview by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col A. Ladin with Kazakh CP Central Committee Secretary Stanislav Vikentyevich Urzhumov under the rubric "Topical Interview": "A Soldier Returns from Duty..."]

[Text] [Question] Stanislav Vikentyevich, I am speaking with you at a time when a partial replacement of the personnel that have served out their stipulated terms and are returning home is taking place in the armed forces, and their places are being taken by the new generation. This process is undoubtedly interconnected with the life of the whole country. Our sons are entering the service in the cities and remote Caucasian mountain villages of the republic with the hope that in two or three years they will have matured somewhat, grown stronger and received spiritual and physical tempering—in other words, they will complete the strict school of civic spirit, independence and internationalism. What could you tell us about this school that our youth will be completing and what effect it has on their further life, work and schooling?

[Answer] Our army always was and remains an important link in the system of political, patriotic and international education of the young. The soldiers in the reserves that have passed through this school are energetically included in civilian life and the fight for restructuring and democratization in Soviet society.

Yes, today we do not have enough thinking and independent workers with initiative able to resolve wisely the tasks of renewing the economic and social spheres of the republic. I will not conceal it, we are counting on this influx of new manpower that will be pouring into the labor collectives. I know the potential of the soldiers in the reserves from more than hearsay. Sr Sgt (Res) Yuriy Pudovkin, the team leader of a Komsomol youth team at the Urals Mechanical Plant imeni 60th Anniversary of the USSR, has become a true leader of restructuring. His team recently took first place and the challenge pennant once again in competition. Yuriy has become a laureate of the Leninist Komsomol of Kazakhstan prize. The position of veterinarian has been entrusted to reserve soldier Talgat Zhakupov at the Stepnyak Sovkhoz in Tselinograd Oblasts, while former internationalist soldier Aleksandr Korniyenko has been promoted to director of the Niva Sovkhoz in Kustanay Oblast...

The KaSSR CP Central Committee, as we know, is applying a great deal of effort to make military patriotic work with youth more active. Reserve soldiers have been irreplaceable assistants in this important matter, especially those that have gone through combat tempering in Afghanistan. It is typical that such energy is especially clearly manifested among former soldiers in recent years. It seems that they simply cannot reconcile themselves to the red tape, indifference and bureaucratism that have put down deep roots in the activity of the Komsomol, the defense societies and our schools. Having encountered new reinforcements that are poorly prepared for service in the army, having seen formalism in military and patriotic education through personal experience, they approach the problem from a statewide angle, devoting personal effort and experience to this work.

We have created some 158 reserve soldiers' councils in the republic that unite over three thousand people. Clubs and military and patriotic associations that enjoy widespread popularity among the adolescent generation are operating actively and are having a positive influence on their education and training for the service.

Steps are being taken in conjunction with the command of the Central Asian Military District to render the essential material and methodological assistance to those informal collectives whose activity facilitates the activation of sporting and mass-defense work.

[Question] However, Stanislav Vikentyevich, they are not helping the reserve soldiers so willingly everywhere. In the city of Ushtoba in Taldy-Kurgan Oblast, for example, they have been unable to find accommodations where it would be possible to hold the classes of military and patriotic circles for a long time. And Kayrat Yeleusizov from the town of Zhayrem in Dzhezkazgan Oblast, speaking at a rally for young reserve soldiers that was held in the oblast center, spoke of the inattention of the rayon DOSAAF [All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy of the USSR]

committee to the proposals of former soldiers. The internationalist soldier Murat Ayazbayev was unable to find support among these responsible comrades despite all efforts...

[Answer] It must of course be investigated why this happens in each specific instance. And we do not fail to pay attention to such instances. But one thing can evoke no doubt: the party, soviet and Komsomol organizations, military commissariats and DOSAAF committees are obliged to assist in every way possible the good endeavors of reserve soldiers that are aimed at imparting greater effectiveness and specificity to military and patriotic work. It must be acknowledged that in relations, say, between conscripted students and their teachers, there is frequently a lack of true mutual trust. And it is something else when the young men have as mentors or simply good comrades fellows who are very close to them in age who have served in the army, passed through the difficulties of the service and sometimes the crucible of battle. Youth seeks an example for itself, a reference point in life. And they find it in their contemporaries who have distinguished themselves through courage and valor. The reserve soldiers of today have really become a joining link in the relay race of the older and younger generations.

I will cite an example of an informal approach to the problem. In the Urals Oblast they were able to find accommodations for the military and patriotic club and determine a pay scale for its director and instructor without putting it off. But there is something else interesting here: a competition was announced through the oblast newspaper PRIURALYE for the appointments to those positions. All who were interested from among the veterans were invited to participate in it. The Komsomol obkom declared that all of the essential conditions existed, but true enthusiasts were needed with their own ideas and suggestions. And the former soldiers reacted passionately to such an appeal.

Clubs and other military and patriotic associations that are headed by young people who have been hardened in the service also actively foster, in my opinion, the development of healthy and morally pure relations among nations. A love for the army and the natural gravitation of the young toward heroic deeds all tempers the adolescents and students of different nationalities around the army pupils. And this is a question of no small importance, as you know, for us...

[Question] Of course, the principles and civic activeness of reserve soldiers should be realized in all spheres of the national economy and public life. But does it always turn out that way?

[Answer] Unfortunately, not always. The corresponding organs engaged in accounting for and redistributing labor resources have not yet been able, figuratively speaking, to take in at a glance the entire returning contingent of servicemen who have been discharged and

to work without delay with each one, to offer each in advance the work that suits him best, to interest him in good wages under advantageous living conditions and other incentives. We still have quite a few of the old bureaucratic obstacles. They engender inattention toward people.

[Question] We have been talking about the young so far. But after all, there are also many problems with reserve officers. Especially with housing...

[Answer] Our discussion has moved onto the plane of exceedingly acute social problems that it is high time were solved. And if they are solved, this will only raise the effectiveness of the human factor and, that means, the efficacy of the course of restructuring. But you will agree that not everything can be solved even through the power of the Central Committee and the government of the republic alone. A review of some legislative provisions at the all-union level is essential here, in my opinion. The practices of providing housing for reserve officers requires improvement.

We have succeeded in removing the acuity of the housing problem among invalids from the Great Patriotic War. But it was not easy to do. Work on accelerating housing construction has advanced appreciably in recent years in the republic in connection with the realization of the Housing-91 program: improvements in the living conditions of all families that were put on the rolls by 1987 are envisaged. The program also projects a volume of living space start-up 45-percent higher than that stipulated by the plan and one-and-a-half times more than the housing that was turned over in the 11th Five-Year Plan. Behind this I can see the joy of thousands of new homes in our republic. Among them, naturally, will be the families of former servicemen, officers and non-commissioned officers of the reserves.

[Question] A special question—concern and attention for the former internationalist soldiers. Justice is not always observed here. Former "Afghans" have appealed to the Aktyubinsk Komsomol Obkom because they were rejected for jobs only because they had to be granted the benefits granted by law, including housing benefits. Amanzhol Kazimbetov was not hired by the locomotive depot of the West Kazakhstan Railroad for the same reason.

[Answer] I was able to render assistance to the Afghan people as a party advisor, and I was a witness to the courage and staunchness of our soldiers, who fought arm in arm with Afghan soldiers to defend Afghan land. Today, when the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of that country has begun, we welcome home with pride and gratitude the soldiers who honorably and courageously fulfilled their internationalist duty.

But pride and gratitude for those of our young people who have seen much, our heroes, is too little.

The KaSSR CP Central Committee recently directed attention once again toward the impermissibility of a formalistic and indifferent attitude toward the former internationalist soldiers. The instances you related are known to us. Steps have already been taken regarding them. Several letters came at various times to the Central Committee as well. Effective assistance in obtaining housing was rendered to Andrey Krylov. A one-room apartment was allocated to the mother of Aleksandr Popov, who died of his wounds. The intervention of the Central Committee was required so that the Alma-Ata city ispolkom would expedite matters.

But I would like to cite other examples today as well. The leaders of Kustanay Oblast are resolving these issues in correct party fashion. Visiting there, I found out that the prettiest and nicest house was built at the Novonezhinskiy Sovkhoz for the former internationalist soldier Aleksandr Kiyev by his countrymen. More than twenty apartments were allocated to the "Afghans" on preferential terms in the oblast center last year, and five apartment warrants in a new building were allotted to them by the collective of the chemical-fiber plant.

The decision to build a military hospital in Alma-Ata is new evidence of the popular concern for the war veterans and former internationalist soldiers. It will be built using the contributed funds of the Soviet people to the Peace Fund.

I am for such attention, such concrete concern, and not for the promises that some officials try to use to shut themselves off from the soldiers. The memory of those who did not return home and attention to the living, who have earned our profound respect with their courage and honorable fulfillment of the soldier's duty, are not just part of our life, but also an important element of the education of the rising generation. Everything we are doing today for the participants in the Great Patriotic War and for their combat heirs is imbued with the lofty sense of the sacred principle of the unity of the army and the people.

[Question] In the name of the readers of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, I thank you for this discussion, Stanislav Vikentyevich.

[Answer] And I thank you. And in conclusion I would like to speak of the importance of reinforcing the close ties of the labor and military collectives. I have had occasion to visit such major enterprises of ours as the Ust-Kamenogorsk Lead and Zinc Combine and the Alma-Ata Heavy Machinery Plant imeni 60th Anniversary of the USSR. I noticed that there were no active correspondence or close contacts there among the party and Komsomol organizations, shop and team leaders with military units and their political and party departments. I request that you not be stingy with a kind word or begrudge the time for a letter.

We, for our part, will do everything possible to see that the soldiers returning from service, wherever they go to continue their labor, will be able, in the words of the Theses of the CPSU Central Committee for the 19th Party Conference, to make fuller use of their intellectual and moral potential, be more actively included in public life and render effective support for restructuring and the revolutionary transformations in the country.

12821

Ukrainian 2nd Secretary Faults Party Buro on Support to DOSAAF

18010407b Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian
8 Jun 88 p 2

[Interview by A. Akishin and G. Chernomorskiy with UkSSR CP Crimean Oblast Second Secretary Nikolay Vasilyevich Bagrov under the rubric "Toward the 19th All-Union Party Conference": "In Debt to Perestroika"]

[Text] [Question] Perestroika. It touches on all aspects of our lives, including the activity of the defense society. How, in the opinion of the party obkom, is the work of the DOSAAF [All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy of the USSR] oblast organization regarded in this connection?

[Answer] Our DOSAAFers have lost their former positions in recent years. There are various reasons. We have not always had the most fundamental regard for the activity of the defense organization and have not taken effective steps to eliminate shortcomings. And when we look, as they say, at the big picture, serious faults are detected. First and foremost puffing up results, deception and neglect in personnel work.

At the same time, the leaders of the DOSAAF obkom have not made full use of existing opportunities to rectify the situation.

I won't lay it on too thick, but it seems to me that obkom Chairman A. Yefimenko and his deputies do not always get the necessary support on the part of the party buro (Secretary V. Gustafov), first and foremost in providing a personal example for every communist of the party apparatus in the fulfillment of official duties. I would note that as a rule, the necessary and correct decisions are made at party meetings. But the necessary deeds do not always follow them. That is how it comes to pass that the workers in the localities sometimes cannot render effective aid to the rayon and city committees. Doesn't the 20th place our DOSAAFers found themselves in in the socialist competition among oblast defense organizations go back to that?

The Theses of the CPSU Central Committee for the 19th All-Union Party Conference note that formalism and bureaucracy have not yet been eliminated from the activity of public organizations. This is also typical of

our oblast defense organization. The communists working here are being called upon actively to eliminate the negative phenomena that are restraining the efficacy of DOSAAF work.

[Question] The 2nd Simferopol Combined Technical School received a poor grade last year and lost the title of model school. You would agree that this is extraordinary.

[Answer] There cannot be two opinions here. It is obviously an extraordinary event. But I should say that the party organization of the school has not lost heart and, as they say, has rolled up its sleeves and gotten to work. One of the first issues it resolved was the question of the personal example of communists and the creation of a climate of exactingness.

The agenda of party meetings has begun to be determined more thoughtfully. It has been, as they say, brought to a point—the fuller and better fulfillment of the decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers aimed at the further improvement of the training of the young for military service.

The party buro often hears reports from communists today. And not because they are working poorly, but because they are obliged to and can work better. Rank-and-file workers and supervisors are called in. The deputy chief for training-operations, F. Litvinov, recently reported to the buro the course of restructuring of the training process.

The communists have begun to monitor the principal "sore spots." It is natural that the commanders of the training platoons be constantly concerned for the living conditions of their cadets. But when the party buro charged communist I. Trukhachev with the permanent monitoring of this issue, the situation clearly improved. Questions of attendance were taken up by V. Zakharenko. Instructor D. Semikhin and training-operations leaders I. Priyatelchuk and G. Gazhva are working today in exemplary fashion. The secretary of the party organization and training-operations leader V. Zhegulin installed, on his own time, an operating electronic jig that eases the study and operation of complex radio equipment.

The principles of training personnel have been radically reconsidered. Technical seminars are being held, the careful monitoring of teacher preparation for class has been introduced and mutual class attendance with the subsequent discussion of results is now being practiced.

Serious attention is also devoted to reinforcing the material base of teaching. Emphasis has been placed on the military and patriotic cultivation of the cadets and individual work with them.

The communists have begun working better, and the whole collective has begun to pull itself together.

[Question] But are they acting that way everywhere?

[Answer] That cannot be said. Instances on another plane can unfortunately also be cited. Serious shortcomings, by way of example, have been uncovered in the work of the primary party organizations of the Yalta Driver Training School. It seems that the school has been completely staffed with instructors and training-operations leaders. It came in second in the 1986 results.

But all of this remains in the past. It can be asserted today that the leadership of the school is satisfied with what has been achieved, has not taken into account the demands of the times and has not restructured its work. The cadets are not obtaining solid skills when doing complex exercises, and the methodology council is inactive. There are other shortcomings as well. But the party organization (party buro Secretary I. Oranskiy) is meanwhile indifferent. There is no critical evaluation of the results here, no aspiration to advance to a new and higher level. Reports by communists are also not planned. The buro has no interest in how communists take part in the formation of the moral and political look of the future soldiers. It has also had no concern for the incorporation of progressive experience. And, as a result, the school has lost its position and is now in seventh place.

[Question] Nikolay Vasilyevich, of the factors determining the success of a soldier's service, isn't the attitude that the conscript brings to the subunit not the least among them?

[Answer] Undoubtedly. But educational work must be set up with pre-conscript and conscript youth so that the youth arrive at the garrison dedicated to outstanding service, with a burning desire to take their place in the combat formation as fast as possible. But this attitude is not created in and of itself. Purposeful and skilled work is needed. And not only by the military commissariats, but by all the party and training organizations of DOSAAF as well.

The party committees and ispolkoms of the soviets of people's deputies that do not always precisely coordinate the efforts of trade unions, the Komsomol, DOSAAF and other public organizations in the fulfillment of the decrees of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers aimed at the further improvement of training the young for military service are not finishing their work. Many measures are often duplicated, and sometimes in unskilled fashion. The Leninskiy and Bakhchisarayskiy rayon party committees, by way of example, did not make a fundamental analysis of these facts.

What coordination can we be talking about if, at the recent plenum of the DOSAAF obkom that was discussing the most important issue of restructuring the defense organization in light of the requirements of the February (1988) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the resolutions of the 10th All-Union DOSAAF Congress, there was no representative of the oblast council of trade unions? There was a police chief, but the leaders of the oblast military commissariat were absent. As if the military commissariat and DOSAAF were doing different things. Such a situation is impermissible.

[Question] We often work with such concepts as the human factor and the micro-environment in the collective. How do these factors affect the state of mass-defense work?

[Answer] The success of any endeavor, the more that which the DOSAAFers are doing, depends first and foremost on the human factor, on potential capabilities, both of each executive and of the whole collective in general. Party organizations unfortunately do not always take that into account. Take the Alushtinskiy Rayon DOSAAF organization. It is among the top ten. It could even be a prizewinner if the workers of the city committee and the sports and technical club of DOSAAF were to augment their work. But it is not. There are cliques and squabbles in the collective. And all because the party and trade-union organizations and the administration are seemingly working at cross purposes and conflict with each other.

[Question] The party and Komsomol press have an important role in restructuring. Do the Crimean papers, both oblast and rayon, often address defense topics and help the DOSAAF organizations in their work?

[Answer] KRYMSKAY PRAVDA, in my opinion, deserves a good word. It publishes the page "Son of the Fatherland" every month. They write interestingly on training for service in the armed forces, the activity of the DOSAAF training organizations, on the life of the primary levels and, naturally, how our countrymen are fulfilling their constitutional duty. We have no complaints toward the newspapers SOVETSKIY KRYM, SELSKAYA NOV and OGNI MAYAKA either.

At the same time, the local newspapers of the Simferopolskiy and Leninskiy rayons do not address defense topics, while the party organizations have grown accustomed to this situation.

If we speak overall about bottlenecks in our press propaganda, it would be a shortage of problematical materials on defense topics and the absence of any deep critical analysis. The situation has begun to right itself of late, true. KRYMSKAYA PRAVDA recently published the feature "Resurrect Past Glory." It analyzed the reasons for the failures of the collective of the 2nd Simferopol Combined Technical School of DOSAAF and discussed how to rectify the situation.

The initiative of Crimean television, which recently held a roundtable devoted to the military and patriotic education of the young and their training for service in the armed forces, also deserves praise.

[Question] Nikolay Vasilyevich, what would you say in conclusion on the prospects for the further development of initiative and creativity in the work of the oblast DOSAAF organization, and more briefly, its restructuring in the spirit of the times?

[Answer] The basic thing is clear—the defense organization of the Crimean Oblast has at its disposal considerable potential and solid personnel. A serious and genuine restructuring of the mass-defense, military and patriotic work is essential for its realization, however, so that

party and soviet organs coordinate more purposefully and skillfully first and foremost the efforts of the trade unions, Komsomol, DOSAAF and the military commissariats in the fulfillment of the decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers aimed at the further improvement of the training of the young for military service.

And something else. A great deal will depend on the communists working in the defense society. Each of them is obliged to be not simply an executor, but also to set a personal example, display initiative and assist to the utmost in reinforcing the defensive might of the country, as required by the party charter.

12821

Further Discussion of Military Educational Reform

18010411 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 May 88 Second Edition p 2

[Unsigned Article: "The Military Scientist. What is he to be?"]

[Text] That was the name of the article by Doctor of Military Sciences, Col Ye. Zhuravlev, published in the paper on 1 March. The editors received many responses to this article, in which the readers—chiefs of military academies and schools, leaders of scientific research establishments and laboratories, faculty chiefs, instructors, graduate students and students—continue a concerned discussion about the problems it touched upon, express their points of view, and make specific suggestions.

The author of letters to the editor justifiably remarked that without serious changes, without a decisive turn toward solving the urgent problems, we will not gain high creative tempos. Giving its due to the merits and traditions of the military educational system, the letters also revealed its flaws, which are slowing our forward movement. Today we published a survey of letters on this topic.

"The new tasks placed before society at the present stage significantly increase the role of science in all the processes of perestroyka," is stated in the theses of the CPSU Central Committee to the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

This same thought is expressed in one way or another in the readers' letters. "It is gratifying," writes, for example, Col A. Vayner, candidate of military sciences, docent, "that on the threshold of the conference the paper took up the important, burning topic of military science, for the state and prospects of its cadre support concern our community. What is the military scientist, the pedagogue to be? How is the effectiveness of scientific work to be improved? How is the younger generation of military scientists, researchers and pedagogues to be developed? These are far from rhetorical questions." Jointly with A. Vayner, officers I. Terekhov, V. Vasilenok, A. Reytselis, A. Byzov, I. Prokopenko, A. Oderiy, S. Lysenko and other comrades submitted their responses to the newspaper article.

"Science is not accomplished by a crowd, it is done by creative individuals—this is the immutable principle of the organization of scientific work, which if forgotten undermines its investigative sense and creative foundation," writes a group of instructors from the Military PVO [Air Defense] Command Academy imeni MSU G. K. Zhukov. "Do we teach creativity?" The letter's authors continue their thoughts. "Alas, no. That is why the organization of military scientific studies requires thorough analysis and restructuring, not in general, but in the spirit of the times."

Without claiming categorical knowledge, Lt Gen Professor L. Sorochenko expresses this suggestion: "In the military schools, according to the results of the first two years of study, the most capable, inquisitive, if you will gifted and talented students, who have displayed uncommon cognitive and analytical capabilities, and are inclined toward more thorough study of general scientific and military disciplines, can be distinguished and placed in separate groups. It would be advisable to structure their subsequent training according to a special program, taking into account the fact that future scientists and pedagogues, candidates and doctors of science, docents and professors are being trained." Colonels G. Sirosh and V. Ivanov share this opinion.

Lt Gen L. Sorochenko, Col V. Malikov, and others suggest that the number of hours spent on higher mathematics, mathematical methods of investigation and modeling, the use of computer equipment, programming, physics, logic, pedagogy, and methods of scientific research, on those disciplines which develop intellect and general cultural levels, be increased.

While guarding the right of basic research to free inquiry, it should not be forgotten, emphasized participants in the discussion, and in particular, Col A. Izvekov, doctor of military sciences, professor, and Capt 1st Rank A. Klyukin, that their main purpose is to serve practice. Many readers share the opinion that for competing for the academic degree of candidate of technical sciences it is necessary to have at least one authorship certificate or an invention, "with worldwide novelty." This will enable the competitor to become familiar with patenting and licensing work, to believe in his own capabilities to find new technical solutions, and to create contemporary and future technical equipment.

And here is one more thought that merits support. "At times our attitude to forecasts and bold innovator's ideas is as to something secondary, which overshadows the tasks of the day. Meanwhile, military science must look more boldly to tomorrow," writes docent K. Samoylov. "This is all the more true, since the loss of tempo leads to a loss in quality."

The authors of letters to the editors state with regret that a competitor for the academic degree of doctor of sciences loses one or two years solely gaining confirmation of his dissertation plan. First this plan undergoes examination by experts at the faculty, then at the academy scientific soviet, and only then in the central and main directorates. Moreover, a response is also necessary from no fewer than two "interested" establishments, confirming that this will be a doctoral dissertation that the forces, VUZes, and NII [scientific research institutes] await for implementation of its results. Here it happens, note the discussion participants, that administrative "patriotism" gains the upper hand over the interests of science.

"Can it be considered normal climate in a scientific or specialized soviet, when in making a favorable conclusion by open voting all 100 percent of the members vote 'for,' and in secret voting the same scientists vote 'against' conferring the academic degree or title? Where are the honor, worth, principles and objectivity of the scientists and soviet members?" Behind these questions we also see a problem that requires definite decisions on the part of the VAK [high degree commission].

The readers justifiably believe that more extensive use should be made of the right to defend candidate and doctoral dissertations by reporting on the entirety of scientific results achieved, their introduction into the theory of military science, and practice of enhanced combat readiness, improved weapons and military equipment, and methods of operation of troops and naval forces, and their all-round support and servicing.

Col V. Smirnov cites examples of how military district cadre organs at times prevent talented officers from entering graduate work by form replies of this sort: "The district has no allocations for attendance at such and such a military VUZ." The author of the letter asks: Can people's destinies, and in the final analysis also our scientific cadres, be decided by allocations?

Col A. Kameney focuses attention on another important problem. "The term 'scientific-pedagogical cadres' has already become customary. Behind it is an entirely specific content. But, has not today the concept of training these cadres become obsolete? Is the mechanical combining of two independent directions—scientific and pedagogical—right? They are not always fused into one. At times one person has scientific interests, and another pedagogical; a person may have high scientific qualifications, and his pedagogical qualifications may not correspond."

Many readers share the opinion about the need for a system under which an instructor could move by special assignment toward the title "docent" and "professor," fulfilling on this path entirely specific tasks, associated with the restructuring of the training and educational process in the light of the decisions of the February 1988 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, and instructions of the minister of defense. The nature of such assignments, degree of their novelty, and practicability of recommendations and developments should correspond to the level of the competition; one who is claiming the title of "professor" should bear a heavier burden.

Col G. Motovilov, doctor of technical sciences, poses the question of increasing the scientific content of engineering training of the students and cadets at military VUZes. In his opinion, a four year term is advisable for training candidates of technical sciences. This will facilitate greater results of scientific research, and the introduction of scientific developments into troop practice, and will create a firmer base for the training of doctors of sciences.

A collective letter by professors and doctors of military sciences, Maj Gen M. Ionov, and colonels B. Zyazev, Kh. Leybovich and M. Sergeyev states that lack of the necessary coordination of schooling and scientific work is the most obsolete and chronic ailment of military educational institutions. And if school work is relatively clearly regulated by plans, programs, and schedules, note the authors of the letter, such precise points of reference are lacking in the organization of scientific work.

Today many state: "It is necessary to pick up the tempos!" This is true. But there are few who ask the question: Are we in a condition to do this? The composition of faculties does not depend on the amount of planned scientific research work. Whether there are 5 or 15 topics, the number of instructors and technical personnel in the faculty does not change. And the topics of scientific work, their complexity and labor intensiveness are far from identical. "An experienced faculty chief was asked," writes the letter's authors, "how many scientific research projects can one instructor accomplish simultaneously?" He answered: "one, possibly two." "Well, and if personnel are lacking and each instructors must accomplish several, what is the maximum permissible?" "If there are more than two, then it does not matter how many. All the rest will be to the detriment of quality," answered the experienced pedagogue."

Among the proposals that, in the opinion of readers, may contribute to solving many problems, was the idea that has previously been expressed of the advisability of creating an academy of military sciences, as the main center for military science (similar to the academies of medical or pedagogical sciences, or the Academy of Artillery Sciences that existed at one time). The authors of the letters to the editors believed that this question merits serious study from the positions of restructuring the leadership of military science in the spirit of the requirements of the day.

Col M. Zheltov and Lt Col G. Kretinin believe, not without justification, that military scientific work must become an integral part of the training process, that it has become necessary to introduce into the VUZes the "Basics of Scientific Research" (this discipline is already being taught in civilian VUZes), and that the existing system of organization of competitions for the best scientific work of cadets and students requires improvement.

"Perestroyka in no way means that it is necessary simply to specify somewhat more precisely, and modernize the system that has been established for decades, and to carry out "cosmetic repairs," writes Col Ye. Kozhevnikov, doctor of military sciences, professor. "No, something more is required. It is necessary to change the psychology of people and their attitude toward the training of military scientific and scientific-pedagogical cadres."

These are only some of the letters received by the editors. Of course, not everything is indisputable in the readers' judgements, but there is much that is rational. The letters published today do not exhaust the problem. Therefore, the discussion begun by the newspaper and continued by the readers does not end with this. Specific and effective

solutions are needed. And we hope that they will appear and will contribute to improving the activeness of all military scientific work.

Department of Science, Technology and Cosmonautics.

9069

Mortar Effectiveness in WW II Noted

18010408b Moscow TRUD in Russian 21 May 88 p 4

[Unsigned article: "The Mortar—A Formidable Weapon"]

[Text] Which type of weapon caused the fascists the greatest harm during the Great Patriotic War? (I. Klyuyev, Kharkov).

This answer was obtained from the archives of the military historical museum of artillery, engineer troops and communications.

All branches of arms and all types of weapons made their contribution to the defeat of Hitler's forces. The fascists suffered the greatest number of losses of personnel on the Soviet-German Front from mortar weapons. These losses constituted one third of the killed and wounded—approximately three million men. During the period of the Great Patriotic War approximately 200,000,000 mortar rounds were expended; 53 percent of the overall expenditure of field artillery ammunition.

9069

Discussion of Availability of Military Archives

18010408a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 May 88 p 4

[Article by Retired Col M. Stegantsev, director, Central State Soviet Army Archives: "The Military Archives Speak"]

[Text] The revolution, Civil War, NEP [New Economy Policy], industrialization, collectivization... the most ardent and dramatic events of those days are ever more removed from us in time. Fewer and fewer living witnesses remain with us. And interest in the inanimate witnesses, the documents that have come to us from the past, is more and more acute and real. We asked Retired Col Mikhail Vasilyevich Stegantsev, director, Central State Soviet Army Archives, to answer some readers' questions.

Before going directly to the questions, I would like to say a few words in connection with the professional anniversary of Soviet archivists. Seventy years ago, on 1 June 1918, V. I. Lenin signed a Soviet of People's Commissars Decree, "On Reorganization and Centralization of Archival Matters in the RSFSR." Imagine the situation in the country at that time. Everywhere counterrevolution was organizing sabotage after sabotage. The Red Army was still just being created. There was hunger, poverty. And the genius of Lenin was already directed toward the future. From seventy years away he literally saw our today, this tremendous and ever growing interest, going deep in the centuries, of the Soviet people toward their past. Today it is impossible even to imagine that all of this wealth of ours may not have been. Some hotheads called for the destruction of the entire legacy of the past. Everything—so that there would be no traces!

However, in history one cannot begin or finish reading at one's own discretion. It is impossible to rewrite it anew, in clean copy. Everything was, and we can only, as we are doing today, look at the past from positions of having lived through it, having endured it. "It is very desirable to do this honestly, using facts and not fantasies and concoctions," writes retired Maj I. Borodin from Semipalatinsk. "Not situational considerations, but a desire for historical truth should lay at the foundation of the approach to the study of the past." He is supported by O. Savchenko from Dnepropetrovsk, N. Ilichev from Khabarovsk, and many others. They are interested in what our archives possess, and what they can and intend to say in the great and difficult work of eliminating the "blank spots."

Here are a few figures. Our country's state archival fund numbers 340,000,000 works (beginning in the 20th Century). We in TsGASA [Central State Soviet Army Archives] alone have over 1,700,000 such works. They are from the Revolutionary Military Soviet, the republic People's Defense Committee, the RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army] headquarters and political directorate, district troop control organs, military educational institutions, troop units, large units and operational formations from 1918-1940, border troops and internal troops, including 1941-1945. Among them are documents directly related to F. E. Dzerzhinskiy and S. M. Kirov, G. K. Ordzhonikidze and V. V. Kuybyshev, Ya. M. Sverdlov and I. V. Stalin.

What can and are we doing? We are publishing individual documents and collections, organizing topical exhibitions, answering various requests, assisting in the preparation of radio and television programs, and carrying out research work. Our capabilities could be broader if the archivists had appropriate printing equipment, and modern (and sufficient) copying equipment. In reality it is necessary to prepare for publication, not that which is most urgently needed, but that which is of interest to local publishing houses.

Many would like to know how accessible are the documents stored in state archives to, so to speak, the researcher at large. This question has been asked, in particular, by A. Bannikov from Irkutsk, and V. Novikov from Tula. B. Sarkisyan from Yerevan writes that he read somewhere a statement by a historian, whose name he unfortunately forgot, that only documents up to 1930 can be obtained in the archives. When will the archives be opened, he asks.

I remember that in February of this year Maj Gen Yu. Kirshin spoke about this very thing in SOVETSKAYA KULTURA. Moreover, he charged that archivists "do not know what they have and where it is."

What can be said in this regard? In open storage; i.e., accessible to virtually any researcher, are more than 1,000,000 works in TsGASA alone, associated with the

activity of M. V. Frunze, V. K. Blyukher, M. N. Tukhachevskiy, A. I. Yegorov and other well known commanders and military leaders, and with the most important events in the life of the army and country in the period 1918-1940.

Access to documents of the troop control organs, which contain secret information, is limited for entirely understandable reasons. The strictness of regulations in working with them stems from the interest of the security of the country and its defense capability. Fulfilling them is not someone's whim, as P. Kuchkin and A. Baltis believe, but necessity. It is in our common interest. By the way, in TsGASA alone, in 1987 more than 100,000 documents were removed from closed storage. This year another 16,000 plus works will be transferred to the open fund. In connection with the 50th Anniversary of events on Lake Khasan, the Khalkhin-Gol River, and the Soviet-Finnish War, many of the documents of those years will be transferred to open storage. The same is true of documents concerning the White Guards formations.

To some extent this also already answers the question of readers S. Petrenko from Kuybyshev, and P. Kravchenko from Kharkov about what new awaits researchers in the archives. Included in circulation are the memoirs of I. I. Vatsetis, first RKKA commander-in-chief, explanatory notes and reports by N. V. Krylenko, first Soviet supreme commander-in-chief, and other documents. They require thorough study.

The work of archivists in disclosing Lenin's documents is of importance. In TsGASA alone, 1,722 documents of Lenin, many of which went into the Complete Works of V. I. Lenin, and into publication of his biographic chronicle, have been uncovered and transferred to the Institute of Marxism-Leninism at the CPSU Central Committee.

Retired Col N. Matrosov, Capt P. Goncharov from the Kiev Military District, and student T. Petrov are interested in whether authentic documents of military leaders repressed during the years of the cult of personality have been preserved, and comrades Yu. Serebryanskiy from Volgograd Oblast, and T. Inoshvili from Georgia are interested in any data on RKKA military specialists who were formerly Tsarist generals and officers. I intentionally combined these questions into one, because many of the military specialists were repressed in the 1930s.

According to information that exists today, 73,311 generals and officers from the former army served in the Red Army; constituting 56 percent of all command personnel. At the requests of readers I will name those who are best known. Former generals V. N. Yegorov, P. P. Sytin, M. D. Bonch-Bruyevich, colonels A. I. Yegorov, V. I. Shorin, I. I. Vatsetis, S. S. Kamenev, 2d Capt L. A. Govorov, and Lt M. N. Tukhachevskiy. Marshals A. M. Vasilevskiy, F. I. Tolbukhin, and B. M. Shaposhnikov, army generals I. Ye. Petrov, and A. I. Antonov, and Lt Gen D. M. Karbyshev were also military specialists. It

was those about whom V. I. Lenin spoke: "You have heard about a number of brilliant victories of the Red Army. In it are working tens of thousands of old officers and colonels. If we had not taken them into service and not forced them to serve us, we would not have been able to create an army," "only with their help could the Red Army have gained those victories that it gained."

And these people, or more accurately very many of them, who had honorably served the people's revolution, were declared enemies of the people and were shot. I think that the lads from the Minsk group Poisk [Search] are right in asserting that each of us living today should do everything he can in order to name the names of those who fell on the battlefield and in the camps on our native soil. Archivists are doing a great deal to accomplish this. With the use of archival documents, essays, articles, books and monographs have been written about the lives and activities of military leaders whose destinies were crushed by the "streamroller" of the cult of personality.

And here is a sad question for us. A student from Sverdlovsk, I. Kravtsov, writes: "In MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS I read several parts of the 'Unwritten Novels' by Yu. Semenov. The author asserts that the archives of V. K. Blyukher have been destroyed, and that he had to use bits of documents. Has EVERYTHING really been destroyed?" Yulian Semenov, to put it mildly, exaggerated. Had there been no documents, how could the well known books by V. Dushenkin, V. Malyshov, and A. Yakimov, and documentary essays have been published? This statement by the writer unpleasantly surprised us. In 1952, and then in 1955, TsGASA, at the request of the Writers' Union, presented the documents at its disposal of the headquarters of the People's Revolutionary Army of the Far Eastern Republic, the Amur Front, 11th Army, and Transbaykal Cavalry Division. It is true that it was limited to an examination of only 150 out of several thousand of these works. I do not think that the writer overlooked the orders to the troops, reports of the revolutionary military soviet, and action reports of Blyukher, or notes from his direct conversation by direct wire. What we have here is based on the principle that everyone will find that for which he is looking. It is only a pity that a tremendous number of people are being confused.

A group of letter writers, mainly veterans, would like to know whether the assertion is unsubstantiated that in preparing the 10 volume work, "Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voyna Sovetskogo Naroda" [Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People], memoirs, letters and other documents from the personal archives of front line soldiers will be used. It is hard for me to judge to what extent this affects all participants in the war, but the documents of many will be used. One of the indications of this is the work going on to receive in state storage the personal archives of veterans, which should be going on everywhere. Unfortunately, and letters to the editor indicate this, its topics, scale, level, and quality are still far from those desired.

Both the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War were all-people's wars, and therefore documents from each participant, from marshals to privates, possess historical value. And they should be viewed not only as historical factual sources, but mainly as sources for understanding the psychology, and the moral spirit of the "man with a gun."

Today the country's state archives have taken into storage approximately 150,000 works, containing more than a million personal documents of participants in the Civil War and Great Patriotic War. They are diaries, front line notes, letters and photographs, award materials, reminiscences, soldiers' memoirs, manuscripts of addresses, drawings, biographical documents, etc. But so far, we

believe, only the first steps have been taken. In two wars our army conducted several hundred major military operations, and documents only from participants in 66 operations have come into the state archives, and even they are in insignificant numbers.

USSR Glavarkhiv [Main Archives] at this time has decided to create an autonomous data base of personal records of participants in the armed defense of the Soviet state, in the Automated System of Scientific and Technical Information From Documents of the State Archive Fund. There is much work to be done, but it will be important for improving the use of these documents.

9069

Arctic: Theater of War or Zone of Peace

18010437 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Jun 88 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Capt 3d Rank M. Bolshakov]

[Text] Not very long ago the extreme conditions of the Arctic with its fierce winds, perfidious ice and murderous cold created the impression that it stood far aside from the mainstream of international life. In recent years, however, the stereotype of a "godforsaken hole" has been decisively displaced by the Arctic region's growing role in the modern world.

Today the basin of the Arctic Ocean with contiguous Arctic areas of the European, Asiatic and American continents not only is a world "weather kitchen," but also appreciably influences the entire planet's political climate. This is quite natural. Borders converge in the Arctic and spheres of economic, political and military-strategic interests of many states intersect. Significant potentials for nuclear destruction relating to the two military-political alliances—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—are concentrated here. This region also is of enormous importance for the economy of Arctic countries; it attracts their attention by the very abundant reserves of raw energy materials, valuable metals and other resources contained in the subsoil of northern territories and the shelf of polar seas.

In light of this the intensifying military preparations of the United States and a number of its NATO partners in the Arctic cannot help but cause uneasiness. This is especially so as they are occurring at a time when the world community is awaiting further practical steps along the path to nuclear disarmament and a relaxation of the military threat after the Soviet-American INF Treaty entered into force and when the Soviet-American Moscow summit meeting strengthened anew peoples' hopes for the possibility of arriving at new agreements along the path to a non-nuclear and non-violent world.

The facts indicate that some in the West are linking plans to "compensate" for American nuclear missiles in Europe subject to destruction with northern and Arctic regions. Statements by prominent NATO figures and western press publications are emphasizing more and more often the "growing strategic significance" and "vital importance" of the Arctic for NATO, and calls are sounding for a sharp build-up of bloc military activity there.

It should be noted that U.S. and NATO leaders have had a heightened interest in the Arctic region as a potential theater of war with the Soviet Union for a long while now. From the Pentagon's standpoint the significance of the Arctic always has been determined above all by its key role in scenarios for nuclear attack on the USSR. According to western press data, it is planned to employ over half of all U.S. ICBM's and up to 30 percent of U.S. strategic bombers across Arctic regions.

To support its nuclear strategy objectives the Pentagon established an entire complex of military installations in the Arctic, using the territories and possessions of NATO allies. The complex includes the northernmost strategic air base in northwestern Greenland and airfields and naval basing points in Northern Norway, Iceland, northern Canada and Alaska. A chain of radar and aerospace surveillance stations and of navigation support, guidance, reconnaissance and communications systems also stretched out here. Armed forces personnel of the United States and a number of other NATO countries practice skills in conducting combat operations in high latitudes during maneuvers held regularly in Northern Norway, Greenland and Alaska.

The activation of U.S. and NATO militaristic preparations now occurring in the Arctic basin is directly linked with strategic aims developed by the Pentagon in the early 1980s for achieving a "decisive military superiority" over the USSR in all spheres. In particular, these aims provide for a concentration of combat-ready strike groupings of the U.S. Navy and navies of U.S. allies in the immediate vicinity of the USSR's northern borders with the objective of providing conditions for delivering a "disarming strike" and sealing up the Soviet Navy in its own territorial waters.

Plans for deploying several thousand Tomahawk cruise missiles with conventional and nuclear warheads aboard submarines and surface ships in the North Atlantic and in Arctic seas also are being considered for these purposes. In addition it is planned to supplement sea-based Tomahawks with cruise missiles accommodated aboard U.S. Air Force bombers on standing patrol above the Arctic. Practice in employing these missiles continues in full swing in the Canadian Arctic sector (six training launches already have been conducted from January through March of this year).

One of the priority places in U.S. and NATO "polar strategy" is given to expanding operations of multirole nuclear submarines (SSN's) in the Arctic. Their primary mission is the secret shadowing of Soviet missile submarines. Speaking to American Congressmen not long ago, U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations Adm C. Trost frankly declared: "We intend to keep the Soviet naval forces constantly in our sights in case of war."

American submarine forces are intensively mastering the Arctic's under-ice waters. According to a report of the American naval journal PROCEEDINGS, from 1958, when the SSN "Nautilus" reached the North Pole under the ice for the first time, up to 1987 U.S. Navy nuclear submarines made over 40 cruises into the Arctic basin. Several cruises were made by British SSN's. In addition to conducting research they practiced surfacing in the ice, practiced tactical procedures for conducting combat operations alone and as part of groups, and tested weapons. The expanding scale of operations in polar waters also is indicated by the fact of the introduction of

a special decoration—a blue and white "Arctic Service" stripe—in the U.S. Navy in 1987 which already has been awarded to the crews of 15 submarines.

The program for modernizing and building up the American submarine fleet has a clear Arctic direction. In particular, the Pentagon revised the decision not to employ "Los Angeles"-Class SSN's in high latitudes. Beginning with the 34th (in the "Chicago" series), these submarines are being built in a modified version for ice operation. The first five such SSN's of the 32 planned already have reinforced the U.S. Navy's "polar submarine fleet" of 37 specially outfitted "Sturgeon"-Class submarines built during the 1960s and 1970s. Construction of a series of advanced "Seawolf"-Class SSN's (SSN-21) designed for submarine warfare under Arctic conditions will begin in the near future.

The inclusion of NATO partners of the United States in the arms race beyond the Arctic Circle is becoming a very alarming trend. In recent years Canada's ruling circles have been displaying heightened military activity in the region along with Great Britain. In 1987 the B. Mulroney cabinet announced an ambitious 15-year program for building up Canadian military might in the Arctic. Its basis is a plan for creating [sozdaniye] their own nuclear submarine fleet of 10-12 submarines. The official objective of this program—"defense of Canada's sovereignty in Arctic regions"—does not hold up to criticism even in the opinion of the Canadian press. There is every basis to assume that in accordance with NATO's "offensive strategy," the primary mission of Canadian SSN's will be to take part in "hunting" Soviet missile submarines near USSR shores. It is no accident that the Pentagon and NATO staffs are studying the question of forming a regional allied Arctic command of the NATO Allied Armed Forces which would coordinate operations of all naval, air and ground forces of bloc countries operating in polar latitudes.

Special mention should be made of efforts being put forth in the United States and other NATO countries for psychological support of the Arctic basin's militarization. The unwinding of a wide-scale arms race here is being justified by the very same notorious "Soviet threat" in its polar version. The mass media depict the Arctic as a "nuclear missile bastion of the Soviets" from which, hidden beneath the ice, "gigantic 'Tayfun' submarines threaten the 'western world' with their missiles". The organization of drift stations and Soviet icebreakers' conquest of the North Pole are presented as "Moscow's claims to hegemony in the Arctic." The U.S. Navy journal PROCEEDINGS informs readers in all seriousness that while the American Navy allegedly is just attempting to adapt to the polar environment, "significant Soviet maritime and naval operations in the region began at the beginning of the 15th century (!)." For more than the first year now pages of the western press also have been exaggerating unsubstantiated assertions about regular invasions of the territorial waters of Norway and Canada by "Russian submarines." And so,

hastily remaking the cartoon symbol of "Soviet aggressiveness"—the brown bear—into its polar brother with the very same savage baring of teeth, NATO propaganda harps on the rightfulness of building up the bloc's military potential in the Arctic region.

With a coast that is washed by seas of the Arctic Ocean for more than 15,000 km, the Soviet Union naturally has legitimate economic, political and defense interests in the Arctic. Our country invariably has acted and is acting for a radical decrease in the level of military confrontation in the Arctic basin and for turning it into a zone of firm peace and international cooperation.

The concept of security of the planet's North was set forth in detail in a speech by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev in Murmansk on 1 October 1987. Its essence is the elimination of nuclear weapons from the Arctic, restriction of military activities there, and development of a world economic, scientific and ecologic partnership of all interested countries on a mutually advantageous basis. The set of Soviet peace initiatives for demilitarization of the North and the Arctic received broad approval and support from all sober-minded circles of the planet and from peace advocates in Scandinavian countries and Canada.

6904

Persian Gulf Incident Said to Raise Japanese Question on Aegis Acquisition

18010458 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 15 Jul 88 p 3

[Report by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA's own correspondent N. Tsvetkov: "Should We Trust the 'Aegis'?"]

[Text] The circumstances surrounding the loss of the Iranian civil aircraft shot down by the American cruiser Vincennes on 3 July continue to be the subject of heated discussion in Japan. There is no denying that the Japanese Government has turned out to be in a delicate situation with respect to the tragic incident over the distant Persian Gulf. The United States is Tokyo's number one ally, and clearly you do not condemn it. But the maintenance of amicable relations with Iran is a subject of continuing concern for the Japanese MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], which understands the importance of the oil imported from this country. For this reason, official Tokyo, after expressing regret in connection with the loss of nearly 300 passengers on the Airbus, has generally preferred to remain silent, to refrain from assessments of the incident based on principle, and to "forget" about it a little more quickly.

However, there is an aspect which is not comparable with the main point, of course—the death of innocent people, but which has attracted universal attention in Japan. The Vincennes detected and hit the "air target" with the aid of the most up-to-date electronic complex,

the Aegis. The same complex which the Japanese "Self-Defense Forces" will add to their arsenal in 1992. The contract for Japan to acquire the Aegis system was made official no later than 24 June, that is, a few days before the Vincennes' salvo.

How much has been said by those who support Japan's military might on both sides of the Pacific about the "100-percent" reliability of the Aegis! And here is an embarrassing point: the vaunted radars and computers took the scheduled Airbus for an F-14 fighter. In any case, that was the version of the American warriors who were put in an awkward position. An awkward version, but one they stubbornly support, nevertheless. After all, otherwise the incident would have to be called by its real name—a crime.

But if the Aegis is incapable of distinguishing a heavenly gift from an omelet, who needs it? And are the expenditures to acquire it justified? The overall cost of the transaction is no more or less than 130 billion dollars. These reasonable questions have appeared on the pages of Japanese newspapers. And probably will be put to the government at the forthcoming special session of parliament.

Japan's national defense administration made haste to make its position clear: the Aegis is not at fault, they said, since it was technically impossible in principle to simply identify the "flying object" approaching the Vincennes. The Aegis honestly provided information on the approaching target and then, after receiving the appropriate command, it just as honestly destroyed it. So possibly without wanting to do so, a representative of the Japanese military department corroborated the fact that a computer, even the most advanced one, remains a tool without brains—in a moral sense—in the hands of its owner.

Many people in Japan today are asking the question: will the Japanese lines be safer if the Japanese "Self-Defense Forces" are equipped with expensive innovations readily delivered from across the ocean? Or, on the other hand, will the danger of an "accidental" situation which threatens peace increase time and again? Unfortunately, only those who have the levers of the Japanese political machine in their hands have no doubts. In any event, they consider it unnecessary to correct their position because of what they view as a "special case" in the Persian Gulf.

8936

French Test of Nuclear Capable Air-to-Ground Missile

18010454 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
18 Jul 88 p 3

[Report by IZVESTIYA's own correspondent Yu. Kovalenko: "They Are Flexing Their Nuclear Muscles"]

[Text] Paris—Tests of the latest French "air-to-ground" missile, the ASMP, have been conducted at the Air Force

base in Luxeuil-les-Bains (Haut-Saône Department); it has a range of 300 kilometers, and the first squadron of Mirage-2000N aircraft were equipped with it on 1 July.

In the presence of President F. Mitterand and Minister of Defense J.-P. Chevènement, the Mirages armed with this missile, which has a nuclear warhead of 300 kilotons (15 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima), simulated a strike against an "enemy" tank formation which had "broken through" the allies' defensive lines.

The use of such missiles—previously they called them tactical weapons here, but now they call them sub-strategic—is "the last warning" to an enemy, in the French strategists' terminology. A massed nuclear attack against his cities and military bases will follow unless he stops offensive operations.

Just what is the ASMP? It is a cruise missile which flies at an altitude of 50 to 60 meters at a speed of 2,400 to 3,600 kilometers per hour; it is 8.3 meters long and 0.35 meters in diameter, and it weighs 830 kilograms. Essentially, the ASMP is a type of offensive weapon, not a deterrent one. Installed on the Mirages, which also fly at low altitude, and by not being fixed by radars, the ASMP can attack targets deep in enemy territory (supplemented by the new "Hades" tactical missiles with a range of 500 kilometers).

But the purpose of the ASMP is not defined by its advanced technical features alone. These missiles, together with the Mirage-2000N, in the words of the defense minister, should promote the beginning of "a European defense concept." Expanding on this in an extensive interview published in the 14 July issue of the newspaper LE MONDE, J.-P. Chevènement calls upon his allies to assume responsibility for strengthening NATO's European support. At the same time, the head of the military department stated that France will become the motive force in European defense. As far as nuclear forces are concerned, they must play an important role to ensure peace in Europe, in the minister's words.

And while F. Mitterand has repeatedly opposed the NATO concept of "flexible response," the minister of defense, on the other hand, maintains that the French and American concepts can "coexist." Paris will continue modernization of its nuclear arsenals, which does not conflict with the disarmament process, the minister maintains.

Many of those on the banks of the Seine have been very skeptical about the new Soviet proposals on the reduction of conventional arms and armed forces in Europe and the convening of a European conference on these matters. But by flexing its muscles in the area of nuclear weapons, writes L'HUMANITÉ, France wants to show everyone by its appearance that it is not concerned about the nuclear disarmament begun by the Soviet-American

RSMD [INF] Treaty. Paris believes that Europe should speak with one voice in military matters, and that France should be given the role of the main pacemaker in the "accelerated buildup of European defense."

8936

Letters Raise Question of Soviet POWs in Afghanistan

18010406 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Jun 88 p 14

[Letters under the rubric "International Life": "We Must Save Them!"]

[Text] Letters come to the editors that are permeated with alarm and pain: what can the country do, what can we all do to save the Soviet soldiers that have been captured in Afghanistan? "LG" began this difficult and essential discussion in features from New York (April 20 and May 4 of this year), and it was continued in the last issue by N.S. Mashina, the mother of missing soldier Vadim Mashin. Today we are publishing some of the letters. LITERATURNAYA GAZETA is sending all of the mail of our readers to the UN.

My son fell 10 Jun 85 in Afghanistan (in any case, that is what the notification said). I have not seen him dead, and no one can prove to me that he was in the coffin. Can it be that he is in a hole in the ground somewhere?

I wrote a letter to the unit, but the answers did not reassure me, because the commander wrote alone, and it is a different matter on official paper.

America is deciding what is to become of our boys in captivity. Why are our superiors not stirring? Are they waiting for instructions? After all, their children will not be serving in Afghanistan.

When I hear that "Afghan troops smashed a band of dushman" I think: how many of ours perished? Not a word about that! I remember when the Americans were fighting in Vietnam, the newspapers regularly reported on how many coffins were sent to America that day, how many since the beginning of the campaign and how many Americans had been captured.

We want to know about our own losses, about what is happening with our children!

—T.A. Antropova, Berezovskiy.

I served in Afghanistan from 29 Dec 79 through June of 1981. Seven years have passed, my two sons are growing up, but today it is terrible for me, very terrible, to try to imagine our boys in captivity in Afghanistan. The worst thing for us there was not to be killed (we didn't think about that, or tried not to), but to fall into the hands of the "ghosts" alive. And everyone thus hid a bullet "for

himself"—not out of heroism, it was a forced measure. Every day in captivity was hell, utter hell on earth, and we cannot and should not sleep peacefully.

—V. Gitsenko, Staryy Oskol.

I am writing and crying. How do the mothers of missing sons live? How many of them are alive that were seen by the American emissaries in 1983? We must act immediately, without delay, and save at any price those to whom this terrible misfortune has befallen—be they in the clutches of the dushman or already in America or any other country.

—I.Ya. Kalnustraut, Riga.

We, students and staffers of the Ufa Order of Lenin Aviation Institute imeni Sergo Ordzhonikidze, are shaken by the fact that our boys continue to languish in the terrible conditions of captivity at the same time as the Afghan government is releasing dushman prisoners and the Soviet troops are being withdrawn from Afghanistan.

We appeal to the Soviet, American and Pakistani governments and to all people who are not indifferent to the fate of our people to support us! We demand their release and return to the Motherland!

—A total of 1,678 signatures, Ufa.

I am very bitter that the American public is troubled by a few dozen refuseniks. The president of the United States and the secretary of state include the question of these fat people, not suffering from any physical torment, in their programs of negotiations between our countries. And the fellows that are in the captivity of the rebels do not even have elementary medical care in their underground holes!

—L.I. Ivashchenko and several other signatures, Gorkiy.

We are indignant at the perfidy and cruelty of the intelligence agencies of the United States, Canada and England and their attitude toward our prisoners of war in Pakistan.

Where is their infamous defense of human rights? Why do they only demand of us the observance of rights in relations to various traitors to the Motherland and dissidents, while they themselves violate both the rights of their own citizens that are unsuitable to the regime and the citizens of other countries?

We earnestly request that Comrade Shevardnadze, during his negotiations with Shultz, demand of the United States a guarantor of the fulfillment of the decisions on Afghanistan, the release of our prisoners of war in Pakistan.

—Kuzmenko, Obninsk.

We are shaken by the newspaper reports of the torture of our sons in the captivity of the dushman and demand immediate steps to render them practical assistance through all channels—through the International Red Cross, the Committee of Soviet Women, The Soviet Committee of War Veterans, our trade unions, Komsomol and party organizations, and through all international organizations that want to take on the mission of intermediaries.

—A.G. Voytenko and the collective of the workers at the Solnyshko kindergarten, Grishino (Crimean Oblast).

Has the USSR appealed to the international social organizations that are occupied with human rights with a request to render aid to our prisoners of war? Has the Russian Orthodox Church come forward in their defense? Has the future fate of the prisoners of war been agreed upon in the treaty between the USSR and Afghanistan?

—A collective of workers from the IVTs [computer center] of the Soyuzgazavtomatika Plant, Kaliningrad.

The question of saving the prisoners of war should be resolved by our government openly and with glasnost. We are not demanding any particular act of kindness from it, we await actions by fundamentally proper and responsible people. After all, it is not only individual citizens that are obliged to defend the state, and the state, in turn, cannot throw the fate of its own citizens to the whims of fate under any circumstances.

—V.I. Astashkin, Lvov.

If there are not enough funds for this sacred cause (the sacred mountain can wait), I will turn over all of my savings to the last kopeck.

—T.A. Grushko, Vakhrushevo.

I am a widow, I have two sons, but I will take everything from myself, I will give the last, if money is needed to ransom them. Just return, return our children, stop their hellish torture. Mother country, by your will are they there. Protect and help them!

—P.V. Bykova, Krasnoyarsk.

We ask you, while it is still not too late, to organize a Committee to Save Soviet Soldiers in the Captivity of the Afghan Rebels.

Without getting into the tangles of bureaucratic red tape and diplomatic convention, it is essential as a first step to propose the ransom of our prisoners from the leaders of the Afghan rebels through the International Red Cross. For the sake of all that is holy, take this step. And we, the Soviet citizens, will give as much as is needed to the ransom fund! We are sure that our state will not remain on the sidelines. The main thing is that our people and

our state today and now prove by deed that they are not indifferent to the fate of our captive soldiers. Inaction and delay are fraught with tragedy.

—The Kudryavtsevs, Moscow.

I request, no, demand that you answer: why does the Peace Fund to which we "voluntarily" and systematically deduct our daily wages exist and what is it occupied with? Let its funds go for the ransom of the unfortunate captives. Yes, ransom! There is no shame to the state in saving its citizens. If the funds of the Peace Fund are tied up for something else, then we must appeal to the Soviet people again. Forced collections are not needed—I am sure that anyone whose conscience is not moss-covered will not begrudge a work ruble for a sacred cause, whatever his attitude toward the presence of our troops in Afghanistan before. If it is difficult to resolve the issue at the level of state diplomacy, let them give freedom of action to the social organizations or the church—we will send them money to save our suffering countrymen.

Our government is doing much for peace and mutual understanding, but nothing can prove that our order is better more than a humanitarian concern for those who have come to misfortune in the performance of duty.

—M.Ye. Strunnikov, Temnikov.

We must buy our boys out. Collect money from the people, voluntarily of course. I myself can give 200-300 rubles at once, and it is no problem to collect 500 million rubles for this noble cause. We could buy out our boys with this money through the United States, since the rebels will not enter into direct contact with us.

—A.P. Zagayevskiy, Murmansk.

No one can remain aloof to the fate of our children who have fallen into captivity in Afghanistan. We must use every conceivable and inconceivable channel and include every however-famous person, write appeals to everyone who could give any assistance at all, the presidents of the United States and Pakistan, the leaders of Islam, the leaders of the PLO and China, all who are helping the dushman (after all, under the guise of humanitarian considerations) and demand of all the Amnesties and like organizations no less energy in the cause of saving the prisoners than they display with regard to our dissidents, that all personal contacts and ties and all formal and informal communication be utilized.

—Yu.V. Zilberg, Dnepropetrovsk.

Red Cross, Crescent Notes Uncertain Number of Deaths Among POWs

18010433b Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
23 Jun 88 p 6

[Article: "In the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Center"]

[Text] D. Venediktov, chairman of the Executive Committee of the USSR Societies of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, gave information on searches for Soviet MIA's in Afghanistan at a routine briefing in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Center. He said in particular:

"The International Red Cross has its representatives in Kabul, where a special hospital and some subunits and missions are located. They are also operating on the territory of Pakistan in Peshawar, maintaining business contacts with leaders of the armed opposition, and working in Afghan refugee camps.

"Eleven Soviet servicemen were freed in recent years through negotiations.

"There is a supposition that some of the more than 300 MIA's died in the course of military clashes or in captivity. Some might have died from wounds, torture and humiliation. We do not know for now the exact number of such losses.

"A number of POW's also may be in third countries. The newspapers mention the United States, Canada and Iran, for example. We have requested the national committees of these countries to provide necessary information about the fate and location of Soviet officers and men."

6904

U.S. Said to Have Delivered 30km Range Missiles to Opposition

18010433a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Jun 88 Second Edition p 3

[Article by V. Vinogradov: "Breaching Obligations: Notes on the Occasion"]

[Text] According to obligations stemming from the bilateral agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan on principles of mutual relations between them, which is part of the "Geneva package" of agreements on Afghanistan, both parties renounce intervention in each other's internal affairs. The specific interpretation of these obligations for Pakistan means that it ceases the entire spectrum of operations and actions of intervention in Afghanistan's affairs, including making its territory available for hostile operations against the other party.

Facts indicate that Pakistan continues to make its territory available for armed intervention in Afghanistan's affairs. Here are the latest two reports, one of them

published by the Pakistani newspaper MUSLIM. According to its information, mercenaries from the Sudan, Somalia, Egypt and Saudi Arabia who are part of the extremist Ittihad-i-Islami grouping relocated from this grouping's Shashu Camp in Pakistan to Afghan territory for more active involvement in combat operations against government troops. MUSLIM reports that the number of these "volunteers" already exceeds 250 and continues to grow. All of them reach Afghan soil exclusively through Pakistan.

The second report was contained in the American weekly NEWSWEEK. It follows from this report that the armed opposition acting against national reconciliation in Afghanistan received missile weaponry produced in the United States with an effective range of over 30 km. The weekly itself notes that these missiles, never before employed in Afghanistan, will significantly strengthen the opposition's combat potential. It now will be able to fire on Kabul by taking up favorable positions on hills surrounding the Afghan capital. There is no need to stress that these American weapons too can get into the hands of the armed opposition only through Pakistani territory.

These are just two examples of the Pakistani side's gross breach of the obligations it undertook and which it signed in Geneva. There are enormously more of these breaches, and this cannot help but generate an appropriate reaction from Kabul. The Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs already has been forced to present the group of UN observers in Kabul with 17 official notes about impermissible actions of the Pakistani side.

Breaches of the Geneva agreements must be halted.

6904

Western Reports on Postwithdrawal Instability Denied

Life in Jalalabad "Normal"

18010273 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian
28 Jul 88 p 3

[Article by M. Yevstafyev, APN correspondent, Jalalabad—Kabul: "Jalalabad Is Not Surrendering"]

[Text] The 2 months that have passed since Soviet forces were withdrawn from Jalalabad, a strategically important city in the east of Afghanistan, have kept both the military and the politicians in a state of tension. Radio reports in the West have been filled with declarations by leaders of the "Alliance of the Seven" that the city would inevitably fall immediately after Soviet forces were withdrawn. Precise deadlines were even set. During a trip to Nangarkhar I had occasion to see the situation in Jalalabad with my own eyes.

The first Soviet chasti left Jalalabad on 15 May, and since that day responsibility for protecting the "East" zone, which includes the provinces of Nangarkhar, Kunar, and Lagman, has fallen to chasti of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Afghanistan. I was told by Lieutenant General Mokhammad Asef Delavar, commander of the army corps stationed in Jalalabad. "I would like to emphasize that government forces control the situation in the province. In spite of rumors to the effect that the city has been cut off and the roads blocked, you have been able to see for yourself that trucks loaded with goods have been passing through Jalalabad going to and from Kabul. The road to Asadabad has also been opened. There is no question that the population has been frightened by the declarations of Gulbeddin Khakmatiyar to the effect that Jalalabad will fall in the hands of the Mujahedin ('fighters for the faith') any day. But up to now the armed opposition has not really threatened the city a single time. Jalalabad is living a normal life, the stores are open—in short, nothing has changed in these 2 months. Our government is doing everything for the speediest implementation of the Geneva Accords. But we are disturbed by the position of Pakistan, which is continuing to give aid to detachments of the armed opposition, delivering, for example, shipments of arms and ammunition to the Afghan border. One gets the impression that the Pakistani leadership is not interested in establishing peace in Afghanistan."

Colonel Khabib, chief of the political department of the corps, continued the conversation:

"All posts, garrisons, and military camps turned over to us by our Soviet friends are now occupied by various chasti of the province's armed forces," he said.

In the last 3 weeks the rebels have stepped up somewhat their shelling of certain posts. The adversary has been attempting to take security posts around Jalalabad, to come closer to the city, but he will not be successful in this.

Disagreements have intensified greatly between various groups of the armed opposition. Whereas some bands are trying to attack Jalalabad, others are opposing them.

"There are no Soviet forces in Jalalabad now. Why shell a city, peaceful inhabitants, our fellow citizens?" they ask. The contradictions are constantly growing greater because of zones of influence, and major collisions are occurring between the rebels themselves. There has been a noticeable decline in the morale and fighting spirit of the "fighters for the faith." More and more members of the armed opposition have been trying to come over to the government side. More and more frequently they are refraining from conducting military actions, taking the position that once Soviet forces left the province, there was no need to continue the bloodshed. There have been more frequent cases of refusal to carry out the orders of

commanders. The rebels are leaving the dead and wounded on the battlefield and throwing down their weapons. Nothing like that occurred earlier.

"According to our data," Col Khabib continued, "Yunus Khales, leader of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan, personally visited certain districts in Nangarkhar Province, trying somehow to smooth out the contradictions between detachment commanders, to achieve a temporary unity and to resume coordinated military action. But the trip was unsuccessful. The people of Afghanistan have given up the war which has lasted many years. It has come to feel that peace in the country is not far away. It is no wonder that Yunus Khales came up against a wall of distrust and resentment. A few months ago this would have seemed impossible. But, as we see, the attitudes of the people are changing."

I think I will not make a mistake if I say that the Afghan people are becoming more and more convinced that the policy of national reconciliation is working in its interests. In past years it has been a problem for many people to see who was the true friend and who was the enemy. There has been a great deal of grief and mutilated destinies, but now the truth is obvious.

Rebels Incapable of "Major" Victories

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[Article by Yuriy Tyssovskiy, TASS correspondent in Kabul: "Afghanistan: Hot Summer"]

[Text] We will dwell on two key provinces in the country—Nangarkhar in the east and Kandahar in the south, where developments, I am convinced, will over the next 2 or 3 months explain a great deal about how the situation will take shape throughout Afghanistan.

The provincial seat of Nangarkhar is Jalalabad—a major industrial city and the pearl of an important farming area—and it was supposed to become the first victim of the united formations of the Peshawar "Alliance of the Seven." The first thing to say is that it did not. The leaders of the opposition set many dates for the city's seizure, the last of which was 26 Saratan, which corresponds to 16 July, the very day, as irony would have it, that these lines are being written. Battles have died down in the province quite recently. The rebels have tried to take if not a provincial seat, at least a district seat, but they have managed only to take the center of Lalpur County for a few hours, but they were soon driven out.

On the whole, the "total offensive" of the bandits at the beginning of July cost them more than 200 dead (government forces lost 12), and at the same time there was no material compensation whatsoever, no propagandistic dividends at all.

In the province, according to some calculations, the 12,000 rebels united under the command of Yunus Khales, a native of these parts belonging to the Khugiani tribe, who is the leader of a fraction that split off from the IPA and is "responsible for Nangarkhar" in the "Alliance of the Seven," are opposed by 20,000 soldiers of an army corps of the regular armed forces. As demonstrated by the experience of 2 months of combat action to repel enemy hit-and-run attacks, the more flexible tactics of the opposition's formations, especially the ability to move forces rapidly from one area to another, can give them numerical superiority along certain lines, and on that basis they can win short-lived success. I think major "victories" are precluded.

The military impotence of the leaders of the "Alliance" is forcing them to seek support under the slogans of the "jihad" (the holy war against infidels) from the tribes, where—and this is extremely important—they have not been gaining the support they want. Khales personally visited several districts of Nangarkhar, trying to find broad support of the local population, but he was hardly successful anywhere, and his "ideas" were coolly received even among the elders of his native tribe, the Khugiani. The situation at present is calm in Jalalabad, there have been fewer shellings, practically no military actions are being carried out except individual operations to eliminate the bases and caches of the bands.

What we have said does not mean, of course, that everything is fine in Nangarkhar, the situation there remains both problematical and contradictory. But ultimately the example of Jalalabad on the one hand not only undermines the morale of the members of the bands, who have believed the emissaries of their leaders, but it also disappoints opponents of the Kabul regime as a whole, sows among them seeds of distrust of the ability of the Peshawarites to raise up the masses into a "nationwide war against the Communists." On the other hand, according to the reports coming in, everywhere in government agencies and chasti of the armed forces of the regular army the events in Nangarkhar are instilling greater confidence that the revolution is defending its gains.

And another very important point. The success achieved in Nangarkhar is largely explained by the fact that the five "fingers" of popular power in the province—the governor, the corps commander, the chiefs of contingents of the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the party government make up a single fist. The present governor of the province, Vakil Mukhammed Azam Shinvari, who comes from the Shinvari tribe, which is influential there, is not, incidentally, a member of the party. What is more, himself a representative of the moderate opposition, he has been able to win a reputation as an able organizer who has a keen feeling for the situation in his own "domain," and has been able to instill in people hope for and belief in a political solution of the conflict not only in the province, but also in Afghanistan as a whole.

It also has to be seen as an encouraging element of the situation in Nangarkhar that there has been infighting in the camp of the oppositionists, engendering distrust in their own forces, and this in general is manifested in the attempts to take for themselves "zones of influence" in the districts through physical annihilation of opponents in the formations of the other "parties." Military conflicts between them, first, sometimes cause damage and losses even greater than the fighting against the government forces (there was the case when 70 bitter enemies were killed in a week), and second, this situation is similar to that in a majority of other provinces.

"After the Soviet forces left Jalalabad and Nangarkhar Province and the attempts to take that city failed completely," said the governor general of Kandahar Province, Nur-ul-Khak Ylyumi, "the leaders of the armed opposition decided to shift the emphasis in their sorties from the east to the south of the country and to take our province. They carried out the first attempt of this kind in the border district Spinbuldak, concentrating major forces there, transferring to the district seat more than 3,000 'Mujahedin,' equipped with Western weapons, including heavy weapons. The Pakistani authorities, in flagrant violation of the Geneva Accords, furnished the extremists direct fire support in their combat actions by shelling our positions with long-range artillery from the point Chaman and their own territory. It is sufficient to say that as many as 1,500 shells fell on Spinbuldak in 1 day, and the victims were mainly the peaceful inhabitants. What is more, the rebels have been vigorously supported by armed Pakistani tribal formations—the 'malishi.' Even in this regard we possess quite reliable facts. In spite of the large losses incurred, the attackers were still unable to take Spinbuldak. Even the foreign advisers did not help. The extremists undertook to use chemical mines in areas along the border. But unsuccessfully. And as far as Kandahar is concerned, they had promised to take it in a day. As you see," the general smiled, "these attempts have also ended in complete failure."

N. Ylyumi spoke calmly, competently, only from time to time checking the figures of intelligence summaries and reports on the progress of battle.

"The vain attempts to take Kandahar, Spinbuldak, Argandab, and Meyvand at any price have caused major losses without compensation for the formations of the opposition," he said. "And this is having a demoralizing effect to a very high degree on the spirit of the members of the extremist groupings and is convincing many ordinary people, who previously often blindly believed in the rebels, that in practice they are not capable of anything except senseless terror. People are tired of the unending warfare. They want to work in peace, they want to cultivate the extremely fertile land in Kandahar. Representatives of the tribes and districts have been sending their 'messengers' to leaders of the opposition in Pakistani cities with the demand that they cease the fratricidal bloodshed. People are refusing to listen to the

orders of the bands that they leave their homes because the extremists intend to step up military actions in that particular area. This applies even to Kandahar. In our activity we are now putting the main emphasis on working with the people, on an honest and frank dialogue in which we clarify the policy of ethnic reconciliation and its authentic goals as the only way to put an end to the protracted war. And people believe us."

The general said that an acute conflict on a tribal basis has been observed in the ranks of the opposition. The most important Kandahar tribes, the Duranis and the Ghilzais, have been refusing to follow the instructions of the "foreigners" like Khekmatiyar, the leader of the "Islamic Party of Afghanistan," with extremist views, and certain other leaders of the "Alliance of the Seven." The rebels have also been having a problem in the religious area. After the Soviet forces stopped carrying out active military operations, the term "jihad" (holy war against the "infidels") ceased to have meaning for many members of the band-formations, and came down to murder of fellow tribesmen and persons of the same faith, which compels them to be suspicious of the appeals of the "militants" that they continue the fighting until ultimate victory over the "Reds from Kabul." And to seek a political compromise as the main approach to resolving the conflict.

"Of course, following the departure of your armed forces," N. Ylyumi remarked, "certain problems will arise, but we have sufficient forces to resist the encroachments on the revolution, as has already been evident in extensive areas which have been left by the Soviet Armed Forces. As for Kandahar, the emphasis is now being put on bringing our contingents up to strength and reinforcing their materiel and equipment. Every day we are becoming stronger and stronger."

During the conversation there was constant firing of rocket shells around the governor general's residence. One of them exploded some 150 meters from the building, immediately behind the clay duval, and did not harm anyone. The second fell 40 meters from the UAZ that was waiting for me, but did not explode.

The country is literally strewn with the most widely varying types of weapons from every possible place—Western, Arab, Pakistani, and other makes as well. It seems to have been this that brought the government to announce a collection of all types of arms, including the arms of the rebels. In Kandahar, for example, in just the last 2 weeks they have acquired three notorious "Stingers" (an English word), each of them costing 5-6 million afghans.

As is well-known, when they receive weapons from their leaders, the rebels also learn about the unit prices paid for damage inflicted on the government: for bringing

down an airplane or helicopter, for example, the lucky "hunter" receives 1 million afghans. By turning in to the legal authorities a "Stinger" sent by the Reagan administration, its possessor immediately receives five or six times as much....

This is a strange war, you say, these are some of the traits that make it colorful. It is also interesting that according to certain data the most enterprising enemies are "reexporting" Pentagon gifts to Iranian dealers in the eastern provinces of the country and getting 15 million afghans or more. So that the American pilots over the waters of the Persian Gulf are not very grateful to the White House for its generous lethal aid to the Afghan "fighters for Islam," when they become the victims of the "stinging" missile bearing the words "Made in the U.S.A."

What can be said about the province's prospects for the future? The "Alliance of the Seven" badly needs an area in Afghanistan where it might locate its recently proclaimed "transitional government" headed by Akhmad Shakh, an "engineer" with pro-American and pro-Saudi leanings. Which is why they will not give up trying to take Kandahar.

According to the reports coming in, the leaders of the "Alliance" Gulbeddin Khekmatiyar, Burkhanuddin Rabbani, Abdul Rasuf Sayyaf, and the already familiar Khales have informed Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq that they have worked out a strategic plan for cutting off and capturing Kandahar after soldiers of the Soviet Army leave its vicinity. The plan is aimed at a subsequent encirclement of Kandahar, cutting it off from communications with Kabul and taking the city in order to create the conditions for members of the "transitional government" to go there. And all of this, it is pointed out, has been taken under consideration and approved by Zia-ul-Haq!

A hot summer has fallen to Afghanistan's lot this year. In Kabul the temperature has constantly edged up to 40 degrees Celsius, in Kandahar it has been above 50 degrees, and in Jalalabad it has been close to 60 degrees in the shade.

I do not like to resort to a worn-out analogy, but you cannot get away from the facts—the end of the summer will be still hotter both in the weather and in the military-political situation. Especially, it would seem, in the country's southernmost province.

I do not want to play the prophet, to make predictions in Afghanistan is just like gambling in the soccer "Sportloto"—you may hit it, but only by pure chance, since in both cases there are too many factors for anyone to be able to take into account. And still I will take the risk once again of saying that the events of the next 2 or 3 months will sort everything out.

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